Freedom of Speech & Expression

Freedom of speech is the right to engage in expression without censorship or interference from the government or its agencies. This includes, but is not limited to, what people say, write, read, sing, paint, perform, draw, and even wear. While not unlimited, this right is broader in the United States than in any other country.

Opinions & Commentaries

Overruled

This case comes here with a certificate by the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana that they were divided in opinion upon a question which occurred at the hearing. It presents for our consideration an indictment containing sixteen counts, divided into two series of eight counts each, based upon sect. 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. That section is as follows:—"That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court, — the fine not to exceed $5,000, and the imprisonment not to exceed ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the constitution or laws of the United States." 16 Stat. 141.

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The power vested in Congress "to establish post-offices and post-roads" has been practically construed, since the foundation of the government, to authorize not merely the designation of the routes over which the mail shall be carried, and the offices where letters and other documents shall be received to be distributed or forwarded, but the carriage of the mail, and all measures necessary to secure its safe and speedy transit, and the prompt delivery of its contents. The validity of legislation prescribing what should be carried, and its weight and form, and the charges to which it should be subjected, has never been questioned. What should be mailable has varied at different times, changing with the facility of transportation over the post-roads. At one time, only letters, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, not exceeding eight ounces in weight, were carried; afterwards books were added to the list; and now small packages of merchandise, not exceeding a prescribed weight, as well as books and printed matter of all kinds, are transported in the mail. The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded. The difficulty attending the subject arises, not from the want of power in Congress to prescribe regulations as to what shall constitute mail matter, but from the necessity of enforcing them consistently with rights reserved to the people, of far greater importance than the transportation of the mail. In their enforcement, *733 a distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter, — between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined. Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.

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In the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error many presumed errors are elaborately discussed, all of which when analyzed rest on the assumption that there was a right in the plaintiff in error to use the common of the city of Boston free from legislative or municipal control or regulation. It is argued that —"Boston Common is the property of the inhabitants of the city of Boston, and dedicated to the use of the people of that city and the public in many ways, and the preaching of the gospel there has been, from time immemorial to a recent period, one of these ways. For the making of this ordinance in 1862 and its enforcement against preaching since 1885, no reason whatever has been or can be shown."The record, however, contains no evidence showing the manner in which the ordinance in question had been previously enforced, nor does it include any proof whatever as to the nature of the ownership in the common from which it can be deduced that the plaintiff in error had any particular right to use the common apart from the general enjoyment which he was entitled, as a citizen, to avail of along with others and to the extent only which the law permitted. On the contrary, the legislative act and the ordinance passed in pursuance thereof, previously set out in the statement of facts, show an assumption by the State of control over the common in question. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the conviction, placed its conclusion upon the express ground that the common was absolutely under the control of the legislature, which, in the exercise of its *47 discretion, could limit the use to the extent deemed by it advisable, and could and did delegate to the municipality the power to assert such authority. The court said:"There is no evidence before us to show that the power of the legislature over the common is less than its power over any other park dedicated to the use of the public or over public streets the legal title to which is in a city or town. Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 578, 580. As representative of the public it may and does exercise control over the use which the public may make of such places, and it may and does delegate more or less of such control to the city or town immediately concerned. For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right interferes the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting the public use to certain purposes. See Dillon Mun. Corp. secs. 393, 407, 651, 656, 666; Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243, 244.

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This appeal was taken directly to this court on the ground that the case involved the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States, and that the constitutionality of a law of the United States was drawn in question; and although it may be, as argued by the Government, that the principles which must control our decision have been practically settled, we think, the whole record considered, that we are not constrained to dismiss the appeal for that reason.

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Nicholas Halter was charged with violating Nebraska's Act to Prevent and Punish the Desecration of the Flag of the United States after using a picture of an American flag to advertise his beer. He pleaded not guilty, claiming the statute was null and void under the Fourteenth Amendment for depriving them of the right to exercise an implied constitutional right. The Supreme Court held that no such privilege to use the American flag in an advertisement existed, and upheld Halter's conviction.

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The publisher of certain articles and a cartoon, which were intended to embarrass the Supreme Court of Colorado and reflected upon the motives and conduct of the Supreme Court of Colorado in cases still pending, was found guilty of contempt and fined by the Supreme Court of Colorado. The publisher argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated and that his conviction should be reversed. — In this his first free-speech opinion while sitting on the High Court, Holmes declined to hold that the First Amendment applied to the states. He declared: "We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the 14th Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the 1st. But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were protected from abridgments on the part not only of the United States but also of the states, still we should be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have us reach. In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. Com. v. Blanding, [cites]; Respublica v. Oswald, [cites]. The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false. This was the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not in all." — The senior Justice Harlan rejected Holmes' view. Declared Harlan: "I go further and hold that the privileges of free speech and of a free press, belonging to every citizen of the United States, constitute essential parts of every man's liberty, and are protected against violation by that clause of the 14th Amendment forbidding a state to deprive any person of his liberty without due process of law. It is, I think, impossible to conceive of liberty, as secured by the Constitution against hostile action, whether by the nation or by the states, which does not embrace the right to enjoy free speech and the right to have a free press."

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The Post Office Appropriation Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 553, 554, c. 389, in § 2, contains the following:"SEC. 2. . . . That it shall be the duty of the editor, publisher, business manager, or owner of every newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication to file with the Postmaster General and the postmaster at the office at which said publication is entered, not later than the first day of April and the first day of October of each year, on blanks furnished by the Post Office Department, a sworn statement setting forth the names and post-office addresses of the editor and managing editor, publisher, business managers, and owners, and, in addition, the stockholders, if the publication be owned by a corporation; and also the names of known bondholders, mortgagees, or other security holders; and also, in the case of daily newspapers, there shall be included in such statement the average of the number of copies of each issue of such publication sold or distributed to paid subscribers during the preceding six months: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to religious, fraternal, temperance, and scientific, or other similar publications: Provided further, That it shall not be necessary to include in such statement the names of persons owning less than one per centum of the total amount of stock, bonds, mortgages, or other securities. A copy of such sworn statement shall be published in the second issue of such newspaper, magazine, or other publication printed *297 next after the filing of such statement. Any such publication shall be denied the privileges of the mail if it shall fail to comply with the provisions of this paragraph within ten days after notice by registered letter of such failure.

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Overruled

Complainant directs its argument to three propositions: (1) The statute in controversy imposes an unlawful burden on interstate commerce; (2) it violates the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by § 11, art. 1, of the constitution of the State of Ohio;[1] and (3) it attempts to delegate legislative power to censors and to other boards to determine whether the statute offends in the particulars designated.

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236 U.S. 273 35 S.Ct. 383 59 L.Ed. 573 JAY FOX, Plff. in Err.,v.STATE OF WASHINGTON. No. 134. Submitted January 19, 1915. Decided February 23, 1915. Mr. Gilbert E. Roe for plaintiff in error. [Argument of Counsel from page 274 intentionally omitted] Mr. W. V. Tanner, Attorney General of Washington, and Mr. Fred G. Remann,… Read more

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The Espionage Act (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219) provides that: "Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States . . . shall be punished." Sugarman was charged with having violated this section on July 24, 1917, by words spoken in an address made at a Socialist meeting which was attended by many registrants under the Selective Service Act, sustained in Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366. He was tried in the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, found guilty by the jury, and sentenced. See 245 Fed. Rep. 604. Thirty-one exceptions were taken to rulings of the trial judge. Instead of seeking review by the Circuit Court of Appeals under § 128 of the Judicial Code, the case is brought here under § 238.

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Socialist Charles Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing leaflets which called the draft involuntary servitude and called for a boycott of the draft. The act made it a crime to “attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall wilfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States[.]”

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The defendant circulated a newspaper that criticized the United States’ involvement in World War I. He was charged under the Espionage Act of 1917 which granted the government wide latitude in punishing expression that could disrupt the United States’ war efforts. Affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Supreme Court stated, “a person may be convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion.”

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Eugene Debs, a candidate for president, expressed anti-draft and anti-war sentiments at a rally, illustrated by his statement to the crowd, “[Y]ou need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.” The Supreme Court, finding “the defendant caused and incited and attempted to cause and incite insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States and with intent so to do delivered, to an assembly of people, a public speech,” held that Debs’ speech violated the Espionage Act.

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Russian immigrants protesting recent U.S. military action in Russia were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window that called for a strike at U.S. ammunitions plants. Congress had declared in the Espionage Act that such propaganda would harm the war effort, and the Supreme Court had previously upheld the Espionage Act as constitutional in Schenck v. United States (1919).

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Indictment in nine counts under the Espionage Act. Preliminary to indicating the special offenses we may say that the indictment charges that at the dates mentioned therein the Philadelphia Tageblatt and the Philadelphia Sonntagsblatt were newspapers printed and published in the German language in Philadelphia by the Philadelphia Tageblatt Association, a Pennsylvania corporation of which defendants were officers; Peter Schaefer being president, Vogel treasurer, Werner chief editor, Darkow managing editor, and Lemke business manager.

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Plaintiffs in error were jointly indicted October 2, 1917, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, upon six counts, of which the 4th and 5th were struck out by agreement at the trial and the 1st is now abandoned by the Government.

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A Minnesota statute made it unlawful "to interfere with or discourage the enlistment of men in the military or naval forces of the United States or of the State of Minnesota." The indictment charged that Gilbert, at a time and place designated in the state and with the United States being at war with the kingdom and imperial government of Germany, spoke out publicly against the draft and the nation's involvement in World War I.

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Benjamin Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto” that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York’s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. Gitlow challenged his conviction, arguing that the First Amendment restrains the states as well as the federal government and that the criminal anarchy law violated the First Amendment.

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Overruled

By a criminal information filed in the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, the plaintiff in error was charged, in five counts, with violations of the Criminal Syndicalism Act of that State. Statutes, 1919, c. 188, p. 281. She was tried, convicted on the first count, and sentenced to imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. 57 Cal. App. 449. Her petition to have the case heard by the Supreme Court[1] was denied. Ib. 453. And the case was brought here on a writ of error which was allowed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had. Jud. Code, § 237.

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The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District Court of Rice County, Kansas, upon an information charging him with violating the Criminal Syndicalism Act of that State. Laws, Spec. Sess. 1920, c. 37. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the *382 State, 117 Kan. 69; and this writ of error was allowed by the Chief Justice of that court.

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The relator, Bryant, who was held in custody to answer a charge of violating a statute of New York, brought a proceeding in habeas corpus in a court of that state to obtain his discharge on the ground that the warrant under which he was arrested and detained was issued without any jurisdiction, in that the statute which he was charged with violating was unconstitutional. The statuted provided that "Every existing membership corporation, and every existing unincorporated association having a membership of twenty or more persons, which corporation or association requires an oath as a prerequisite or condition of membership, other than a labor union or a benevolent order mentioned in the benevolent orders law, within thirty days after this article takes effect, and every such corporation or association hereafter organized, within ten days after the adoption thereof, shall file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of its constitution, bylaws, rules, regulations and oath of membership, together with a roster of its membership and a list of its officers for the current year. . . ., and that "Any person who becomes a member of any such corporation or association, or remains a member thereof, or attends a meeting thereof, with knowledge that such corporation or association has failed to comply with any provision of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

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Overruled

Respondent filed a petition for naturalization in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The court found her unable, without mental reservation, to take the prescribed oath of allegiance and not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and not well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; and it denied her application. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree and directed the District Court to grant respondent's petition. 27 F. (2d) 742.

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Yetta Stromberg was convicted of a California statute that criminalized displaying a red flag in any public place “as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.” The statute made the crime a felony. The trial court held that Stromberg should be convicted if Stromberg displayed the flag for any of the reasons specified in the statute. The California District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Stromberg challenged the statute on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.

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A Minnesota statute passed in 1925 provided for the "abatement" of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical." Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 701-02 (1931). J.M. Near published a newspaper called The Saturday Press, which contained articles complaining of the mayor, district attorney, and chief of police, among others, and alleging a Jewish gambling conspiracy. As a result, the county attorney filed an action against the paper to prevent it from publishing any more issues. Near argued that the law violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.

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Appellant, Dirk De Jonge, was indicted in Multnomah County, Oregon, for violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Law of that State.[1] The Act, which we set forth in *357 the margin, defines "criminal syndicalism" as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution." With this preliminary definition the Act proceeds to describe a number of offenses, embracing the teaching of criminal syndicalism, the printing or distribution of books, pamphlets, etc., advocating that doctrine, the organization of a society or assemblage which advocates it, and presiding at or assisting in conducting a meeting of such an organization, society or group. The prohibited acts are made felonies, punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both.

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The appellant claims his conviction in a state court deprived him of his liberty contrary to the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. He assigns as error the action of the Supreme Court of Georgia in overruling his claim and refusing him a discharge upon habeas corpus. The petition for the writ, presented to the Superior Court of Fulton County, asserted the appellant was unlawfully detained by the appellee as sheriff under the supposed authority of a judgment pronouncing him guilty of attempting to incite insurrection, as defined in § 56 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to imprisonment *244 for not less than eighteen nor more than twenty years. Attached were copies of the judgment and the indictment and a statement of the evidence upon which the verdict and judgment were founded. The petition alleged the judgment and sentence were void and appellant's detention illegal because the statute under which he was convicted denies and illegally restrains his freedom of speech and of assembly and is too vague and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt, and further alleged that there had been no adjudication by any court of the constitutional validity of the statute as applied to appellant's conduct. A writ issued. The appellee answered, demurred specially to, and moved to strike, so much of the petition as incorporated the evidence taken at the trial. At the hearing the statement of the evidence was identified and was conceded by the appellee to be full and accurate. The court denied the motion to strike, overruled the special demurrer and an objection to the admission of the trial record, decided that the statute, as construed and applied in the trial of the appellant, did not infringe his liberty of speech and of assembly but ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because too vague and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt, and ordered the prisoner's discharge from custody. The appellee took the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, assigning as error the ruling upon his demurrer, motion, and objection, and the decision against the validity of the statute. The appellant, in accordance with the state practice, also appealed, assigning as error the decision with respect to his right of free speech and of assembly. The two appeals were separately docketed but considered in a single opinion which reversed the judgment on the appellee's appeal and affirmed on that of the appellant,[1] concluding: "Under *245 the pleadings and the evidence, which embraced the record on the trial that resulted in the conviction, the court erred, in the habeas corpus proceeding, in refusing to remand the prisoner to the custody of the officers."

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Appellant, Alma Lovell, was convicted in the Recorder's Court of the City of Griffin, Georgia, of the violation of a city ordinance and was sentenced to imprisonment for fifty days in default of the payment of a fine of fifty dollars. The violation, which is not denied, consisted of the distribution without the required permission of a pamphlet and magazine in the nature of religious tracts, setting forth the gospel of the "Kingdom of Jehovah." Appellant did not apply for a permit, as she regarded herself as sent "by Jehovah to do His work," and that such an application would have been "an act of disobedience to His commandment."

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The Committee for Industrial Organization gathered in New Jersey to initiate a recruitment drive. Police shut down the meeting based on a city ordinance that forbade labor meetings in public. The CIO filed suit against several city officials, challenging the ordinance on First Amendment grounds.

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Four cases are here, each of which presents the question whether regulations embodied in a municipal ordinance *154 abridge the freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.[1]

No. 13.

The Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles, 1936, provides:"Sec. 28.00. `Hand-Bill' shall mean any hand-bill, dodger, commercial advertising circular, folder, booklet, letter, card, pamphlet, sheet, poster, sticker, banner, notice or other written, printed or painted matter calculated to attract attention of the public.""Sec. 28.01. No person shall distribute any hand-bill to or among pedestrians along or upon any street, sidewalk or park, or to passengers on any street car, or throw, place or attach any hand-bill in, to, or upon any automobile or other vehicle."The appellant was charged in the Municipal Court with a violation of § 28.01. Upon his trial it was proved that he distributed handbills to pedestrians on a public sidewalk and had more than three hundred in his possession for that purpose. Judgment of conviction was entered and sentence imposed. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County affirmed the judgment.[2] That court being the highest court in the State authorized to pass upon such a case, an appeal to this court was allowed.

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Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell — who identified as Jehovah's Witnesses and claimed to be ordained ministers — were arrested in New Haven, Connecticut after distributing religious literature for inciting a breach of the peace and violating a local ordinance requiring solicitors to obtain a permit.

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Overruled

Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged ten, were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise. The local Board of Education required both teachers and pupils to participate in this ceremony. The Gobitis family are affiliated with "Jehovah's Witnesses," for whom the Bible as the Word of God is the supreme authority. The children had been brought up conscientiously to believe that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of Scripture. The Gobitis children were of an age for which Pennsylvania makes school attendance compulsory. Thus, they were denied a free education, and their parents had to put them into private schools. To be relieved of the financial burden thereby entailed, their father, on behalf of the children and in his own behalf, brought this suit.

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Appellants are five "Jehovah's Witnesses" who, with sixty-three others of the same persuasion, were convicted in the municipal court of Manchester, New Hampshire, for violation of a state statute prohibiting a "parade or *571 procession" upon a public street without a special license.

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These two cases, while growing out of different circumstances and concerning different parties, both relate to the scope of our national constitutional policy safeguarding free speech and a free press. All of the petitioners were adjudged guilty and fined for contempt of court by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Their conviction rested upon comments pertaining to pending litigation which were published in newspapers. In the Superior Court, and later in the California Supreme Court, petitioners challenged the state's action as an abridgment, prohibited by the Federal Constitution, of freedom of *259 speech and of the press; but the Superior Court overruled this contention, and the Supreme Court affirmed.[1] The importance of the constitutional question prompted us to grant certiorari. 309 U.S. 649; 310 U.S. 623.

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Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, stood on a street corner in Rochester, NH distributing materials and denouncing all religions as a “racket.” After people complained to the city marshal about Chaplinsky’s actions, the officer informed the crowd that he was allowed to be on the corner. As the crowd grew more restless, the marshal warned Chaplinsky of a riot, to which he replied “You are a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.” Chaplinsky was arrested and convicted under a state statute, making it unlawful to “address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.”

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Overruled

The respondent, a citizen of Florida, owns a former United States Navy submarine which he exhibits for profit. *53 In 1940 he brought it to New York City and moored it at a State pier in the East River. He prepared and printed a handbill advertising the boat and soliciting visitors for a stated admission fee. On his attempting to distribute the bill in the city streets, he was advised by the petitioner, as Police Commissioner, that this activity would violate § 318 of the Sanitary Code, which forbids distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter,[1] but was told that he might freely distribute handbills solely devoted to "information or a public protest."

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Overruled

By writ of certiorari in Nos. 280 and 314 and by appeal in No. 966 we have before us the question of the constitutionality *586 of various city ordinances imposing the license taxes upon the sale of printed matter for nonpayment of which the appellant, Jobin, and the petitioners, Jones, Bowden and Sanders, all members of the organization known as Jehovah's Witnesses, were convicted.

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The appellant, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, was charged with distributing handbills on the streets of Dallas, Texas, in violation of an ordinance of that city which prohibits their distribution. She was convicted in the Corporation Court of Dallas, and appealed to the *414 County Criminal Court where, after a trial de novo, she was again convicted and a fine of $5.00 and costs was imposed. Under Texas law she could appeal to no higher state court,[1] and since she properly raised federal questions of substance in both courts, the case is rightfully here on appeal under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code. King Manufacturing Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100. The appellee has asked us to reconsider the doctrine of the King Manufacturing Co. case under which this Court takes jurisdiction on appeal from judgments sustaining the validity of municipal ordinances. We see no reason for reconsidering the King Manufacturing Co. case and follow it here.

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The City of Jeannette, Pennsylvania, has an ordinance, some forty years old, which provides in part:

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Petitioners brought this suit in the United States District Court for Western Pennsylvania to restrain threatened criminal prosecution of them in the state courts by respondents, the City of Jeannette (a Pennsylvania municipal corporation) and its Mayor, for violation of a city ordinance which prohibits the solicitation of orders for merchandise without first procuring a license from the city authorities and paying a license tax. The ordinance as applied is held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech, press and religion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 105. The questions decisive of the present case are whether the district court has statutory jurisdiction as a federal court to entertain the suit, and whether petitioners have by their pleadings and proof established a cause of action in equity.

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319 U.S. 103 63 S.Ct. 890 87 L.Ed. 1290 Roscoe JONES, Petitioner,v.CITY OF OPELIKA. Lois BOWDEN and Zada Sanders, Petitioners, v. CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS. Charles JOBIN, Appellant, v. The STATE OF ARIZONA. Nos. 280, 314, 966. Reargued March 10, 11, 1943. Decided May 3, 1943. Robert MURDOCK, Jr., Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA… Read more

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For centuries it has been a common practice in this and other countries for persons not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on doors or ring doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants or to invite them to political, religious, or other kinds of public meetings. Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not upon the determination of the community. In the instant case, the City of Struthers, Ohio, has attempted to make this decision for all its inhabitants. The question to be decided is whether the City, consistently with the federal Constitution's *142 guarantee of free speech and press, possesses this power.[1]The appellant, espousing a religious cause in which she was interested — that of the Jehovah's Witnesses — went to the homes of strangers, knocking on doors and ringing doorbells in order to distribute to the inmates of the homes leaflets advertising a religious meeting. In doing so, she proceeded in a conventional and orderly fashion. For delivering a leaflet to the inmate of a home, she was convicted in the Mayor's Court and was fined $10.00 on a charge of violating the following City ordinance:"It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other advertisements they or any person with them may be distributing."The appellant admitted knocking at the door for the purpose of delivering the invitation, but seasonably urged in the lower Ohio state court that the ordinance as construed and applied was beyond the power of the State because in violation of the right of freedom of press and religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.[2]*143 The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.[3] This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, and necessarily protects the right to receive it. The privilege may not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a community of cleaning litter from its streets. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162. Yet the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304. No one supposes, for example, that a city need permit a man with a communicable disease to distribute leaflets on the street or to homes, or that the First Amendment prohibits a state from preventing the distribution of leaflets in a church against the will of the church authorities.

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In view of our dependence upon regulated private enterprise in discharging the far-reaching role which radio plays in our society, a somewhat detailed exposition of the history of the present controversy and the issues which it raises is appropriate.

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March 20, 1942, the State of Mississippi enacted a statute[1] the title of which declares that it is intended to *584 secure the peace and safety of the United States and of the State of Mississippi during war and to prohibit acts detrimental to public peace and safety. The first section, with which alone we are here concerned, provides:"That any person who individually, or as a member of any organization, association, or otherwise, shall intentionally preach, teach, or disseminate any teachings, creed, theory, or set of alleged principles, orally, or by means of a phonograph or other contrivance of any kind or nature, or by any other means or method, or by the distribution of any sort of literature, or written or printed matter, designed and calculated to encourage violence, sabotage, or disloyalty to the government of the United States, or the state of Mississippi, or who by action or speech, advocates the cause of the enemies of the United States or who gives information as to the military operations, or plans of defense or military secrets of the nation or this state, by speech, letter, map or picture which would incite any sort of racial distrust, disorder, prejudices or hatreds, or which reasonably tends to create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor or respect the flag or government of the United States, or of the state of Mississippi, shall be guilty of a felony and punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary until treaty of peace be declared by the United States but such imprisonment shall not exceed ten years."At the June 1942 term of the Madison County Circuit Court, Taylor, the appellant in No. 826, was indicted for orally disseminating teachings designed and calculated to encourage disloyalty to the government of the United States and that of the State of Mississippi; and for orally disseminating teachings and distributing literature and printed matter reasonably tending to create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor, and respect the flag and government of the United States and of the State of *585 Mississippi, and designed and calculated to encourage disloyalty to the government of the United States.

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The West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that saluting the flag become “a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools,” and that all teachers and pupils “shall be required to participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag.” It also provided that “refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly.” Failure to conform was “insubordination,” dealt with by expulsion, and readmission was denied by statute until compliance. Meanwhile, the expelled child was “unlawfully absent,” and could be proceeded against as a delinquent. Parents or guardians were liable to prosecution, and, if convicted, were subject to fine not exceeding $50 and jail term not exceeding thirty days. The appellees, who identified as Jehovah’s Witnesses, brought suit in the United States District Court for an injunction to restrain enforcement of these laws and regulations. Jehovah’s Witnesses consider that the flag is a “graven image” within the meaning of the Biblical Second Commandment, and for that reason, they refuse to salute it.

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We brought this case here on certiorari, 314 U.S. 597, because of its importance and its possible relation to freedom of thought. The question is whether the naturalization of petitioner, an admitted member of the Communist Party of the United States, was properly set aside by the courts below some twelve years after it was granted. We agree with our brethren of the minority that our relations with Russia, as well as our views regarding its government and the merits of Communism are immaterial to a decision of this case. Our concern is with what Congress *120 meant by certain statutes and whether the Government has proved its case under them.

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Appellant was convicted of violating an ordinance of the town of McCormick, South Carolina which provided: ". . . the following license on business, occupation and professions to be paid by the person or persons carrying on or engaged in such business, occupation or professions within the corporate limits of the Town of McCormick, South Carolina: Agents selling books, per day $1.00, per year $15.00." Appellant is a Jehovah's Witness and has been certified by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society as "an ordained minister of Jehovah God to preach the gospel of God's kingdom under Christ Jesus." He is a resident of McCormick, South Carolina, where he went from house to house distributing certain books. He obtained his living from the money received; he had no other source of income. He claimed that he merely offered the books for a "contribution." But there was evidence that he "offered to and did sell the books." Admittedly he had no license from the town and refused to obtain one. He moved for a directed verdict of not guilty at the close of the evidence, claiming that the ordinance restricted freedom of worship in violation of the First Amendment which the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States. The motion was overruled and appellant was found guilty by the jury in the Mayor's Court. That judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of General Sessions for McCormick County and then by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The case is here on appeal. Judicial Code, § 237 (a), 28 U.S.C. § 344 (a).

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In this case we are asked to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town's management. The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that it has all the characteristics of any other American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a "business block" on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. Merchants and service establishments have rented the stores and business places on the business block and *503 the United States uses one of the places as a post office from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area. The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which can not be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and according to all indications the residents use the business block as their regular shopping center. To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a company-owned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to enter and leave the stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the business block lead into a four-lane public highway which runs parallel to the business block at a distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the business block and upon arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities available there. In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.

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Respondent publishes a daily newspaper at White Plains, New York. During the period relevant here, its daily circulation ranged from 9,000 to 11,000 copies. It had no desire for and made no effort to secure out-of-state circulation. Practically all of its circulation was local. But about one-half of 1 per cent was regularly out-of-state.[1] Petitioners are some of respondent's employees. They brought this suit in the New York courts to recover overtime compensation, liquidated damages and counsel fees pursuant to § 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). The supreme court gave judgment for the petitioners. 179 Misc. 832, 38 N.Y.S.2d 231; 180 Misc. 8, 41 N.Y.S.2d 534. The appellate division reversed and ordered the complaint to be dismissed. 267 App. Div. 284, 45 N.Y.S.2d 479. That judgment was affirmed by the court of *181 appeals without opinion. 293 N.Y. 781, 58 N.E.2d 520; 294 N.Y. 701, 60 N.E.2d 848. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the probable conflict between the decision below and those from the federal courts.[2]

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These cases bring for decision important questions concerning the Administrator's right to judicial enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum issued by him in the course of investigations conducted pursuant to § 11 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52 Stat. 1060. His claim is founded directly upon § 9, which incorporates the enforcement provisions of §§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717.[1] The subpoenas sought the production of specified records to determine whether petitioners were violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, including records relating to coverage. Petitioners, newspaper publishing corporations, maintain that the Act is not applicable to them, for constitutional and other reasons, and insist that the question of coverage must be adjudicated before the subpoenas may be enforced.

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In 1943 petitioner, a native of Canada, filed his petition for naturalization in the District Court of Massachusetts. He stated in his application that he understood the principles *62 of the government of the United States, believed in its form of government, and was willing to take the oath of allegiance (54 Stat. 1157, 8 U.S.C. § 735 (b)) which reads as follows:

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The Hatch Act,[*] enacted in 1940, declares unlawful certain specified political activities of federal employees.[1] Section 9 forbids officers and employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government, with exceptions, from taking "any active part in political management or in political campaigns."[2] Section 15 declares that the activities *79 theretofore determined by the United States Civil Service Commission to be prohibited to employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the Civil Service Rules shall be deemed to be prohibited to federal employees covered by the Hatch Act.[3] These sections of the Act cover all federal officers and employees whether in the classified civil service or not and a penalty of dismissal from employment is imposed for violation. There is no designation of a single governmental agency for its enforcement.

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The District Court dismissed a criminal information filed against the respondent, James C. Petrillo, on the ground that the statute on which the information was founded was unconstitutional. 68 F. Supp. 845. The case is here on direct appeal by the Government as authorized by the Criminal Appeals Act. 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1946) § 682. The information charged a violation of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102, as amended by an Act of April 16, 1946. 60 Stat. 89. The specific provisions of the Amendment charged to have been violated read:

"SEC. 506. (a) It shall be unlawful, by the use or express or implied threat of the use of force, violence, intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or implied threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to coerce, compel, or constrain a licensee —
"(1) to employ or agree to employ, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services; or
.....
"(d) Whoever willfully violates any provision of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall, upon conviction *4 thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both." 60 Stat. 89.
The information alleged that a radio broadcasting company, holding a federal license, had, for several years immediately preceding, employed "certain persons who were sufficient and adequate in number to perform all of the actual services needed .. . in connection with the conduct of its broadcasting business." The information further charged that the respondent, Petrillo, "wilfully, by the use of force, intimidation, duress and by the use of other means, did attempt to coerce, compel and constrain said licensee to employ and agree to employ, in connection with the conduct of its radio broadcasting business, three additional persons not needed by said licensee to perform actual services .. . ."The coercion was allegedly accomplished in the following manner:
"(1) By directing and causing three musicians, members of the Chicago Federation of Musicians, theretofore employed by the said licensee in connection with the conduct of its broadcasting business, to discontinue their employment with said licensee;
"(2) By directing and causing said three employees and other persons, members of the Chicago Federation of Musicians, not to accept employment by said licensee; and,
"(3) By placing and causing to be placed a person as a picket in front of the place of business of said licensee."
The only challenge to the information was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Act on which the information was based (a) abridges freedom of speech in contravention of the First Amendment; (b) is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment because it defines a crime in *5 terms that are excessively vague, and denies equal protection of the law and liberty of contract; (c) imposes involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.[1] The District Court dismissed the information, holding that the 1946 Amendment on which it was based violates the First, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendments.

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This case presents questions as to the validity of an order issued by petitioner, the Postmaster General, which directed that mail addressed to some of respondents be returned to the senders marked "Fraudulent," and that postal money order sums payable to their order be returned to the remitters.

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Appellant is a New York City bookdealer, convicted, on information,[1] of a misdemeanor for having in his possession with intent to sell certain magazines charged to violate subsection 2 of § 1141 of the New York Penal Law. It reads as follows:

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Section 124 of the Traffic Regulations of the City of New York[1] promulgated by the Police Commissioner provides:

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When Arthur Terminiello delivered a speech in an auditorium in Chicago, the auditorium was filled to capacity with over eight hundred people. Outside of the speech, almost one thousand people gathered to protest the speech. Although police were assigned there to maintain order, they could not prevent several disturbances. In his speech, Terminiello condemned the conduct of the crowd outside and criticized various political and racial groups whose activities he denounced as harmful to the nation’s welfare. Terminiello was found guilty of disorderly conduct under a Chicago city ordinance prohibiting “breach[es] of the peace” and subsequently fined.

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May the United States exclude without hearing, solely upon a finding by the Attorney General that her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, the alien wife of a citizen who had served honorably in the armed forces of the United States during World War II? The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that it could, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 173 F. 2d 599. We granted certiorari to examine the question especially in the light of the War Brides Act of December 28, 1945. 336 U. S. 966.

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The question in this case is whether the shipment of obscene phonograph records in interstate commerce is prohibited by § 245 of the Criminal Code, which makes illegal the interstate shipment of any "obscene . . . book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character."

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These cases present for decision the constitutionality of § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.[1] This section, commonly referred to as the non-Communist affidavit provision, reads as follows: "No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under section 9 (e) (1) shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or *386 constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits."

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339 U.S. 846 (1950) OSMAN ET AL. v. DOUDS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 12. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 5, 1950. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Victor Rabinowitz and Samuel A. Neuberger for appellants. PER CURIAM. This case was… Read more

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A student’s inflammatory speech on a public sidewalk, which argued for violent revolution by black Americans and against President Truman, led to restlessness among the crowd and “at least one threat of violence.” Police officers asked the student to stop speaking three times, and after his third refusal, arrested him for disorderly conduct.

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New York City has adopted an ordinance which makes it unlawful to hold public worship meetings on the streets *291 without first obtaining a permit from the city police commissioner.[1] Appellant, Carl Jacob Kunz, was convicted and fined $10 for violating this ordinance by holding a religious meeting without a permit. The conviction was *292 affirmed by the Appellate Part of the Court of Special Sessions, and by the New York Court of Appeals, three judges dissenting, 300 N. Y. 273, 90 N. E. 2d 455 (1950). The case is here on appeal, it having been urged that the ordinance is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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341 U.S. 56 (1951) GERENDE v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS OF BALTIMORE. No. 577. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 9, 1951. Decided April 12, 1951. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. I. Duke Avnet and William H. Murphy argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Harold… Read more

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341 U.S. 123 (1951) JOINT ANTI-FASCIST REFUGEE COMMITTEE v. McGRATH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.   NO. 8. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued October 11, 1950. Decided April 30, 1951. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.[*]*124 O. John Rogge and Benedict Wolf argued the cause for… Read more

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The National Labor Relations Board entertained a complaint by the Textile Workers Union of America against respondent, Highland Park Manufacturing Company, and ordered respondent to bargain with that Union. At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Textile Workers Union was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations and, while the Textile Workers Union officers had filed the non-Communist affidavits pursuant to statute, the officers of the C. I. O. at that time had not. The statute provides that "No investigation shall be made by the Board . . ., no petition under subsection (e) (1) of this section shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party [etc.]." § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 159 (h). (Italics added.) The order was challenged upon the grounds, among others, that the failure of the C. I. O. officers to file non-Communist *324 affidavits disabled its affiliate, the Textile Workers Union, and the Board could not entertain their complaint and enter the order.

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341 U.S. 494 (1951) DENNIS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 336. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued December 4, 1950. Decided June 4, 1951. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.*495 George W. Crockett, Jr., Abraham J. Isserman and Harry Sacher argued the cause for petitioners. With… Read more

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The appellant here, Jack H. Breard, a regional representative of Keystone Readers Service, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, was arrested while going from door to door in the City of Alexandria, Louisiana, soliciting subscriptions for nationally known magazines. The arrest was solely on the ground that he had violated an ordinance because he had not obtained the prior consent of the owners of the residences solicited. Breard, a resident of Texas, was in charge of a crew of solicitors who go from house to house in the various cities and towns in the area under Breard's management and solicit subscriptions for nationally known magazines and periodicals, including among others the Saturday Evening Post, Ladies' Home Journal, Country Gentleman, Holiday, Newsweek, American Home, Cosmopolitan, Esquire, Pic, Parents, Today's Woman and True. These solicitors spend only a few days in each city, depending upon its size. Keystone sends a card from its home office to the new subscribers acknowledging receipt of the subscription and thereafter the periodical is forwarded to the subscriber by the publisher in interstate commerce through the mails.

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In 1941 the California Legislature amended the Charter of the City of Los Angeles to provide in part as follows:

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Overruled

Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, praying that § 12-a of the Civil Service Law,[1] as implemented by *487 the so-called Feinberg Law,[2] be declared unconstitutional, and that action by the Board of Education of the City of New York thereunder be enjoined. On motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court held that subdivision (c) of § 12-a, the Feinberg Law, and the Rules of the State Board of Regents promulgated thereunder violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and issued an injunction. 196 Misc. 873, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 114. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed, 276 App. Div. 527, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 466, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, 301 N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. 2d 806. The appellants come here by appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

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These cases present a narrow question with several related issues. May the Attorney General, as the executive head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,[1] after taking into custody active alien Communists on warrants,[2] charging either membership in a group that advocates *527 the overthrow by force of this Government[3] or inclusion in any prohibited classes of aliens,[4] continue them in custody without bail, at his discretion pending determination as to their deportability, under § 23 of the *528 Internal Security Act?[5] Differing views of the Courts of Appeals led us to grant certiorari. 342 U. S. 807, 810.

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The ultimate question in these three cases is whether the United States constitutionally may deport a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist Party which terminated before enactment of the Alien Registration Act, 1940.[1]

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Beauharnais produced a leaflet that called on the Mayor and City Council of Chicago “to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro.” The leaflet also called for the use of violence to further this goal. Beauharnais was charged under an Illinois law prohibiting exposing “any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy[.]”

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The principal question here is whether, in the District of Columbia, the Constitution of the United States precludes a street railway company from receiving and amplifying radio programs through loudspeakers in its passenger vehicles under the circumstances of this case. *454 The service and equipment of the company are subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia. The Commission, after an investigation and public hearings disclosing substantial grounds for doing so, has concluded that the radio service is not inconsistent with public convenience, comfort and safety and "tends to improve the conditions under which the public ride." The Commission, accordingly, has permitted the radio service to continue despite vigorous protests from some passengers that to do so violates their constitutional rights. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that neither the operation of the service nor the action of the Commission permitting its operation is precluded by the Constitution.

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The issue here is the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of a New York statute which permits the banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are "sacrilegious." That statute makes it unlawful "to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel [with specified exceptions not relevant here], unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department. . . ."[1] The statute further provides:

"The director of the [motion picture] division [of the education department] or, when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto."[2]
Appellant is a corporation engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures. It owns the exclusive rights to distribute throughout the United States a film produced in Italy entitled "The Miracle." On November 30, 1950, after having examined the picture, the motion picture division of the New York education department, *498 acting under the statute quoted above, issued to appellant a license authorizing exhibition of "The Miracle," with English subtitles, as one part of a trilogy called "Ways of Love."[3] Thereafter, for a period of approximately eight weeks, "Ways of Love" was exhibited publicly in a motion picture theater in New York City under an agreement between appellant and the owner of the theater whereby appellant received a stated percentage of the admission price.

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This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upholding the validity of a loyalty oath[1] prescribed by Oklahoma statute for all state officers and *185 employees. Okla. Stat. Ann., 1950, Tit. 51, §§ 37.1-37.8 (1952 Supp.). Appellants, employed by the State as members of the faculty and staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, failed, within the thirty days permitted, to take the oath required by the Act. Appellee Updegraff, as a citizen and taxpayer, thereupon brought this suit in the District Court of Oklahoma County to enjoin the necessary state officials from paying further compensation to employees who had not subscribed to the oath. The appellants, who were permitted to intervene, attacked the validity of the Act on the grounds, among others, that it was a bill of attainder; an ex post facto law; impaired the obligation of their contracts with the State and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also sought a mandatory injunction directing the state officers to pay *186 their salaries regardless of their failure to take the oath. Their objections centered largely on the following clauses of the oath:

". . . That I am not affiliated directly or indirectly. . . with any foreign political agency, party, organization or Government, or with any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization; . . . that I will take up arms in the defense of the United States in time of War, or National Emergency, if necessary; that within the five (5) years immediately preceding the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of . . . any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized public agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization . . . ."
The court upheld the Act and enjoined the state officers from making further salary payments to appellants. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed, sub nom. Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131 (1951).[2] We noted probable jurisdiction because of the public importance of this type of legislation and the recurring serious constitutional questions which it presents.

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The National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on March 27, 1950, following a charge filed August 3, 1949, by the International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-7, against respondent, Dant & Russell, Ltd. The charge was filed in accordance with the procedure of the Act, § 10 (b), and was based on violations of § 8 (a) (1) and (3).[1] After the usual proceedings, the Board ordered respondent to take appropriate remedial action to correct the charged unfair labor practices. The International Woodworkers Union was and is an affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. There were on file with the Board at the time the charge was made the non-Communist affidavits executed by the officers of the local union as required by § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 101. Affidavits executed by *377 the officers of the C. I. O. were filed with the Board prior to the issuance of the complaint but subsequent to the filing of the charge.

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346 U.S. 587 (1954) SUPERIOR FILMS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF OHIO, DIVISION OF FILM CENSORSHIP, HISSONG, SUPERINTENDENT.   No. 217. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued January 6, 1954. Decided January 18, 1954. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.[*]John C. Harlor argued the cause for appellant in No. 217. With him… Read more

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347 U.S. 439 (1954) LINEHAN ET AL. v. WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR ET AL. No. 557. Supreme Court of United States. Decided April 12, 1954. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.[*] George A. Brenner for appellants. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General of New York, Lawrence… Read more

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The principal question here presented is whether the New York State Education Law,[1] on its face or as here construed and applied, violates the Constitution of the United States by authorizing the suspension from practice, for six months, of a physician because he has been convicted, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, of failing to produce, before a Committee of the United States House of Representatives, certain papers subpoenaed by that Committee.[2] For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it does not.

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This action was instituted by petitioner in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The principal relief sought is a declaration that petitioner's removal and debarment from federal employment were invalid. Prior to trial, the District Court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judgment was affirmed, one judge dissenting, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, relying on its decision in Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 F. 2d 46, sustained here by an equally divided vote, 341 U. S. 918. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 882, because the case appeared to present the same constitutional question left unresolved by this Court's action in Bailey v. Richardson, supra.

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The respondent Steve Nelson, an acknowledged member of the Communist Party, was convicted in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, of a violation of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act[1] and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years and to a fine of $10,000 and to costs of prosecution in the sum of $13,000. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction. 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. 2d 431. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, recognizing but not reaching many alleged serious trial errors and conduct of the trial court infringing upon respondent's right to due process of law,[2] decided *499 the case on the narrow issue of supersession of the state law by the Federal Smith Act.[3] In its opinion, the court stated:

"And, while the Pennsylvania statute proscribes sedition against either the Government of the United States or the Government of Pennsylvania, it is only alleged sedition against the United States with which the instant case is concerned. Out of all the voluminous testimony, we have not found, nor has anyone pointed to, a single word indicating a seditious act or even utterance directed against the Government of Pennsylvania."[4]
The precise holding of the court, and all that is before us for review, is that the Smith Act of 1940,[5] as amended in 1948,[6] which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which proscribes the same conduct.

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This appeal brings into question the constitutionality of § 903 of the Charter of the City of New York. That section provides that whenever an employee of the City utilizes the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering a question relating to his official conduct, "his term or tenure of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or employment under the city or any agency."[1] Appellant Slochower invoked the privilege against self-incrimination *553 under the Fifth Amendment before an investigating committee of the United States Senate, and was summarily discharged from his position as associate professor at Brooklyn College, an institution maintained by the City of New York. He now claims that the charter provision, as applied to him, violates both the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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This case is here to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirming an order of the Subversive Activities Control Board that petitioner register with the Attorney General as a "Communist-action" organization, as required by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. That Act sets forth a comprehensive plan for regulation of "Communist-action" organizations.[1] Section 2 of the Act describes a *117 world Communist movement directed from abroad and designed to overthrow the Government of the United States by any means available, including violence. Section 7 requires all Communist-action organizations to register as such with the Attorney General. If the Attorney General has reason to believe that an organization, which has not registered, is a Communist-action organization, he is required by § 13 (a) to bring a proceeding to determine that fact before the Subversive Activities Control Board, a five-man board appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and created for the purpose of holding hearings and making such determinations. Section 13 (e) lays down certain standards for judgment by the Board.

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351 U.S. 536 (1956) COLE v. YOUNG ET AL. No. 442. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 6, 1956. Decided June 11, 1956. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. *537 David I. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were James H…. Read more

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This appeal from a judgment of conviction entered by the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit, Michigan, *381 challenges the constitutionality of the following provision, § 343, of the Michigan Penal Code:

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The issues tendered in this case are the construction and, ultimately, the constitutionality of 18 U. S. C. § 610, an Act of Congress that prohibits corporations and labor organizations from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection with" any election for federal office. This is a direct appeal by the Government from a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissing a four-count indictment that charged appellee, a labor organization, with having made expenditures in violation of that law. Appellee had moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds (1) that it failed to state an offense under the statute and (2) that the provisions of the statute "on their face and as construed and applied" are unconstitutional. The district judge held that the indictment did not allege a statutory offense and that he was therefore not required to rule upon the constitutional questions presented. 138 F. Supp. 53. The case came here, 351 U. S. 904, under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3731.

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The petitioner, Raphael Konigsberg, graduated from the Law School of the University of Southern California in 1953 and four months later satisfactorily passed the California bar examination. Nevertheless, the State Committee of Bar Examiners, after several hearings, refused to certify him to practice law on the grounds he had failed to prove (1) that he was of good moral character and (2) that he did not advocate overthrow of the Government of the United States or California by unconstitutional means.[1] As permitted by state law, Konigsberg asked the California Supreme Court to review the Committee's refusal to give him its certification. He contended that he had satisfactorily proved that he met all the requirements for admission to the bar, and that the Committee's action deprived him of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. *254 The State Supreme Court, without opinion, and with three of its seven justices dissenting, denied his petition for review. We granted certiorari because the constitutional questions presented were substantial. 351 U. S. 936.

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This is a review by certiorari of a conviction under 2 U. S. C. § 192 for "contempt of Congress." The misdemeanor is alleged to have been committed during a *182 hearing before a congressional investigating committee. It is not the case of a truculent or contumacious witness who refuses to answer all questions or who, by boisterous or discourteous conduct, disturbs the decorum of the committee room. Petitioner was prosecuted for refusing to make certain disclosures which he asserted to be beyond the authority of the committee to demand. The controversy thus rests upon fundamental principles of the power of the Congress and the limitations upon that power. We approach the questions presented with conscious awareness of the far-reaching ramifications that can follow from a decision of this nature.

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In an investigation conducted by a State Attorney General, acting on behalf of the State Legislature under a broad resolution directing him to determine whether there were "subversive persons" in the State and to recommend further legislation on that subject, appellant answered most questions asked him, including whether he was a Communist; but he refused to answer questions related to (1) the contents of a lecture he had delivered at the State University, and (2) his knowledge of the Progressive Party of the State and its members. He did not plead his privilege against self-incrimination, but based his refusal to answer such questions on the grounds that they were not pertinent to the inquiry and violated his rights under the First Amendment. Persisting in his refusal when haled into a State Court and directed to answer, he was adjudged guilty of contempt. This judgment was affirmed by the State Supreme Court, which construed the term "subversive persons" broadly enough to include persons engaged in conduct only remotely related to actual subversion and done completely apart from any conscious intent to be a part of such activity. It also held that the need of the Legislature to be informed on the subject of self-preservation of government outweighed the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred in the process.

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Overruled (in part)

We brought these cases here to consider certain questions arising under the Smith Act which have not heretofore been passed upon by this Court, and otherwise to review the convictions of these petitioners for conspiracy to violate that Act. Among other things, the convictions are claimed to rest upon an application of the Smith Act which is hostile to the principles upon which its constitutionality was upheld in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494.

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On December 14, 1951, petitioner, John S. Service, was discharged by the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, from his employment as a Foreign Service Officer in the Foreign Service of the United States. This case brings before us the validity of that discharge.

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This is a proceeding under § 22-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure (L. 1941, c. 925), as amended in 1954 (L. 1954, c. 702). This section supplements the existing conventional criminal provision dealing with pornography by authorizing the chief executive, or legal officer, of a municipality to invoke a "limited injunctive remedy," under closely defined procedural safeguards, against the sale and distribution of written and printed matter found after due trial to be obscene, and to obtain an order for the seizure, in default of surrender, of the condemned publications.[1]

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The defendant operated a mail-order business that mailed circulars, advertisements, and a book that the trial court held to be legally obscene and therefore without First Amendment protection.

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355 U.S. 171 (1957) BARR v. MATTEO ET AL.         No. 409. Supreme Court of United States.    Decided December 9, 1957. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Paul A. Sweeney and Bernard Cedarbaum for petitioner.PER CURIAM.The petition… Read more

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Petitioner is an alien who has been ordered deported by virtue of § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 1006,[1] for past membership in the Communist Party. He attacks the judgment below on the ground—the only claim we need to consider—that he was not a "member" of the Communist Party within the scope of that section.

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Appellant, Rose Staub, was convicted in the Mayor's Court of the City of Baxley, Georgia, of violation of a city ordinance and was sentenced to imprisonment for 30 days or to pay a fine of $300. The Superior Court of the county affirmed the judgment of conviction; the Court of Appeals of the State affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, 94 Ga. App. 18, 93 S. E. 2d 375; and the Supreme Court of the State denied an application for certiorari. The case comes here on appeal.

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356 U.S. 576 (1958) SACHER v. UNITED STATES. No. 828. Supreme Court of United States. Decided May 19, 1958. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Hubert T. Delany, Frank J. Donner and Telford Taylor for petitioner. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General… Read more

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This case concerns two applications for passports, denied by the Secretary of State. One was by Rockwell Kent who desired to visit England and attend a meeting of an organization known as the "World Council of Peace" in Helsinki, Finland. The Director of the Passport Office informed Kent that issuance of a passport was precluded by § 51.135 of the Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State on two grounds:[1] (1) that he was a *118 Communist and (2) that he had had "a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line." The letter of denial specified in some detail the facts on which those conclusions were based. Kent was also advised of his right to an informal hearing under § 51.137 of the Regulations. But he was also told that whether or not a hearing was requested it would be necessary, before a passport would be issued, to submit an affidavit as to whether he was then or ever had been a Communist.[2] Kent did not ask for a hearing but filed a new passport application listing several European countries he desired to visit. When advised that a hearing was still available to him, his attorney replied that Kent took the position *119 that the requirement of an affidavit concerning Communist Party membership "is unlawful and that for that reason and as a matter of conscience," he would not supply one. He did, however, have a hearing at which the principal evidence against him was from his book It's Me O Lord, which Kent agreed was accurate. He again refused to submit the affidavit, maintaining that any matters unrelated to the question of his citizenship were irrelevant to the Department's consideration of his application. The Department advised him that no further consideration of his application would be given until he satisfied the requirements of the Regulations.

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Petitioner, a native-born citizen, is a physicist who has been connected with various federal projects and who has been associated as a teacher with several of our universities. In March 1954 he applied for a passport to enable him to travel to India in order to accept a position as research physicist at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, affiliated with the University of Bombay. In April 1954 the Director of the Passport Office advised him that his application was denied because the Department of State "feels that it would be contrary to the best interest of the United States to provide you passport facilities at this time."

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The question before us is whether the Board of Public Education for the School District of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States when the Board, purporting to act under the Pennsylvania Public School Code, discharged a public school teacher on the ground of "incompetency," evidenced by the teacher's refusal of his Superintendent's request to confirm or refute information as to the teacher's loyalty and his activities in certain allegedly subversive organizations. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it did not.

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In an investigation conducted under the New York Security Risk Law, appellant, a subway conductor employed by the New York City Transit Authority, was summoned to the office of the Commissioner of Investigation of New York City and asked whether he was then a member of the Communist Party. He refused to answer, claiming his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and he persisted in this refusal after being warned that it might lead to his dismissal and after being given time to reconsider and to obtain counsel. Based upon this refusal, appellees found that "reasonable grounds exist for belief that, because of his doubtful trust and reliability," appellant's continued employment would endanger national and state security, and they suspended him and later discharged him after he failed to avail himself of an opportunity to submit statements or affidavits showing why he should be reinstated

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The appellants are honorably discharged veterans of World War II who claimed the veterans' property-tax *515 exemption provided by Art. XIII, § 1 1/4, of the California Constitution. Under California law applicants for such exemption must annually complete a standard form of application and file it with the local assessor. The form was revised in 1954 to add an oath by the applicant: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the support of a foreign government against the United States in event of hostilities." Each refused to subscribe the oath and struck it from the form which he executed and filed for the tax year 1954-1955. Each contended that the exaction of the oath as a condition of obtaining a tax exemption was forbidden by the Federal Constitution. The respective assessors denied the exemption solely for the refusal to execute the oath. The Supreme Court of California sustained the assessors' actions against the appellants' claims of constitutional invalidity.[1] We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals. 355 U. S. 880.

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These are companion cases to Speiser v. Randall and Prince v. City and County of San Francisco, ante, p. 513. The petitioners claimed the property-tax exemption provided by Art. XIII, § 1 1/2, of the California Constitution for real property and buildings used solely and exclusively for religious worship. The Los Angeles assessor denied the exemptions because each petitioner refused to subscribe, and struck from the prescribed application form, the oath that they did not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States and of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means nor advocate the support of a foreign government against the United States in the event of hostilities. Each petitioner sued in the Superior Court in and for the County of Los Angeles to recover taxes paid under protest and for declaratory relief. Both contended that the exaction of the oath pursuant to § 19 of Art. XX of the State Constitution and § 32 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code was forbidden by the Federal Constitution. The court upheld the validity of the provisions in the action brought by petitioner First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P. 2d 508. We granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 853. The Superior Court in the action brought by petitioner Valley Unitarian-Universalist Church, Inc., upheld the validity of the provisions under the Federal Constitution but held that § 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code violated the California Constitution because it excluded or exempted householders from the requirement. The Supreme Court of California reversed, 48 Cal. 2d 899, 311 P. 2d 540, and we granted certiorari, 355 U. S. 854.

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357 U.S. 568 (1958) FIRST METHODIST CHURCH OF SAN LEANDRO ET AL. v. HORSTMANN, ASSESSOR OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. No. 485. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 30, 1958. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. Stanley A. Weigel, Lawrence Speiser and Frank B. Frederick for appellants. J. F. Coakley for appellees,… Read more

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We review from the standpoint of its validity under the Federal Constitution a judgment of civil contempt entered against petitioner, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in the courts of Alabama. The question presented is whether Alabama, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, can compel petitioner to reveal to the State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents, without regard to their positions or functions in the Association. The judgment of contempt was based upon petitioner's refusal to comply fully with a court order requiring in part the production of membership lists. Petitioner's claim is that the order, in the circumstances shown by this record, violated rights assured to petitioner and its members under the Constitution.

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Petitioner was found guilty, after jury trial, of failure to produce, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a Subcommittee of a Senate Committee,[1] records of a *148 union[2] showing the names and addresses of members of that organization who were employed either by the United States or by any state, county, or municipal government in the country.[3] The District Court denied a motion for acquittal or new trial. 112 F. Supp. 669. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed by a divided vote. 98 U. S. App. D. C. 324, 235 F. 2d 821. On petition for a writ of certiorari we vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, an intervening decision. 354 U. S. 929. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, once more affirmed by a divided vote. 103 U. S. App. D. C. 319, 258 F. 2d 413. We again granted certiorari. 357 U. S. 904.

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These cases, coming to us from two different Circuits, present identical issues, and may appropriately be dealt with together in one opinion. The issues involve the interpretation and validity of Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (o)-1 and § 29.23 (q)-1 as applied by the courts below to deny deduction as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under § 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939[1] to sums expended by the respective taxpayer petitioners in furtherance of publicity programs designed to help secure the defeat of initiative measures then pending before the voters of the States of Washington and Arkansas.

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359 U.S. 344 (1959) SCULL v. VIRGINIA EX REL. COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM AND RACIAL ACTIVITIES. No. 51. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 18, 1958. Decided May 4, 1959. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were… Read more

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This case concerns the legality of petitioner's discharge as an employee of the Department of the Interior. Vitarelli, an educator holding a doctor's degree from Columbia University, was appointed in 1952 by the Department of the Interior as an Education and Training Specialist in the Education Department of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, at Koror in the Palau District, a mandated area for which this country has responsibility.

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This case is here again on appeal from a judgment of civil contempt entered against appellant by the Merrimack County Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. It arises out of appellant's refusal to produce certain documents before a New Hampshire legislative investigating committee which was authorized and directed to determine, inter alia, whether there were subversive persons or organizations present in the State of New Hampshire. Upon the first appeal from the New Hampshire court, 100 N. H. 436, 130 A. 2d 278, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case to it, 355 U. S. 16, for consideration in the light of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957). That court reaffirmed its former decision, 101 N. H. 139, 136 A. 2d 221, deeming Sweezy not to control the issues in the instant case. For *74 reasons which will appear, we agree with the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

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Once more the Court is required to resolve the conflicting constitutional claims of congressional power and of an individual's right to resist its exercise. The congressional power in question concerns the internal process of Congress in moving within its legislative domain; it involves the utilization of its committees to secure "testimony needed to enable it efficiently to exercise a legislative function belonging to it under the Constitution." McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 160. The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it has similarly been utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national purse, or whether to appropriate. The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.

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These two appeals involve convictions of four appellants for refusal to answer certain questions put to them at sessions of the "Un-American Activities Commission" of the State of Ohio, established in the legislative branch of the Ohio Government.[1] The appellants had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to answer each of the questions. The cases are before us for the second time; on prior appeals the judgments below were vacated and the causes remanded for reconsideration in the light of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, and Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178. See 354 U. S. 929. The remand resulted in a reaffirmance of the prior judgment without discussion, 167 Ohio St. 295, 147 N. E. 2d 847, and on the present appeals we postponed *425 further consideration of the jurisdictional questions presented until the arguments on the merits. 358 U. S. 862, 863.

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Once again the Court is required to consider the impact of New York's motion picture licensing law upon First Amendment liberties, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the States. Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495.

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This case involves the validity of the Government's revocation of security clearance granted to petitioner, an aeronautical engineer employed by a private manufacturer which produced goods for the armed services. Petitioner was discharged from his employment solely as a consequence of the revocation because his access to classified information was required by the nature of his job. After his discharge, petitioner was unable to secure *476 employment as an aeronautical engineer and for all practical purposes that field of endeavor is now closed to him.

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360 U.S. 709 (1959) TAYLOR v. McELROY ET AL. No. 504. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 31-April 1, 1959. Decided June 29, 1959. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John… Read more

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360 U.S. 622 (1959) IN RE SAWYER.   No. 326. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued May 19-20, 1959. Decided June 29, 1959. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.John T. McTernan argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. *623 A. William Barlow, attorney for the Bar… Read more

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Appellant, the proprietor of a bookstore, was convicted in a California Municipal Court under a Los Angeles City ordinance which makes it unlawful "for any person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing. [or] book . . . [i]n any place of business where . . . books . . . are sold or kept for sale."[1] The offense was defined by the Municipal Court, and by the Appellate *149 Department of the Superior Court,[2] which affirmed the Municipal Court judgment imposing a jail sentence on appellant, as consisting solely of the possession, in the appellant's bookstore, of a certain book found upon judicial investigation to be obscene. The definition included no element of scienter—knowledge by appellant of the contents of the book—and thus the ordinance was construed as imposing a "strict" or "absolute" criminal liability.[3] The appellant made timely objection below that if the ordinance were so construed it would be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. This contention, together with other contentions based on the Constitution,[4] was rejected, and the case comes here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2); 358 U. S. 926.

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Petitioners, when employees of the County of Los Angeles, California, were subpoenaed by and appeared before a Subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee, but refused to answer certain questions concerning subversion. Previously, each petitioner had been ordered by the County Board of Supervisors to answer any questions asked by the Subcommittee relating to his subversive activity, and § 1028.1 of the Government Code of the State of California[1] made it the duty of any *3 public employee to give testimony relating to such activity on pain of discharge "in the manner provided by law." Thereafter the County discharged petitioners on the ground of insubordination and violation of § 1028.1 of the Code. Nelson, a permanent social worker employed by the County's Department of Charities, was, upon his request, given a Civil Service Commission hearing which resulted in a confirmation of his discharge. Globe was a temporary employee of the same department and was denied a hearing on his discharge on the ground that, as such, he was not entitled to a hearing under the Civil Service Rules adopted pursuant to the County Charter. Petitioners then filed these petitions for mandates seeking *4 reinstatement, contending that the California statute and their discharges violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nelson's discharge was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, 163 Cal. App. 2d 607, 329 P. 2d 978, and Globe's summary dismissal was likewise affirmed, 163 Cal. App. 2d 595, 329 P. 2d 971. A petition for review in each of the cases was denied without opinion by the Supreme Court of California, three judges dissenting. 163 Cal. App. 2d 614, 329 P. 2d 983; 163 Cal. App. 2d 606, 329 P. 2d 978. We granted certiorari. 360 U. S. 928. The judgment in Nelson's case is affirmed by an equally divided Court and will not be discussed. We conclude that Globe's dismissal was valid.

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The question presented here is whether the provisions of a Los Angeles City ordinance restricting the distribution of handbills "abridge the freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution."[1] The ordinance, § 28.06 of the Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles. provides:

"No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have *61 printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and address of the following:
"(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same.
"(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the true names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also appear thereon."
The petitioner was arrested and tried in a Los Angeles Municipal Court for violating this ordinance. It was stipulated that the petitioner had distributed handbills in Los Angeles, and two of them were presented in evidence. Each had printed on it the following:National Consumers Mobilization,Box 6533,Los Angeles 55, Calif.

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362 U.S. 474 (1960) NOSTRAND ET AL. v. LITTLE ET AL. No. 342. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 30-31, 1960. Decided May 2, 1960. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. Francis Hoague and Solie M. Ringold argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants. Herbert H. Fuller, Chief Assistant Attorney General… Read more

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From a decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia holding § 202 (n) of the Social Security Act (68 Stat. 1083, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (n)) unconstitutional, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare takes this direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. The challenged section, set forth in full in the margin,[1] provides for the termination of old-age, survivor, *605 and disability insurance benefits payable to, or in certain cases in respect of, an alien individual who, after September 1, 1954 (the date of enactment of the section), is deported under § 241 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)) on any one of certain grounds specified in § 202 (n).

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We here review petitioner's conviction under 2 U. S. C. § 192[1] for willful failure to comply with a subpoena of the House of Representatives commanding him to produce certain records of the Civil Rights Congress before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The principal question presented is whether the evidence justified the trial court's rulings that the records called for by the subpoena were in existence, subject to petitioner's control, and pertinent to the Committee's inquiry.

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364 U.S. 388 (1960) UPHAUS v. WYMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. No. 336. Supreme Court of United States. Decided November 14, 1960. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. Louis Lusky, Grenville Clark, Marvin H. Morse, Dudley W. Orr, Royal W. France, Hugh H. Bownes and Leonard B. Boudin for appellant. Louis C…. Read more

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An Arkansas statute compels every teacher, as a condition of employment in a state-supported school or college, to file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every organization to which he has belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years. At issue in these two cases is the validity of that statute under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. No. 14 is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge Federal District Court upholding the statute's validity, 174 F. Supp. 351. No. 83 is here on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which also held the statute constitutionally valid. 231 Ark. 641, 331 S. W. 2d 701.

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In this case[1] petitioner was charged on four counts of an indictment with the making and filing of false non-Communist affidavits[2] required by § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley *633 Act, 61 Stat. 136, 146, and further amended by the Act of Oct. 22, 1951, § 1 (d), 65 Stat. 601, 602. The indictment charged that the affidavits were false writings or documents made and executed in Colorado and filed in Washington, D. C., with the National Labor Relations Board.

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Petitioner challenges on constitutional grounds the validity on its face of that portion of § 155-4[1] of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago which requires submission of all motion pictures for examination prior to their public exhibition. Petitioner is a New York corporation owning the exclusive right to publicly exhibit in Chicago the film known as "Don Juan." It applied for a permit, as Chicago's ordinance required, and tendered the license fee but refused to submit the film for examination. The appropriate city official refused to issue the permit and his order was made final on appeal to the Mayor. The sole ground for denial was petitioner's refusal to submit the film for examination as required. Petitioner then brought this suit seeking injunctive relief ordering the issuance of the permit without submission of the film and restraining the city officials from interfering with the exhibition of the picture. Its sole ground is that the provision of the ordinance requiring submission of the film constitutes, on its face, a prior restraint within the prohibition of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds, inter alia, that neither a substantial federal question nor even a justiciable controversy was presented. 180 F. Supp. 843. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the case presented merely an abstract question of law since neither the film nor evidence of its content was submitted. 272 F. 2d 90. The precise question at issue here never having *45 been specifically decided by this Court, we granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 917 (1960).

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The petitioner was convicted for having unlawfully refused to answer a question pertinent to a matter under inquiry before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities at a hearing in Atlanta, *401 Georgia, on July 30, 1958.[1] His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that our decision in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, was "controlling." 272 F. 2d 783. We granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 926, to consider the petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals had misconceived the meaning of the Barenblatt decision. For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the Court of Appeals was correct, and that its judgment must be affirmed.

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This case is a companion to Wilkinson v. United States, decided today, ante, p. 399. The petitioner was the witness immediately preceding Wilkinson at the hearing of a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee, in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 30, 1958. He refused to answer many of the questions directed to him, basing his refusal upon the grounds that the questions were not pertinent to a question under inquiry by the subcommittee and that the interrogation invaded his First Amendment rights. He was subsequently indicted and, after a jury trial, convicted for having violated 2 U. S. C. § 192, in refusing to answer six specific questions which had been put to him by the subcommittee.[1] The Court of Appeals affirmed, 272 F. 2d 653, relying on Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, and we granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 960.

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This case, involving California's second rejection of petitioner's application for admission to the state bar, is a sequel to Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252, in which this Court reversed the State's initial refusal of his application.

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The questions presented by this case are similar to those involved in No. 28, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, decided today, ante, p. 36.

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Pursuing its statutory powers and duties to investigate subversive activities in Ohio,[1] the Ohio Un-American *261 Activities Commission scheduled a hearing to commence at the Stark County Courthouse on the morning of October 21, 1953, and subpoenaed these five appellants to appear and testify before it at that time and place. Each appeared with counsel, was sworn and examined. Though having both constructive and actual knowledge of Ohio's immunity statute,[2] each objected to most of the questions propounded[3] on the ground that an answer would compel him to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Ohio Constitution and of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[4] Appellants were *262 not, in most instances, directed to answer, but in a few instances some of them (Perry, Cooper and Mladajan) were directed to answer the question, yet flatly refused to do so.[5]

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The Subversive Activities Control Act required the Communist Party to register with the Attorney General. The Supreme Court ruled that the registration requirements did not violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech or association because of the serious threat Communism posed to the country.

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Our writ issued in this case (358 U. S. 917) to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals (260 F. 2d 21) affirming petitioner's conviction under the so-called membership clause of the Smith Act. 18 U. S. C. § 2385. The Act, among other things, makes a felony the acquisition or holding of knowing membership in any organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.[1] The indictment charged that from January 1946 to the date of its filing (November 18, 1954) the Communist Party of the United States was such an organization, and that petitioner *206 throughout that period was a member thereof, with knowledge of the Party's illegal purpose and a specific intent to accomplish overthrow "as speedily as circumstances would permit."

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This case, like No. 1, Scales v. United States, ante, p. 203, was brought here to test the validity of a conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act. 361 U. S. 813. The case comes to us from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which affirmed petitioner's conviction in the District Court for the Western District of New York, after a jury trial. 262 F. 2d 501.

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We here review the upholding by the New York Court of Appeals of the action of the New York State Industrial *390 Commissioner terminating petitioners' registration and liability to state taxation as employers under the New York State Unemployment Insurance Law. N. Y. Labor Law, §§ 511-512, 517-518, 570, 577, 581. This determination was effected under what was conceived to be the compulsion of a federal statute, the Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U. S. C. §§ 841-844. which provides, in pertinent part:

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Once again we are called upon to review a criminal conviction for refusal to answer questions before a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives.[1] See Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155; Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431. The petitioner was brought to trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia upon an indictment which charged that he had violated 2 U. S. C. § 192 by refusing to answer five questions "which were pertinent to the question then under inquiry" by the subcommittee. He waived a jury and was convicted upon four of the five counts of the indictment. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 143, 280 F. 2d 691, and we brought the case here because of doubt as to the validity of the conviction in the light of our previous *458 decisions.[2] 364 U. S. 812. A careful review of the trial record convinces us that the District Court should have ordered an acquittal.

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In 1956 the petitioner Rachel Brawner was a short-order cook at a cafeteria operated by her employer, M & M Restaurants, Inc., on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory[1] in the city of Washington. She had worked there for more than six years, and from her employer's point of view her record was entirely satisfactory.

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367 U.S. 820 (1961) LATHROP v. DONOHUE.   No. 200. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued January 18, 1961. Decided June 19, 1961. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.Trayton L. Lathrop and Leon E. Isaksen argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. John W. Reynolds, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Gordon… Read more

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For the purpose of enabling a labor union of which he was then an officer to comply with § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (h), and hence to use the processes of the National Labor Relations Board,[1] petitioner made on December 9, and caused to be filed with the Board on December 11, 1952, an affidavit reciting, inter alia, "I am not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such Party." Upon receipt of that affidavit and like ones of all other officers of the union, the Board advised the union that it had complied with § 9 (h) and could make use of the Board's processes.

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A Florida statute requires each employee of the State or its subdivisions to execute a written oath in which he must swear that, among other things, he has never lent his "aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party."[1] Failure to subscribe to this oath *280 results under the law in the employee's immediate discharge.[2]

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368 U.S. 436 (1962) NOSTRAND ET AL. v. LITTLE ET AL. No. 571. Supreme Court of United States. Decided January 22, 1962. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. Francis Hoague for appellants. John J. O’Connell, Attorney General of Washington, Herbert H. Fuller, Deputy Attorney General, and Timothy R. Malone, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees…. Read more

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In these six cases we review judgments of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,[1] which affirmed convictions obtained in the District Court under 2 U. S. C. *752 § 192.[2] Each of the petitioners was convicted for refusing to answer certain questions when summoned before a congressional subcommittee.[3] The cases were separately briefed and argued here, and many issues were presented. We decide each case upon a single ground common to all, and we therefore reach no other questions.

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370 U.S. 288 (1962) GRUMMAN v. UNITED STATES. No. 436. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 19, 1962. Decided June 18, 1962. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. David Rein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Joseph Forer. Bruce J. Terris… Read more

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370 U.S. 478 (1962) MANUAL ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. v. DAY, POSTMASTER GENERAL. No. 123. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 26-27, 1962. Decided June 25, 1962. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. *479 Stanley M. Dietz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the… Read more

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370 U.S. 717 (1962) SILBER v. UNITED STATES. No. 454. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 19, 1962. Decided June 25, 1962. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Victor Rabinowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Leonard B. Boudin. Bruce J…. Read more

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370 U.S. 724 (1962) HARTMAN v. UNITED STATES. No. 447, Misc. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 25, 1962. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. Lawrence Speiser for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and George B. Searls for the United… Read more

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Four out-of-state distributors sued the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth. The Commission would notify distributors which books the Commission deemed obscene and would recommend to law enforcement which distributors did not cooperate. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island declined to hold the law unconstitutional and stop its enforcement.

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Close to 200 peaceful protesters filed suit after they were arrested following a demonstration to end segregation at the South Carolina State House. The Supreme Court found that the protesters' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, and petition were violated by the state.

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This case is the culmination of protracted litigation involving legislative investigating committees of the State of Florida and the Miami branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

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Petitioner Dawson[1] was served with a subpoena to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee. He alleges that the subpoena was signed in blank by the Committee Chairman and that respondent Wheeler, an investigator for the Committee, filled in Dawson's name without authorization of the Committee. We read the complaint, as does the Solicitor General, most favorably to Dawson and conclude that the complaint alleges that no member of the Committee even attempted to delegate the Committee's subpoena power to Wheeler. The complaint also alleges that Wheeler intended to subject petitioner, when he appeared as a witness before the Committee, to public shame, disgrace, ridicule, stigma, scorn and obloquy, and falsely place upon him the stain of disloyalty without any opportunity of fair defense, to petitioner's irreparable injury. The complaint alleges not only the lack of authority of respondent Wheeler to fill in the blank subpoena but also the unconstitutionality of the House Resolution and the Act of Congress, 60 Stat. 828, authorizing the Committee to act and to subpoena witnesses. The complaint alleges that the mere service of the subpoena on Dawson cost him his job and that Wheeler caused service to be made while petitioner was at work knowing that loss of employment would result. It prays that the subpoena be declared void and of no force or effect, and asks for damages and for an injunction.

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This contempt of Congress case, stemming from investigations conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, involves, among others, questions of whether the House Committee on Un-American Activities failed to comply with its rules and whether such a failure excused petitioner's refusal to answer the Committee's questions.

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Petitioner, the prevailing party in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, comes to this Court for a second time. Prior to April 23, 1953, petitioner was employed by a private corporation producing mechanical and electrical parts for military agencies of the United States. On that date the corporation discharged him because of the revocation of his security clearance by the Department of the Navy. Following his challenge of this revocation, this Court held in 1959 in Greene v. McElroy, supra, that "in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." Id., at 508. On remand the District Court, declaring that revocation of petitioner's security clearance was "not validly authorized," ordered that all rulings denying petitioner's security clearance be *151 "expunged from all records of the Government of the United States."[1]

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376 U.S. 221 (1964) LORD v. WINCHESTER STAR ET AL. No. 732. Supreme Court of United States. Decided March 2, 1964. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. PER CURIAM. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari,… Read more

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Sullivan, a Commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel suit against the publisher of the New York Times and four individual black clergymen in Alabama for running an ad in the paper. The ad described police action against student demonstrators and a leader of the civil rights movement. Some of the statements in the ad were false. A lower court found in favor of Sullivan, awarding him damages of $500,000.

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Petitioners, attorneys engaged in the general practice of law, instituted this declaratory judgment action, 28 *606 U. S. C. § 2201, against respondent, the Attorney General of the United States, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint alleged that petitioners had been:

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The Virginia State Bar brought this suit in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, *2 against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an investigator employed by the Brotherhood, and an attorney designated its "Regional Counsel," to enjoin them from carrying on activities which, the Bar charged, constituted the solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized practice of law in Virginia.[1] It was conceded that in order to assist the prosecution of claims by injured railroad workers or by the families of workers killed on the job the Brotherhood maintains in Virginia and throughout the country a Department of Legal Counsel which recommends to Brotherhood members and their families the names of lawyers whom the Brotherhood believes to be honest and competent. Finding that the Brotherhood's plan resulted in "channeling all, or substantially all," the workers' claims to lawyers chosen by the Department of Legal Counsel, the court issued an injunction against the Brotherhood's carrying out its plan in Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed summarily over objections that the injunction abridges the Brotherhood's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which guarantee freedom of speech, petition and assembly. We granted certiorari to consider this constitutional question in the light of our recent decision in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415.[2] 372 U. S. 905.

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Appellants, approximately 64 in number, are members of the faculty, staff and student body of the University of Washington who brought this class action asking for a judgment declaring unconstitutional two Washington statutes requiring the execution of two different oaths by state employees and for an injunction against the enforcement of these statutes by appellees, the President of the University, members of the Washington State Board of Regents and the State Attorney General.

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Alleging noncompliance with Alabama's corporate registration and business qualification laws, the State in 1956 brought ouster proceedings against the petitioner, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a New York membership corporation with an office in Alabama and doing business there, and it was barred under an ex parte restraining order from operating in the State. Before any hearing on the merits, a contempt judgment, which the State Supreme Court on procedural grounds refused to review, was rendered against the NAACP for failure to produce its membership lists and other records under court order. Without reaching the validity of the underlying restraining order, this Court reversed, and, following reinstatement by the State Supreme Court of the contempt judgment, reversed again. In 1960, the NAACP, still prohibited from operating in Alabama, sued in a federal court alleging failure by the Alabama courts to afford it a hearing on the merits. The case reached this Court a third time, and, in 1961, was remanded with instructions that the Federal District Court be directed to try the case on the merits unless the State did so by a certain time. The State Circuit Court then heard the case; found that the NAACP had violated the State's constitution and laws; and permanently enjoined it from doing business in the State. The State Supreme Court affirmed, solely on the basis of a procedural rule, which it applied to the NAACP's brief, that where unrelated assignments of error are argued together and one is without merit, the others will not be considered.

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378 U.S. 205 (1964) A QUANTITY OF COPIES OF BOOKS ET AL. v. KANSAS.   No. 449. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued April 1-2, 1964. Decided June 22, 1964. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.*206 Stanley Fleishman argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Sam Rosenwein. William M…. Read more

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A manager of a movie theater in Ohio was convicted for “possessing and exhibiting an allegedly obscene film” for showing Les Amants.

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378 U.S. 577 (1964) GROVE PRESS, INC., v. GERSTEIN, STATE ATTORNEY, ET AL. No. 718. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 22, 1964. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT. Edward de Grazia and Richard Yale Feder for petitioner. James W. Kynes, Attorney General of… Read more

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Appellants, native-born citizens and residents of the United States, are ranking officials of the Communist Party of the United States. After hearings under State Department regulations, appellants' passports were revoked under § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which provides that, when a Communist organization is registered, or under final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member with knowledge or notice thereof to apply for or use a passport. Appellants filed suit asking that § 6 be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that the Secretary of State be ordered to issue passports to them.

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378 U.S. 576 (1964) TRALINS v. GERSTEIN, STATE ATTORNEY.   No. 246. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 22, 1964. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT.Richard Yale Feder and Howard W. Dixon for petitioner. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, Herbert P…. Read more

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The District Attorney of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, was convicted by a state court for defamation, principally for attributing “a large backlog of pending criminal cases to the inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations of the judges” and stating that “by refusing to authorize disbursements to cover the expenses of undercover investigations of vice in New Orleans, the judges had hampered his efforts to enforce the vice laws.”

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Law enforcement instructed civil rights activists not to demonstrate directly in front of a courthouse. Law enforcement had complete discretion regarding how to apply Louisiana’s ordinance prohibiting assemblies from “obstructing public passages.”

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Law enforcement instructed civil rights activists not to demonstrate directly in front of a courthouse. Law enforcement had complete discretion regarding how to apply Louisiana’s ordinance prohibiting assemblies from “obstructing public passages.”

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Pursuant to a Texas statute, a district judge issued a warrant describing petitioner's home and authorizing the search and seizure there of "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas." Officers conducted a search for more than four hours, seizing more than 2,000 items, including stock in trade of petitioner's business and personal books, papers, and documents, but no "records of the Communist Party" or any "party lists and dues payments." Petitioner filed a motion with the magistrate who issued the warrant to have it annulled and the property returned, but the motion was denied.

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Appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, Md. Ann. Code, 1957, Art. 66A, and exhibited the film "Revenge at Daybreak" at his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors as required by § 2 thereof.[1] The State concedes that the picture does not violate the statutory standards[2] and *53 would have received a license if properly submitted, but the appellant was convicted of a § 2 violation despite his contention that the statute in its entirety unconstitutionally impaired freedom of expression. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed, 233 Md. 498, 197 A. 2d 232, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 377 U. S. 987. We reverse.

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380 U.S. 503 (1965) AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN BORN v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD. No. 44. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 8-9, 1964. Decided April 26, 1965. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Joseph Forer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on… Read more

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380 U.S. 513 (1965) VETERANS OF THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN BRIGADE v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD. No. 65. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 9, 1964. Decided April 26, 1965. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on… Read more

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The questions for decision are whether the Secretary of State is statutorily authorized to refuse to validate the passports of United States citizens for travel to Cuba, and, if he is, whether the exercise of that authority is constitutionally permissible. We answer both questions in the affirmative.

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These appeals present the same question: is § 305 (a) of the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 840, constitutional as construed and applied? The statute provides in part:

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In this case we review for the first time a conviction under § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which makes it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or (except in clerical or custodial positions) as an employee of a labor union.[1] Section 504, the purpose of which is to protect *439 the national economy by minimizing the danger of political strikes,[2] was enacted to replace § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which conditioned a union's access to the National Labor Relations Board upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union's officers attesting that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party.[3]

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381 U.S. 741 (1965) CAMERON ET AL. v. JOHNSON, GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. No. 587, Misc. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 7, 1965. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI. Arthur Kinoy, William M. Kunstler, Benjamin E. Smith, Bruce C. Waltzer, Melvin Wulf and Morton Stavis… Read more

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The Communist Party of the United States of America failed to register with the Attorney General as required by the order of the Subversive Activities Control Board *72 sustained in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U. S. 1.[1] Accordingly, no list of Party members was filed as required by § 7 (d) (4) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993-994, 50 U. S. C. § 786 (d) (4) (1964 ed.).[2] Sections 8 (a) and (c) of the Act provide that, in that circumstance, each member of the organization must register and file a registration statement; in default thereof, § 13 (a) authorizes the Attorney General to petition the Board for an order requiring the member to register.[3] The *73 Attorney General invoked § 13 (a) against petitioners, and the Board, after evidentiary hearings, determined that petitioners were Party members and ordered each of them to register pursuant to §§ 8 (a) and (c). Review of the orders was sought by petitioners in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under § 14 (a).[4] The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 332 F. 2d 317. We granted certiorari, 381 U. S. 910. We reverse.[5]

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383 U.S. 131 (1966) BROWN ET AL. v. LOUISIANA. No. 41. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 6, 1965. Decided February 23, 1966. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA. *132 Carl Rachlin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Robert F. Collins, Nils R. Douglas, Murphy W. Bell, Floyd… Read more

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Overruled

Massachusetts declared Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, an erotic novel published in 1750, to be legally obscene under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States (1957). However, upon review, the Supreme Court found error in their application of the Roth test. Roth required a work to appeal as a whole to a prurient interest, be patently offensive, and be utterly without redeeming social value. Because the book had been found to have some redeeming social value, even if slight, this was enough to save the work from being declared legally obscene.

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This case, like Ginzburg v. United States, ante, p. 463, also decided today, involves convictions under a criminal obscenity statute. A panel of three judges of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York found appellant guilty of violating § 1141 of the New York Penal Law[1] by hiring others to prepare obscene books, publishing obscene books, and possessing obscene books with intent to sell them.[2] 26 Misc. 2d 152, 207 N. Y. S. 2d 390 *504 (1960). He was sentenced to prison terms aggregating three years and ordered to pay $12,000 in fines for these crimes.[3] The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed those convictions. 17 App. Div. 2d 243, 234 N. Y. S. 2d 342 (1962). The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. 15 N. Y. 2d 671, 204 N. E. 2d 209 (1964), remittitur amended, 15 N. Y. 2d 724, 205 N. E. 2d 201 (1965). We noted probable jurisdiction. 380 U. S. 960. We affirm.

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The defendant’s publications were found to be permeated with the “leer of the sensualist” because they discussed sexual matter “without restraint” and engaged in “pandering,” “the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers.”

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383 U.S. 825 (1966) DeGREGORY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.   No. 396. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued February 24, 1966. Decided April 4, 1966. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.*826 Howard S. Whiteside argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. R. Peter Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General of… Read more

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This case, which involves questions concerning the constitutionality of an Arizona Act requiring an oath from state employees, has been here before. We vacated the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court which had sustained the oath (94 Ariz. 1, 381 P. 2d 554) and remanded the cause for reconsideration in light of Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360. See 378 U. S. 127. On reconsideration the Supreme Court of Arizona reinstated the original judgment. 97 Ariz. 140, 397 P. 2d 944. The case is here on certiorari. 382 U. S. 810.

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Petitioner was sentenced to six months in prison and fined $3,000 for printing a pamphlet found to be prohibited by the common law of criminal libel in Kentucky. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, with three judges dissenting, affirmed petitioner's conviction. 405 S. W. 2d 562. We granted certiorari (382 U. S. 971) and reverse.

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384 U.S. 264 (1966) REDMOND ET UX. v. UNITED STATES. No. 1056. Supreme Court of United States. Decided May 23, 1966. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. John Jay Hooker, Jr., for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall for the United States. PER CURIAM. The petition… Read more

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The question squarely presented here is whether a State, consistently with the United States Constitution, can make it a crime for the editor of a daily newspaper to write and publish an editorial on election day urging people to vote a certain way on issues submitted to them.

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This federal habeas corpus application involves the question whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution.[1] The United States District Court held that he was not afforded a fair trial and granted the writ subject to the State's right to put Sheppard to trial again, 231 F. Supp. 37 (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1964). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by a divided vote, 346 F. 2d 707 (1965). We granted certiorari, 382 U. S. 916 (1965). We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, reverse the judgment.

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This case is a sequel to this Court's decision in Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749, and companion cases. One of those cases related to the same person who is petitioner here and to the same events.

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Petitioners were indicted in 1956 under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring fraudulently to obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on behalf of the union of which they were officers or members by filing false affidavits in purported satisfaction of the requirements of § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Section 9(h), later repealed, provided that a union could not secure NLRB services unless it had filed with the NLRB so-called non-Communist affidavits of each union officer. The Government alleged that, pursuant to a conspiracy, four of the petitioners, union officials who purported to resign from the Communist Party but in reality retained their Party affiliations, filed the required affidavits during 1949-1955, enabling the union to use the NLRB. Petitioners were convicted, but the Court of Appeals, while sustaining the indictment, reversed on the ground that prejudicial hearsay evidence had been admitted. On retrial, petitioners were again convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted, limited to the following questions: whether the indictment stated the offense of conspiracy to defraud the United States; whether § 9(h) is constitutional; and whether the trial court erred in denying petitioners' motion for production to the defense of grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses, or alternatively, for in camera inspection of the grand jury testimony.

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1963- On September 14, approximately 200 black and white demonstrators were arrested while picketing and protesting outside a segregated movie theater in downtown Tallahassee, FL. Later that night, in an act of solidarity with those who had been imprisoned, 99 Florida A & M students gathered in the driveway of the Leon County Jailhouse. The students sang and clapped until the sheriff ordered them to disperse. Over 100 students refused the order and were charged with violating Florida code section 821.18. Thirty-two students were subsequently convicted. Section 821.18 reads: "Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a malicious and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars." Fla. Stat. 821.18 (1965).

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The question presented in this case is whether the Georgia House of Representatives may constitutionally exclude appellant Bond, a duly elected Representative, from membership because of his statements, and statements to which he subscribed, criticizing the policy of the Federal Government in Vietnam and the operation of the Selective Service laws. An understanding of the circumstances of the litigation requires a complete presentation of the events and statements which led to this appeal.

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Appellees were indicted under 18 U. S. C. § 371 for conspiring to violate § 215 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. *477 § 1185 (b). The alleged conspiracy consisted of recruiting and arranging the travel to Cuba of 58 American citizens whose passports, although otherwise valid, were not specifically validated for travel to that country.[1]

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This is a companion case to No. 176, United States v. Laub, ante, p. 475. Petitioner was tried on a stipulation of facts, under an indictment which alleged that on two occasions she "did unlawfully, knowingly and willfully depart from the United States without bearing a valid passport, for the Republic of Cuba, via Mexico, the Republic of Cuba being a place outside the United States for which a valid passport is required" in violation of § 215 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. § 1185 (b). The parties stipulated that "At no time pertinent or material herein did defendant. Helen Maxine Levi Travis, bear a valid *492 United States passport specifically endorsed for travel to the Republic of Cuba . . . ." This stipulation is all that the record in this case reveals as to petitioner's possession of a valid passport. Petitioner was convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari in light of the important questions raised by petitioner, and the apparent conflict with the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of New York in the Laub case, supra, which we affirm today.

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Appellants, faculty members of the State University of New York and a non-faculty employee, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that New York's teacher loyalty laws and regulations are unconstitutional. Their continued employment had been terminated or was threatened when each appellant faculty member refused to comply with a requirement of the University trustees that he certify that he was not a Communist and that, if he had ever been one, he had so advised the university president, and the non-faculty employee refused to state under oath whether he had advocated or been a member of a group which advocated forceful overthrow of the government. Under § 3021 of New York's Education Law, "treasonable or seditious" utterances or acts are grounds for dismissal from the public school system, as well as under § 105, subd. 3, of the Civil Service Law. Other provisions of § 105 of the Civil Service Law disqualify from the civil service or employment in the educational system any person advocating or involved with the distribution of written material which advocates the forceful overthrow of the government. Section 3021 does not define "treasonable or seditious." Section 105, subd. 3, provides that "treasonable word or act" shall mean "treason" as defined in the Penal Law, and "seditious word or act" shall mean "criminal anarchy" as therein defined. Section 3022 (the Feinberg Law) of the Education Law requires the State Board of Regents to issue regulations for the disqualification or removal on loyalty grounds of faculty or other personnel in the state educational system, to make a list of "subversive" organizations, and to provide that membership therein constitutes prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment. The Board listed the National and State Communist Parties as "subversive organizations" under the law, but, shortly before the trial of this case, the university trustees' certificate requirement was rescinded and it was announced that no person would be ineligible for employment "solely" because he refused to sign the certificate, and that §§ 3021 and 3022 of the Education Law and § 105 of the Civil Service Law constituted part of the employment contract. A three-judge District Court sustained the constitutionality of these provisions against appellants' challenges of vagueness and overbreadth and dismissed the complaint. Held: 1. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, in which this Court upheld some aspects of the New York teacher loyalty plan before its extension to state institutions of higher learning, is not controlling, the vagueness issue presented here involving § 3021 and § 105 not having been decided in Adler, and the validity of the subversive organization membership provision of § 3022 having been upheld for reasons subsequently rejected by this Court. Pp. 385 U. S. 593-595. 2. The rescission of the certificate requirement does not moot this case, as the substance of the statutory and regulatory complex challenged by appellants remains. P. 385 U. S. 596. 3. Section 3021 of the Education Law and § 105, subds. 1(a), 1(b), and 3, of the Civil Service Law, as implemented by the machinery created pursuant to § 3022 of the Education Law, are unconstitutionally vague, since no teacher can know from § 3021 of the Education Law and § 105, subd. 3, of the Civil Service Law what constitutes the boundary between "seditious" and nonseditious utterances and acts, and the other provisions may well prohibit the employment of one who advocates doctrine abstractly, without any attempt to incite others to action, and may be construed to cover mere expression of belief. Pp. 385 U. S. 597-604. (a) These provisions, which have not been interpreted by the New York courts, can have a stifling effect on the "free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice" (Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 344 U. S. 195 (concurring opinion)). Pp. 385 U. S. 601-602. (b) Academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. P. 385 U. S. 603. (c) The prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative machinery, and manifold cross-references to interrelated enactments and rules aggravate the problem of vagueness of wording. P. 385 U. S. 604. 4. The provisions of the Civil Service Law (§ 105, subd. 1(c)) and the Education Law (§ 3022, subd. 2) which make Communist Party membership, as such, prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment in the public school system are "overbroad," and therefore unconstitutional. Pp. 385 U. S. 605-610. (a) Constitutional doctrine after this Court's upholding of § 3022, subd. 2, in Adler has rejected its major premise that public employment may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government action. P. 385 U. S. 605. (b) Mere knowing membership, without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization, is not a constitutionally adequate basis for imposing sanctions. Pp. 385 U. S. 606-610. 255 F.Supp. 981, reversed and remanded.

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386 U.S. 767 (1967) REDRUP v. NEW YORK. No. 3. Supreme Court of United States. Argued October 10, 1966. Decided May 8, 1967.[*] CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. Sam Rosenwein argued the cause for petitioner in No. 3. With him on the briefs were Stanley… Read more

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Petitioners claimed that respondents, Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee's chief counsel, tortiously entered into and participated in a conspiracy with Louisiana officials to seize petitioners' property and records in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Louisiana courts held the arrests and searches illegal. Here, the court below, while recognizing difficulty in concluding that there were no disputed issues of fact respecting petitioners' claim, upheld summary dismissal of the action on the ground of respondents' legislative immunity.

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388 U.S. 447 (1967) ADAY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 149. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.Stanley Fleishman for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall for the United States. Melvin L. Wulf, Rolland R…. Read more

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388 U.S. 449 (1967) BOOKS, INC. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 323. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.Stanley Fleishman for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Robert S. Erdahl and Marshall Tamor… Read more

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On Wednesday, April 10, 1963, officials of Birmingham, Alabama, filed a bill of complaint in a state circuit court asking for injunctive relief against 139 individuals and *309 two organizations. The bill and accompanying affidavits stated that during the preceding seven days:

"[R]espondents [had] sponsored and/or participated in and/or conspired to commit and/or to encourage and/or to participate in certain movements, plans or projects commonly called `sit-in' demonstrations, `kneel-in' demonstrations, mass street parades, trespasses on private property after being warned to leave the premises by the owners of said property, congregating in mobs upon the public streets and other public places, unlawfully picketing private places of business in the City of Birmingham, Alabama; violation of numerous ordinances and statutes of the City of Birmingham and State of Alabama . . . ."
It was alleged that this conduct was "calculated to provoke breaches of the peace," "threaten[ed] the safety, peace and tranquility of the City," and placed "an undue burden and strain upon the manpower of the Police Department."The bill stated that these infractions of the law were expected to continue and would "lead to further imminent danger to the lives, safety, peace, tranquility and general welfare of the people of the City of Birmingham," and that the "remedy by law [was] inadequate." The circuit judge granted a temporary injunction as prayed in the bill, enjoining the petitioners from, among other things, participating in or encouraging mass street parades or mass processions without a permit as required by a Birmingham ordinance.[1]*310 Five of the eight petitioners were served with copies of the writ early the next morning. Several hours later four of them held a press conference. There a statement was distributed, declaring their intention to disobey the injunction because it was "raw tyranny under the guise of maintaining law and order."[2] At this press conference one of the petitioners stated: "That they had respect for the Federal Courts, or Federal Injunctions, but in the past the State Courts had favored local law enforcement, and if the police couldn't handle it, the mob would."That night a meeting took place at which one of the petitioners announced that "[i]njunction or no injunction we are going to march tomorrow." The next afternoon, Good Friday, a large crowd gathered in the vicinity of Sixteenth Street and Sixth Avenue North in Birmingham. A group of about 50 or 60 proceeded to parade along the sidewalk while a crowd of 1,000 to 1,500 onlookers stood by, "clapping, and hollering, and [w]hooping." *311 Some of the crowd followed the marchers and spilled out into the street. At least three of the petitioners participated in this march.

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388 U.S. 440 (1967) KENEY v. NEW YORK.   No. 2. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COUNTY COURT OF MONROE COUNTY, NEW YORK.Eugene Gressman for petitioner. James H. Biben for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted… Read more

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388 U.S. 441 (1967) FRIEDMAN v. NEW YORK.   No. 7. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.Ira H. Holley and Eugene Gressman for petitioner. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM…. Read more

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388 U.S. 442 (1967) RATNER ET AL. v. CALIFORNIA.   No. 10. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO.Richard A. Lavine for petitioners. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Robert… Read more

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388 U.S. 443 (1967) COBERT v. NEW YORK.   No. 21. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.Ephraim London for petitioner. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and… Read more

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388 U.S. 444 (1967) SHEPERD ET AL. v. NEW YORK.   No. 26. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.Ira H. Holley and Eugene Gressman for petitioners. Frank S. Hogan for respondent…. Read more

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388 U.S. 446 (1967) AVANSINO ET AL. v. NEW YORK.   No. 72. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.Eugene Gressman for petitioners. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition… Read more

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388 U.S. 448 (1967) CORINTH PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. WESBERRY ET AL.   No. 227. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.Stanley Fleishman for petitioner. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, and G. Ernest Tidwell, Executive Assistant Attorney General, for… Read more

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388 U.S. 450 (1967) ROSENBLOOM v. VIRGINIA.   No. 366. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.Seymour Horwitz and Melvin L. Wulf for petitioner. James B. Wilkinson for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari… Read more

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388 U.S. 452 (1967) A QUANTITY OF COPIES OF BOOKS ET AL. v. KANSAS. No. 865. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. Stanley Fleishman for petitioners. Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General of Kansas, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for… Read more

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388 U.S. 454 (1967) SCHACKMAN ET AL. v. CALIFORNIA.   No. 995. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.Burton Marks for appellants. Roger Arnebergh and Philip E. Grey for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgments of the Superior Court of California, County… Read more

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389 U.S. 50 (1967) CENTRAL MAGAZINE SALES, LTD. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 368. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided October 23, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.Richard Lipsitz for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Jerome M. Feit… Read more

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389 U.S. 47 (1967) POTOMAC NEWS CO. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 164. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided October 23, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.Stanley M. Dietz for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Jerome M. Feit… Read more

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389 U.S. 48 (1967) CONNER v. CITY OF HAMMOND.   No. 259. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided October 23, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, LOUISIANA, PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA.Leonard B. Levy and Stanley Fleishman for petitioner. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is… Read more

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389 U.S. 89 (1967) CHANCE v. CALIFORNIA.   No. 306, Misc. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided November 6, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO.Marshall W. Krause for petitioner. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Robert R. Granucci and Michael J…. Read more

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This suit for declaratory relief that a Maryland teacher's oath required of appellant was unconstitutional was heard by a three-judge court and dismissed. 258 F. Supp. 589. We noted probable jurisdiction. 386 U. S. 906.

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The Illinois State Bar Association and others filed this complaint to enjoin the United Mine Workers of America, District 12, from engaging in certain practices alleged to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The essence of the complaint was that the Union had employed a licensed attorney on a salary basis to represent any of its members who wished his services to prosecute workmen's compensation claims before the Illinois Industrial Commission. The trial court found from facts that were not in dispute that employment of an attorney by the association for this purpose did constitute unauthorized practice and permanently enjoined the Union from "[e]mploying attorneys on salary or retainer basis to represent its members with respect to Workmen's Compensation claims and any and all other claims which they may have under the statutes and laws of Illinois."[1] The *219 Illinois Supreme Court rejected the Mine Workers' contention that this decree abridged their freedom of speech, petition, and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and affirmed. We granted certiorari, 386 U. S. 941 (1967), to consider whether this holding conflicts with our decisions in Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U. S. 1 (1964), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963).

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This appeal draws into question the constitutionality of § 5 (a) (1) (D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 992, 50 U. S. C. § 784 (a) (1) (D),[1]*260 which provides that, when a Communist-action organization[2] is under a final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of the organization "to engage in any employment in any defense facility." In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1 (1961), this Court sustained an order of the SACB requiring the Communist Party of the United States to register as a Communist-action organization under the Act. The Board's order became final on October 20, 1961. At that time appellee, a member of the Communist Party, was employed as a machinist at the Seattle, Washington, shipyard of Todd Shipyards Corporation. On August 20, 1962, the Secretary of Defense, acting under authority delegated by § 5 (b) of the Act, designated that shipyard a "defense facility." Appellee's continued employment at the shipyard after that date subjected him to prosecution under § 5 (a) (1) (D), and on May 21, 1963, an indictment was filed charging him with a violation of that section. The indictment alleged in substance that appellee had "unlawfully and willfully engage[d] in employment" at the shipyard with knowledge of the outstanding order against the Party and with knowledge and notice of the shipyard's designation as *261 a defense facility by the Secretary of Defense. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment on October 4, 1965. To overcome what it viewed as a "likely constitutional infirmity" in § 5 (a) (1) (D), the District Court read into that section "the requirements of active membership and specific intent." Because the indictment failed to allege that appellee's Communist Party membership was of that quality, the indictment was dismissed. The Government, unwilling to accept that narrow construction of § 5 (a) (1) (D) and insisting on the broadest possible application of the statute,[3] initially took its appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On the Government's motion, the case was certified here as properly a direct appeal to this Court under 18 U. S. C. § 3731. We noted probable jurisdiction. 384 U. S. 937.[4] We affirm the judgment of the District Court, but on the ground that § 5 (a) (1) (D) is an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association protected by the First Amendment.[5]

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389 U.S. 573 (1968) I. M. AMUSEMENT CORP. v. OHIO.   No. 260. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided January 15, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.Allen Brown for appellant. Melvin G. Rueger and Calvin W. Prem for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed. Redrup… Read more

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389 U.S. 578 (1968) ROBERT-ARTHUR MANAGEMENT CORP. v. TENNESSEE EX REL. CANALE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY GENERAL.   No. 679. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided January 15, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.Longstreet Heiskell for appellant. George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee. PER… Read more

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Appellant, who has served on board American-flag commercial vessels in various capacities, is now qualified to act as a second assistant engineer on steam vessels. But between 1949 and 1964 he was employed in trades other than that of a merchant seaman. In October 1964 he applied to the Commandant of the Coast Guard for a validation of the permit or license which evidences his ability to act as a second assistant engineer.

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390 U.S. 139 (1968) TEITEL FILM CORP. ET AL. v. CUSACK ET AL., MEMBERS OF THE MOTION PICTURE APPEAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO.   No. 787. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided January 29, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.Elmer Gertz and Leon N. Miller for appellants. Raymond F. Simon… Read more

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390 U.S. 340 (1968) FELTON ET AL. v. CITY OF PENSACOLA.     No. 934. Supreme Court of United States.    Decided March 11, 1968. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT.Stanley Fleishman, Sam Rosenwein and Hugh W. Gibert for petitioners.Dave Caton for respondent. PER CURIAM…. Read more

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Ginsberg, who operated a stationery store and luncheonette, was convicted of selling “girlie” magazines to a 16-year-old boy in violation of the New York Penal Law, which made it unlawful “knowingly to sell … to a minor” under 17 “(a) any picture … which depicts nudity … and which is harmful to minors,” and “(b) any … magazine … which contains [such pictures] and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.” Ginsberg challenged the law, and his conviction, as a violation of the 1st Amendment.

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Appellants are an exhibitor and the distributor of a motion picture named "Viva Maria," which, pursuant to a city ordinance, the Motion Picture Classification Board of the appellee City of Dallas classified as "not suitable for young persons." A county court upheld the Board's determination and enjoined exhibition of the film without acceptance by appellants of the requirements imposed by the restricted classification. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed,[1] and we noted probable jurisdiction, 387 U. S. 903, to consider the First and Fourteenth Amendment issues raised by appellants with respect to appellee's classification ordinance.

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The question presented by this case is whether the Louisiana Supreme Court, in sustaining a judgment for damages in a public official's defamation action, correctly interpreted and applied the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), that the plaintiff in such an action must prove that the defamatory publication "was made with `actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U. S., at 279-280.

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391 U.S. 53 (1968) INTERSTATE CIRCUIT, INC., ET AL. v. CITY OF DALLAS. No. 42. Supreme Court of United States. Decided May 6, 1968.[*] ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. Grover Hartt, Jr., and Edwin Tobolowsky for petitioners in No. 42. N. Alex Bickley… Read more

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Overruled

About the Logan Valley Plaza: The Plaza is a large shopping mall located near the city of Altoona, Pennsylvania. The shopping center directly abuts Plank Road to the east and Goods Lane to the South. Plan Road, otherwise known as U.S. Route 220, is a heavily traveled, high speed highway. There are five entrances to the Plaza: three from Plank Road and two from Goods Lane. At the time of the case, the Plaza was occupied by two businesses, Weis Markets, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck and Co. About Weis: Weis Markets, Inc. owns and operates supermarkets through out the United States. Weis owns an enclosed supermarket building in Logan Valley Plaza. The property includes an open pick-up porch, where Weis consumers can temporarily park and load groceries into their automobiles. About Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590: AFEU 590 is a local food employees union. The members of the union were employed by competitors of Weis.

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391 U.S. 462 (1968) RABECK v. NEW YORK. No. 611. Supreme Court of United States. Decided May 27, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. Stanley Fleishman, Osmond K. Fraenkel, and Sam Rosenwein for appellant. Isidore Dollinger and Daniel J. Sullivan for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant,… Read more

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O’Brien burnt his draft card on the steps of a South Boston courthouse in protest of the Vietnam War and was found in violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948.

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391 U.S. 592 (1968) WATTS ET AL. v. SEWARD SCHOOL BOARD ET AL.   No. 325. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued March 26, 1968. Decided June 3, 1968. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA.George Kaufmann argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Theodore M. Pease, Jr., argued the cause and filed… Read more

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Appellee, Board of Education, dismissed appellant, a teacher, for writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter criticizing the Board's allocation of school funds between educational and athletic programs and the Board's and superintendent's methods of informing, or preventing the informing of, the school district's taxpayers of the real reasons why additional tax revenues were being sought for the schools. At a hearing, the Board charged that numerous statements in the letter were false, and that the publication of the statements unjustifiably impugned the Board and school administration. The Board found all the statements false as charged, and concluded that publication of the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district" and that "the interests of the school require[d] [appellant's dismissal]" under the applicable statute. There was no evidence at the hearing as to the effect of appellant's statements on the community or school administration. The Illinois courts, reviewing the proceedings solely to determine whether the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the Board could reasonably conclude that the publication was "detrimental to the best interests of the schools," upheld the dismissal, rejecting appellant's claim that the letter was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on the ground that, as a teacher, he had to refrain from making statements about the schools' operation "which, in the absence of such position, he would have an undoubted right to engage in."

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392 U.S. 636 (1968) LEE ART THEATRE, INC. v. VIRGINIA. No. 997. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 17, 1968. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA. Plato Cacheris for petitioner. James B. Wilkinson for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted…. Read more

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392 U.S. 655 (1968) HENRY v. LOUISIANA.   No. 932. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 17, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.Thomas Barr III for appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, and William P. Schuler, Second Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss… Read more

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I.

This appeal challenges the constitutionality of the "anti-evolution" statute which the State of Arkansas adopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in its public schools and universities of the theory that man evolved from other species of life. The statute was a product of the upsurge of "fundamentalist" religious fervor of the twenties. The Arkansas statute was an adaptation of the famous Tennessee "monkey law" which that State adopted in 1925.[1] The constitutionality of the Tennessee law was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the celebrated Scopes case in 1927.[2]The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university "to teach the *99 theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals," or "to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches" this theory. Violation is a misdemeanor and subjects the violator to dismissal from his position.[3]The present case concerns the teaching of biology in a high school in Little Rock. According to the testimony, until the events here in litigation, the official textbook furnished for the high school biology course did not have a section on the Darwinian Theory. Then, for the academic year 1965-1966, the school administration, on recommendation of the teachers of biology in the school system, adopted and prescribed a textbook which contained a chapter setting forth "the theory about the origin . . . of man from a lower form of animal."*100 Susan Epperson, a young woman who graduated from Arkansas' school system and then obtained her master's degree in zoology at the University of Illinois, was employed by the Little Rock school system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th grade biology at Central High School. At the start of the next academic year, 1965, she was confronted by the new textbook (which one surmises from the record was not unwelcome to her). She faced at least a literal dilemma because she was supposed to use the new textbook for classroom instruction and presumably to teach the statutorily condemned chapter; but to do so would be a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal.

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Petitioners are identified with a "white supremacist" organization called the National States Rights Party. They held a public assembly or rally near the courthouse steps in the town of Princess Anne, the county seat of Somerset County, Maryland, in the evening of August 6, 1966. The authorities did not attempt to interfere with the rally. Because of the tense atmosphere which developed as the meeting progressed, about 60 state policemen were brought in, including some from a nearby county. They were held in readiness, but for tactical reasons only a few were in evidence at the scene of the rally.

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After becoming aware of a plan among some students to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands during school hours, school officials in Des Moines, Iowa, specifically banned wearing armbands in their schools. Previously, students had been allowed to wear “buttons relating to national political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism.” The students wore the armbands in violation of the new policy, were suspended, and subsequently sued.

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This is a simple case. Petitioners, accompanied by Chicago police and an assistant city attorney, marched in a peaceful and orderly procession from city hall to the mayor's residence to press their claims for desegregation of the public schools. Having promised to cease singing at 8:30 p. m., the marchers did so. Although petitioners and the other demonstrators continued to march in a completely lawful fashion, the onlookers became unruly as the number of bystanders increased. *112 Chicago police, to prevent what they regarded as an impending civil disorder, demanded that the demonstrators, upon pain of arrest, disperse. When this command was not obeyed, petitioners were arrested for disorderly conduct.

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Petitioner’s possession of three films served as the basis for a conviction of “possession of obscene matter” in contravention of Georgia state law.

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Appellant, Sidney Street, having heard a news broadcast of the shooting of James Meredith, a civil rights leader, took an American flag which he owned to a street corner near his home in New York and ignited the flag. He was arrested and thereafter charged by information with malicious mischief for violating 1425, subd. 16, par. d, of the New York Penal Law, which makes it a crime publicly to mutilate or “publicly [to] defy . . . or cast contempt upon [any American flag] either by words or act.” The information charged appellant with burning the American flag and publicly speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the flag. Appellant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the statute violated his constitutional right to free expression by punishing him for activity which he contended was a constitutionally protected "demonstration" or "protest." Appellant was tried before a judge without a jury and convicted.

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Watts was convicted of violating a 1917 statute prohibiting any person from "knowingly and willfully ... [making] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States". During a public rally near the Washington Monument, Watts, 18, joined a small group of fellow teens and adolescents to discuss police brutality. He told the others he had been drafted and had to report the following Monday. He reportedly said, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” He added, “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.” A jury found Watts had committed a felony by knowingly and willfully threatening the President. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed by a two-to-one vote.

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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has for many years imposed on broadcasters a "fairness doctrine," requiring that public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side of those issues be given fair coverage. In No. 2, the FCC declared that petitioner Red Lion Broadcasting Co. had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness doctrine when it carried a program which constituted a personal attack on one Cook, and ordered it to send a transcript of the broadcast to Cook and provide reply time, whether or not Cook would pay for it. The Court of Appeals upheld the FCC's position. After the commencement of the Red Lion litigation, the FCC began a rulemaking proceeding to make the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and more readily enforceable, and to specify its rules relating to political editorials. The rules, as adopted and amended, were held unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in RTNDA (No. 717) as abridging the freedoms of speech and press.

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Brandenburg was convicted of violating a criminal law that prohibited speech that advocates crime, sabotage, violence, and other similar acts after he spoke at a KKK rally. The Supreme Court found that the law infringed on Brandenburg's First Amendment rights, and created the imminent lawless action test. In order for speech to fall out of First Amendment protection, it must 1) be directed at producing imminent lawless action and 2) it is likely to produce such action.

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Petitioner asks this Court to set aside his 1955 jury conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 1001[1] for having falsely and fraudulently denied affiliation with the Communist Party in an affidavit he had filed with the National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.[2] This collateral proceeding was *66 brought in the District Court for the Northern District of California in 1967, some 10 years after his original conviction was upheld over a variety of challenges on direct review.[3] The District Court distinguished Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966), and decided that § 9 (h), which had been upheld in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950), could no longer be thought constitutionally valid, particularly in light of United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 (1965). Having concluded that the Government had no right to ask the questions which petitioner answered falsely in his affidavit, the District Court ruled that petitioner's conviction under § 1001 should be "without effect." It therefore set aside petitioner's conviction and discharged his parole (unreported opinion).[4]

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396 U.S. 119 (1969) CARLOS v. NEW YORK.     No. 524. Supreme Court of United States.    Decided December 8, 1969. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.Herald Price Fahringer and Eugene Gressman for petitioner.PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the… Read more

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396 U.S. 371 (1970) COWGILL v. CALIFORNIA. No. 496. Supreme Court of United States. Decided January 19, 1970. APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. Melville B. Nimmer and Laurence R. Sperber for appellant. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General,… Read more

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397 U.S. 238 (1970) COLE, BOSTON STATE HOSPITAL SUPERINTENDENT, ET AL. v. RICHARDSON. No. 679. Supreme Court of United States. Decided March 16, 1970[*] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Mark L. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, and Gregor I. McGregor, Deputy Assistant… Read more

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397 U.S. 319 (1970) CAIN ET AL. v. KENTUCKY. No. 347. Supreme Court of United States. Decided March 23, 1970 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY. Edmund C. Grainger, Jr., and James E. Thornberry for appellants. John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, and John B. Browning, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. PER… Read more

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A jury in Baltimore City Criminal Court convicted petitioners of violating Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 123 (1967 Repl. Vol.),[1] which prohibits "acting in a disorderly manner to the disturbance of the public peace, upon any public street . . . in any [Maryland] city . . . ."[2] The *565 prosecution arose out of a demonstration protesting the Vietnam war which was staged between 3 and shortly after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of March 28, 1966, in front of a United States Army recruiting station located on a downtown Baltimore street. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected petitioners' contention that their conduct was constitutionally protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and affirmed their convictions. 3 Md. App. 626, 240 A. 2d 623 (1968). The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari in an unreported order. We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 816 (1969). We reverse.

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Appellants challenge the constitutionality of Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 645, 39 U. S. C. § 4009 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), under which a person may require that a mailer remove his name from its mailing lists and stop all future mailings to the householder. The appellants are publishers, distributors, owners, and operators of mail order houses, mailing list brokers, and owners and operators of mail service organizations whose business activities are affected by the challenged statute.

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The petitioner, Daniel Jay Schacht, was indicted in a United States District Court for violating 18 U. S. C. § 702, which makes it a crime for any person "without authority [to wear] the uniform or a distinctive part thereof . . . of any of the armed forces of the United States . . . ."[1] He was tried and convicted by a jury, and on February 29, 1968, he was sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and to serve a six-month prison term, the maximum sentence allowable under 18 U. S. C. § 702. There is no doubt that Schacht did wear distinctive parts of the uniform of the United States Army[2] and that he was not a member of the Armed Forces. He has defended his conduct since the beginning, however, on the ground that he was authorized to wear the uniform by an Act of Congress, 10 U. S. C. § 772 (f), which provides as follows:

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398 U.S. 278 (1970) BLOSS ET AL. v. DYKEMA.   No. 1347. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 1, 1970 ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is reversed…. Read more

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398 U.S. 434 (1970) WALKER v. OHIO. No. 1470. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 15, 1970 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967). MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. The trial court, endeavoring… Read more

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399 U.S. 524 (1970) HOYT ET AL. v. MINNESOTA.   No. 1544. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 29, 1970. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA.PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed, Redrup v. New York, 386 U…. Read more

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No. 55 (hereafter Mail Box) draws into question the constitutionality of 39 U. S. C. § 4006 (now 39 U. S. C. § 3006, Postal Reorganization Act,[†] 84 Stat. 747), under *412 which the Postmaster General, following administrative hearings, may halt use of the mails and of postal money orders for commerce in allegedly obscene materials. No. 58 (hereafter Book Bin) also draws into question the constitutionality of § 4006, and, in addition, the constitutionality of 39 U. S. C. § 4007 (now 39 U. S. C. § 3007), 84 Stat. 748, under which the Postmaster General may obtain a court order permitting him to detain the defendant's incoming mail pending the outcome of § 4006 proceedings against him.

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401 U.S. 1 (1971) BAIRD v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA.   No. 15. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued December 8-9, 1969. Reargued October 14, 1970. Decided February 23, 1971. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA.*2 Peter D. Baird reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John P. Frank… Read more

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401 U.S. 23 (1971) IN RE STOLAR.   No. 18. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued December 9, 1969. Reargued October 14-15, 1970. Decided February 23, 1971. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.*24 Leonard B. Boudin reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was David Rosenberg. Robert D. Macklin, Assistant… Read more

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An applicant for admission to the Bar of New York must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the State for at least six months, and pass a written examination conducted by the State Board of Law Examiners. In addition, New York requires that the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court in the judicial department where an applicant resides must "be satisfied that such person possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law." New York Judiciary Law § 90, subd. 1, par. a (1968).[1] To carry out this provision, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules require the appointment, in each of the four Judicial Departments into which the Supreme Court is divided, of a Committee or Committees on Character and Fitness.[2] Section 528.1 of the Rules of the New York Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counsellors-at-Law requires that the character and general fitness specified in Judiciary Law § 90 "must be shown by the affidavits of two reputable persons residing in the city or county in which [the applicant] resides, one of whom must be a practicing attorney of the Supreme Court of this State."[3] The Committees also require *157 the applicant himself to fill out a questionnaire.[4] After receipt of the affidavits and questionnaire, the Committees conduct a personal interview with each applicant. As a final step before actual admission to the Bar, an applicant must take an oath that he will support the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of New York.[5]This case involves a broad attack, primarily on First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds, upon this system for screening applicants for admission to the New York Bar. The appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, are organizations and individuals claiming to represent a class of law students and law graduates similarly situated, seeking or planning to seek admission to practice law in New York. They commenced two separate actions for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, naming as defendants two Committees on Character and Fitness and their members and two Appellate Divisions and their judges.[6] The complaints attacked the statutes, rules, and screening procedures as invalid on their face or as applied in the First and Second Departments. A three-judge court was convened and consolidated the two suits.

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401 U.S. 480 (1971) GROVE PRESS, INC., ET AL. v. MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF CENSORS. No. 63. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 10, 1970 Decided March 8, 1971 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. Edward de Grazia argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Nathan Lewin, Arnold… Read more

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401 U.S. 531 (1971) RADICH v. NEW YORK. No. 169. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 22, 1971 Decided March 24, 1971 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. Richard G. Green argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Shirley Fingerhood and Melvin L. Wulf. Michael R. Juviler… Read more

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402 U.S. 363 (1971) UNITED STATES v. THIRTY-SEVEN (37) PHOTOGRAPHS (LUROS, CLAIMANT). No. 133. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 20, 1971 Decided May 3, 1971 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. *364 Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the… Read more

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Section 1461 of Title 18, U. S. C., prohibits the knowing use of the mails for the delivery of obscene matter.[1] The issue presented by the jurisdictional statement in this case is whether § 1461 is constitutional as applied to the distribution of obscene materials to willing recipients who state that they are adults. The District Court held that it was not.[2] We disagree and reverse the judgment.

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We granted the writ in this case to consider the claim that an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, enjoining petitioners from distributing leaflets anywhere in the town of Westchester, Illinois, violates petitioners' rights under the Federal Constitution.

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Paul Robert Cohen was convicted of violating California Penal Code § 415, which criminalizes "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct," for wearing a jacket with the phrase "Fuck the Draft" printed on the back. Cohen wore the jacket in the Los Angeles County Courthouse, and argued that his display of the expletive was there to communicate the sincerity and depth of his feelings regarding the draft and the Vietnam War. Women and children were present in the hallway of the courthouse where Cohen was arrested, and their presence was used as justification for his arrest. Cohen argued that his conviction violated his First Amendment rights through the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of those rights against the states. His argument was unsuccessful in front of the state court of appeals, which upheld his conviction. The State of California had argued that wearing the jacket constituted conduct, not speech, and therefore the conviction was justified and did not violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, holding that wearing the jacket was, in fact, speech. Further, although expletives can be used as "fighting words," they must be directed at the listener, and Cohen's jacket was not. Potentially offended parties had the choice of looking away. Accordingly, California's statute as applied violated Cohen's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the decision of the California Court of Appeals was reversed.

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403 U.S. 207 (1971) CONNELL v. HIGGINBOTHAM ET AL. No. 79. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 19, 1970 Decided June 7, 1971 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA. Sanford Jay Rosen argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Tobias Simon and Melvin… Read more

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405 U.S. 313 (1972) RABE v. WASHINGTON. No. 71-247. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 29, 1972. Decided March 20, 1972. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. William L. Dwyer argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Curtis Ludwig argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Herbert H…. Read more

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After being convicted under the statute, Johnny Wilson challenged a Georgia statute providing that “[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence… opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace… shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” He argued it had not been narrowed by the Georgia courts to apply only to fighting words, “which by their very utterance… tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” and that it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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In this appeal we review the decision of the three-judge District Court holding a Massachusetts loyalty oath unconstitutional.

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Appellant Socialist Labor Party has engaged in a prolonged legal battle to invalidate various Ohio laws restricting minority party access to the ballot. Concluding that "the totality of the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a whole" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court struck down those laws in Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 34 (1968).[1] Following that decision the Ohio Legislature revised the state election code, but the Party was dissatisfied with the revisions and instituted the present suit in 1970.

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This case presents two unrelated questions. Appellant challenges his Kentucky conviction for disorderly conduct on the ground that the conviction and the State's statute are repugnant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He also challenges the constitutionality of the enhanced penalty he received under Kentucky's two-tier system for adjudicating certain criminal cases, whereby a person charged with a misdemeanor may be tried first in an inferior court and, if dissatisfied with the outcome, may have a trial de novo in a court of general *106 criminal jurisdiction but must run the risk, if convicted, of receiving a greater punishment.

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407 U.S. 197 (1972) FLOWER v. UNITED STATES. No. 71-1180. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 12, 1972. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. PER CURIAM. Petitioner John Thomas Flower, a regional “Peace Education Secretary” of the American Friends Service Committee and a… Read more

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The Lloyd Corporation owns a large retail shopping center in Portland, Oregon known as the Lloyd Center. It is bounded by public streets and owns all the land and buildings within the Center. The Lloyd Center allows certain civic and charitable organizations, such as the American Legion and The Salvation Army, to have limited use of the mall. In 1960, Center institutes its strict no handbilling policy. At a few places within the Center, small signs are imbedded in the sidewalk which state its policy. Donald Tanner, Betsy Wheeler, Susan Roberts, and two other young people were anti-war protesters. They were trying to publicize a meeting of the Resistance Community. The Resistance Community was composed of people opposed to the draft and the Vietnam War. On November 14, 1968 the respondents distribute anti-war handbills within Lloyd Center. The distribution occurs in several places on the mall walkways. The five young people are quiet and orderly, and there is no littering. Security guards inform the respondents that they will be arrested if they do not cease and desist the distribution of said handbills. Respondents leave the premises in order to avoid arrest and continue handbilling outside. On January 15, 1970, respondents filed an action in the United States District Court of Oregon. Respondents sought an injunction affirming their right to distribute handbills and enjoining Lloyd Corp. from interfering with that right. Chief Judge Solomon grants the injunction, stating that the Center is open to the general public and that it is found to be the functional equivalent of a public business district. On July 7, 1971, per curiam decision, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upholds the constitutionality of the injunction. It states that it is bound by the lower courts factual determination as to the character of Lloyd Center and thus it must abide by the precedents in Marsh and Amalgamated Food Employees Union. In 1972, The United States Supreme Court grants the petition for cert on January 17. On the issue of public forum v. property rights, peaceful expression carried on in a location open generally to public use is, absent from other factors, is protected by the First Amendment. As such, public access must be given to streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places that are historically associated with the exercise of free speech. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The Court has also held that in some circumstances, property that is privately owned may be considered public for First Amendment purposes. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, (1946) In Marsh, the Court ruled that a Jehovahs Witness had the right to distribute religious pamphlets in the business district of a town owned by a private corporation because that district was the functional equivalent of a business district in a municipality. The Court extended the rationale of Marsh to include the peaceful picketing of a store in a large shopping center. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, (1968). A restriction of free expression in a public forum must be able to withstand strict judicial scrutiny of its effect on First Amendment rights.

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City ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute, found by the Court of Appeals to be unconstitutional because overbroad, held violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it makes an impermissible distinction between peaceful labor picketing and other peaceful picketing.

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Appellant Richard Grayned was convicted for his part in a demonstration in front of West Senior High School in Rockford, Illinois. On April 25, 1969, approximately 200 people—students, their family members, and friends—gathered next to the school grounds. Grayned, whose brother and twin sisters attended the school, was part of this group. The demonstrators marched around on a sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building. Many carried signs that summarized the grievances: “Black cheerleaders to cheer too”; “Black history with black teachers”; “Equal rights, Negro counselors.” After warning the demonstrators, the police arrested 40 of them, including Grayned. Grayned was tried and convicted of violating Rockford’s “anti-picketing” ordinance and “anti-noise” ordinance. A $25 fine was imposed for each violation.

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Students at Central Connecticut State College attempted to gain official recognition for a campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, a student organization famous for its activism, including “sit-ins” at various college campuses, on behalf of the Civil Rights Movement and against the Vietnam War. The college president denied recognition because he believed that the campus chapter held values antithetical to the college, would be a disruptive influence, and would not be independent of the national organization.

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408 U.S. 229 (1972) KOIS v. WISCONSIN. No. 71-5625. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 26, 1972. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. PER CURIAM. Petitioner was convicted in the state trial court of violating a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the dissemination of “lewd, obscene or indecent written matter,… Read more

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Respondent was employed in a state college system for 10 years, the last four as a junior college professor under a series of one-year written contracts. The Regents declined to renew his employment for the next year without giving him an explanation or prior hearing. Respondent then brought this action in the District Court, alleging that the decision not to rehire him was based on respondent's public criticism of the college administration, and thus infringed his free speech right, and that the Regents' failure to afford him a hearing violated his procedural due process right. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, concluding that respondent's contract had terminated and the junior college had not adopted the tenure system. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that, despite lack of tenure, nonrenewal of respondent's contract would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if it was in fact, based on his protected free speech, and that, if respondent could show that he had an "expectancy" of reemployment, the failure to allow him an opportunity for a hearing would violate the procedural due process guarantee.

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Overruled (in part)

Appellant Kirby is the director of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, an administrative agency vested by the California Constitution with primary authority for the licensing of the sale of alcoholic beverages in that State, and with the authority to suspend or revoke any such license if it determines that its continuation would be contrary to public welfare or morals. Art. XX, § 22, California Constitution. Appellees include holders of various liquor licenses issued by appellant, and dancers at premises operated by such licensees. In 1970 the Department promulgated rules regulating the type of entertainment that might be presented in bars and nightclubs that it licensed. Appellees then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, 2202, and 42 U. S. C. § 1983. A three-judge court was convened in accordance with 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, and the majority of that court held that substantial portions of the regulations conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.[1]

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A graduate student at the University of Missouri School of Journalism published the headline “Motherfucker Acquitted” and reprinted a cartoon depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and Goddess of Justice with the caption “With Liberty and Justice for All” in the Free Press Underground, a newspaper that had been sold on the campus for four years. The student was found to have violated the General Standards of Student Conduct that prohibited “indecent conduct or speech.” The student was expelled. The trial court found the publication legally obscene, and so without constitutional protection, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

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412 U.S. 94 (1973) COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE. No. 71-863. Supreme Court of United States. Argued October 16, 1972. Decided May 29, 1973.[*] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. *96 J. Roger Wollenberg argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-863. With him… Read more

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Appellant was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute that approximately incorporated the obscenity test formulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 383 U. S. 418 (plurality opinion). The trial court instructed the jury to evaluate the materials by the contemporary community standards of California. Appellant's conviction was affirmed on appeal. In lieu of the obscenity criteria enunciated by the Memoirs plurality, it is held: 1. Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, reaffirmed. A work may be subject to state regulation where that work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; portrays, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and, taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Pp. 413 U. S. 23-24. 2. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, at 354 U. S. 489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when necessary. Pp. 413 U. S. 24-25. 3. The test of "utterly without redeeming social value" articulated in Memoirs, supra, is rejected as a constitutional standard. Pp. 413 U. S. 24-25. 4. The jury may measure the essentially factual issues of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness by the standard that prevails in the forum community, and need not employ a "national standard." Pp. 413 U. S. 30-34. Vacated and remanded.

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Petitioners are two Atlanta, Georgia, movie theaters and their owners and managers, operating in the *51 style of "adult" theaters. On December 28, 1970, respondents, the local state district attorney and the solicitor for the local state trial court, filed civil complaints in that court alleging that petitioners were exhibiting to the public for paid admission two allegedly obscene films, contrary to Georgia Code Ann. § 26-2101.[1] The two films in question, "Magic Mirror" and "It All Comes Out in the End," depict sexual conduct characterized *52 by the Georgia Supreme Court as "hard core pornography" leaving "little to the imagination."Respondents' complaints, made on behalf of the State of Georgia, demanded that the two films be declared obscene and that petitioners be enjoined from exhibiting the films. The exhibition of the films was not enjoined, but a temporary injunction was granted ex parte by the local trial court, restraining petitioners from destroying the films or removing them from the jurisdiction. Petitioners were further ordered to have one print each of the films in court on January 13, 1971, together with the proper viewing equipment.

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We granted certiorari to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles to review the petitioner's conviction for violation of California statutes regarding obscenity.

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We noted probable jurisdiction to review a summary decision of the United States District Court for the Central District of California holding that § 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 688, as amended, 19 U. S. C. § 1305 (a) was "unconstitutional on its face" and dismissing a forfeiture action brought under that statute.[1] The statute provides in pertinent part:

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Appellee Orito was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin with a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462[1] in that he did "knowingly transport and carry in interstate commerce from San Francisco . . . to Milwaukee . . . by means of a common carrier, that is, Trans-World Airlines and North Central Airlines, copies of [specified] obscene, lewd, lascivious, and filthy materials . . . ." The materials specified included some 83 reels of film, with as many as eight to 10 copies of some of the films. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute violated his First and Ninth Amendment rights.[2] The District Court granted his motion, holding that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad since it failed to distinguish between "public" and "non-public" transportation of obscene material. The District Court interpreted this Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967); and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), to establish *141 the proposition that "non-public transportation" of obscene material was constitutionally protected.[3]

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The Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh (the Ordinance) has been construed below by *378 the courts of Pennsylvania as forbidding newspapers to carry "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns except where the employer or advertiser is free to make hiring or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex. We are called upon to decide whether the Ordinance as so construed violates the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This issue is a sensitive one, and a full understanding of the context in which it arises is critical to its resolution.

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413 U.S. 496 (1973) ROADEN v. KENTUCKY No. 71-1134. Supreme Court of the United States. Argued November 14, 1972. Decided June 25, 1973. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY Phillip K. Wicker argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Robert v. Bullock, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, argued the cause for… Read more

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On December 11, 1972, we noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal, 409 U. S. 1058, based on a jurisdictional statement presenting the single question whether the prohibition in § 9 (a) of the Hatch Act, now codified in 5 U. S. C. § 7324 (a) (2), against federal employees taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns," is unconstitutional on its face. Section 7324 (a) provides:

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Petitioner was manager of a movie theater where a sexually explicit film was exhibited. After police officers saw part of the film, an assistant district attorney requested a New York Criminal Court judge to view it. Upon seeing the entire performance, the judge signed warrants for seizure of the film and for petitioner's arrest on the ground that the film was obscene. Exhibition of an obscene film violates New York Penal Law § 235.05. No pretrial motion was made for return of the single film copy seized or for its suppression as evidence. There was no showing below that the seizure prevented exhibition of the film by use of another copy, and the record does not indicate whether another copy was available. Petitioner's trial was held 47 days after his arrest and the film seizure, and he was convicted. He argued that seizure of the film without a prior adversary hearing violated the Fourteenth Amendment. He also challenged his conviction on substantive grounds, arguing that he was convicted under standards of obscenity both overbroad and unconstitutionally vague, and that films shown only to consenting adults in private are constitutionally protected. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that an adversary hearing prior to seizure of the film was not required and that an ex parte warrant, issued after a judicial determination of obscenity, was constitutionally sufficient.

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413 U.S. 836 (1973) ALEXANDER ET AL. v. VIRGINIA   No. 71-1315. Supreme Court of the United States.   Argued October 19, 1972. Decided June 25, 1973. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIAStanley M. Dietz argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. James E. Kulp, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the… Read more

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414 U.S. 2 (1973) PLUMMER v. CITY OF COLUMBUS.   No. 72-6897. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided October 15, 1973. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOR FRANKLIN COUNTY.PER CURIAM. The Court of Appeals of Franklin County, Ohio, in an unreported opinion, affirmed appellant’s conviction of violating Columbus City Code… Read more

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A sheriff and his deputies were dispersing a campus anti-war demonstration that blocked a public street when one of the protestors said, “We’ll take the fucking streets later.” The protestor was convicted for violating Indiana’s disorderly conduct statute. Overruling the Indiana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that “the statement could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst it amounted nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time.” The Supreme Court held that the statement did not meet the Brandenburg standard (Brandenburg v. Ohio) for incitement which requires a statement to be directed at and likely to produce imminent lawless action. Nor did it fit the “narrowly limited classes of speech” that states may punish (Gooding v. Wilson), such as obscenity or “fighting words.”

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The application of appellants (the Communist Party of Indiana, certain of its officers and potential voters, and its candidates for President and Vice President) for a place on the Indiana ballot for the 1972 general election was rejected for failure to submit a statutory loyalty oath stating that the Party "does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence." Appellants, contending that the statute was unconstitutional, thereupon filed this action in the District Court for injunctive and declaratory relief.

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Upon the Louisiana Supreme Court's reconsideration of this case in light of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972), pursuant to our remand, 408 U. S. 913 (1972), that court, three judges dissenting, again sustained appellant's conviction upon a charge of addressing spoken words to a New Orleans police officer in violation of New Orleans Ordinance 828 M. C. S. § 49-7, 263 La. 809, 269 So. 2d 450 (1972).[1] We noted probable jurisdiction, 412 U. S. 926 (1973), and we reverse. We hold that § 49-7, as construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth *132 Amendments and is therefore facially invalid. Section 49-7 provides:

"It shall be unlawful and a breach of the peace for any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty."
The Louisiana Supreme Court on remand did not refine or narrow these words, but took them as they stood: "The proscriptions are narrow and specific— wantonly cursing, reviling, and using obscene or opprobrious language." 263 La., at 827, 269 So. 2d, at 456. Nonetheless, that court took the position that, as written, "it [§ 49-7] is narrowed to `fighting words' uttered to specific persons at a specific time . . . ." Id., at 826, 269 So. 2d, at 456. But § 49-7 plainly has a broader sweep than the constitutional definition of "fighting words" announced in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942), and reaffirmed in Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 522, namely, "those [words] which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." That the Louisiana Supreme Court contemplated a broader reach of the ordinance is evident from its emphasis upon the city's justification for regulation of "the conduct of any person towards a member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty . . . . Permitting the cursing or reviling of or using obscene or opprobrious words to a police officer while in the actual performance of his duty would be unreasonable and basically incompatible with the officer's activities and the place where such activities are performed." 263 La., at 825, 269 So. 2d, at 456.[2]*133 At the least, the proscription of the use of "opprobrious language," embraces words that do not "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." That was our conclusion as to the word "opprobrious" in the Georgia statute held unconstitutional in Gooding v. Wilson, where we found that the common dictionary definition of that term embraced words "conveying or intended to convey disgrace" and therefore that the term was not limited to words which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 405 U. S., at 525. The same conclusion is compelled as to the reach of the term in § 49-7, for we find nothing in the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court that makes any meaningful attempt to limit or properly define—as limited by Chaplinsky and Gooding—"opprobrious," or indeed any other term in § 49-7. In that circumstance it is immaterial whether the words appellant used might be punishable under a properly limited statute or ordinance. We reaffirm our holding in Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 520-521, in this respect:
"It matters not that the words [appellant] used might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute. At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and when `no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution,' . . . the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing `attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making *134 the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity' . . . . This is deemed necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression."
In sum, § 49-7 punishes only spoken words. It can therefore withstand appellant's attack upon its facial constitutionality only if, as authoritatively construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, it is not susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 18-22 (1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1949); Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 520. Since § 49-7, as construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is susceptible of application to protected speech, the section is constitutionally overbroad and therefore is facially invalid.

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The sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals from a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts flag-misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 471 F. 2d 88 (1972), aff'g 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass). We noted probable jurisdiction. 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vagueness *568 ground. We do not reach the correctness of the holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment grounds.

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Overruled (in part)

This case concerns the constitutionality of certain regulations promulgated by appellant Procunier in his capacity as Director of the California Department of Corrections. Appellees brought a class action on behalf of themselves and all other inmates of penal institutions under the Department's jurisdiction to challenge the rules relating to censorship of prisoner mail and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 a three-judge United States District Court was convened to hear appellees' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. That court entered summary judgment enjoining continued enforcement of the rules in question and ordering appellants to submit new regulations for the court's approval. 354 F. Supp. 1092 (ND Cal. 1973). Appellants' first revisions resulted in counterproposals by appellees and a court order issued May 30, 1973, requiring further modification of the proposed rules. The second set of revised regulations was approved by the District Court on July 20, 1973, over appellees' objections. While the first proposed revisions of the Department's regulations were pending before the District Court, appellants brought this appeal to contest that court's decision holding the original regulations unconstitutional.

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Appellant was convicted in Georgia of the crime of distributing obscene material. His conviction, in March 1972, was for showing the film "Carnal Knowledge" in a movie theater in Albany, Georgia. The jury that found appellant guilty was instructed on obscenity pursuant to the Georgia statute, which defines obscene material in language similar to that of the definition of obscenity set forth in this Court's plurality opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 418 (1966):

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On March 5, 1971, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California indicted petitioners William L. Hamling, Earl Kemp, Shirley R. Wright, David L. Thomas, Reed Enterprises, Inc., and Library Service, Inc., on 21 counts of an indictment charging use of the mails to carry an obscene book, The Illustrated Presidential Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, and an obscene advertisement, which gave information as to where, how, and from whom and by what means the Illustrated Report might be obtained, and of conspiracy to commit the above offenses, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 2, 371, and 1461.[1] Prior to trial, petitioners moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it failed to inform them of the charges, and that the grand jury had insufficient evidence before it to return an indictment and was improperly instructed on the law. Petitioners also challenged the petit jury panel and moved to strike the venire on the ground that there had been an unconstitutional exclusion of all persons under 25 years of age. The District Court denied all of these motions.

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This case involves three state libel judgments imposing liability of $165,000 on a labor union as a result of statements made in a union newsletter during a continuing organizational drive. The question presented is whether these libel judgments can be squared with the freedom of speech in labor disputes guaranteed under federal law.

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The issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press.

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418 U.S. 405 (1974) SPENCE v. WASHINGTON.   No. 72-1690. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued January 9, 1974. Decided June 25, 1974. APPEAL FROM SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON.Peter Greenfield argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Burt Neuborne, Melvin L. Wulf, and Joel M. Gora. James E. Warme argued… Read more

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418 U.S. 298 (1974) LEHMAN v. CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS ET AL. No. 73-328. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 26-27, 1974. Decided June 25, 1974. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. Leonard J. Schwartz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Harry J. Lehman,… Read more

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419 U.S. 7 (1974) UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE ET AL. No. 73-1791. Supreme Court of United States. Decided October 29, 1974. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. PER CURIAM. Appellee American Friends Service Committee (employer) is a religious corporation, whose principal operation is philanthropic work… Read more

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Petitioners are the six maritime unions which appeared before this Court as respondents in Windward Shipping v. American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104 (1974). We granted their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, 415 U. S. 947, in order to review their contentions that this case was distinguishable from Windward on the pre-emption issue, and that the temporary injunction upheld by that court had infringed rights guaranteed to them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.[1]

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The issue before us in this case is whether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a State may extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime.

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The issue in this case is whether First Amendment rights were abridged when respondents denied petitioner the use of a municipal facility in Chattanooga, Tenn., for the showing of the controversial rock musical "Hair." It is established, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the States the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 162 (1943).

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We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may enjoin the issuance by Congress of a subpoena duces tecum that directs a bank to produce the bank records of an organization which claims a First Amendment *493 privilege status for those records on the ground that they are the equivalent of confidential membership lists. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that compliance with the subpoena "would invade the constitutional rights" of the organization, and that judicial relief is available to prevent implementation of the subpoena.

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An advertisement carried in appellant's newspaper led to his conviction for a violation of a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circulation of any publication, to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion. The issue here is whether the editor-appellant's First Amendment rights were unconstitutionally abridged by the statute. The First Amendment, of course, is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939).

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There are other questions, but the principal issue presented for decision is whether a private cause of action for damages against corporate directors is to be implied in favor of a corporate stockholder under 18 U. S. C. § 610, a criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors . . . are to be voted for."[1] We conclude *69 that implication of such a federal cause of action is not suggested by the legislative context of § 610 or required to accomplish Congress' purposes in enacting the statute. We therefore have no occasion to address *70 the questions whether § 610, properly construed, proscribes the expenditures alleged in this case, or whether the statute is unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment or of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

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This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a Jacksonville, Fla., ordinance that prohibits showing films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when its screen is visible from a public street or place.

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Appellant is a town attorney in Nassau County, N. Y., who, along with other local law enforcement officials, was preliminary enjoined by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York from enforcing a local ordinance of the town of North Hempstead. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478 (1973), aff'd, 501 F. 2d 18 (CA2 1974). In addition to defending the ordinance on the merits, he contends that the complaint should have been dismissed on the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and its companion cases.

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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, contained a large variety of restrictions on political campaign giving and spending. Various federal officeholders and candidates, supporting political organizations, and others brought suit against appellees (the Secretary of the Senate, Clerk of the House, Comptroller General, Attorney General, and the Commission) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against several statutory provisions on various constitutional grounds.

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A group of labor union members who engaged in peaceful primary picketing within the confines of a privately owned shopping center were threatened by an agent of the owner with arrest for criminal trespass if they did not depart. The question presented is whether this threat violated the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The National Labor Relations Board concluded that it did, 205 N. L. R. B. 628, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed. 501 F. 2d 161. We granted certiorari because of the seemingly important questions of federal law presented. 420 U. S. 971.

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Petitioner was convicted of selling material which had been judicially declared obscene. At his trial he was not permitted to litigate the obscenity vel non of the publication which was the basis of his prosecution, even though he had not been a party to the earlier civil adjudication in which it was held obscene. We granted certiorari, 422 U. S. 1040 (1975), to consider whether this procedure comported with our decisions delineating the safeguards which must attend attempts by the States to prohibit dissemination of expression asserted to be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against such interference. We reverse.

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The Fort Dix Military Reservation is a United States Army post located in a predominantly rural area of central New Jersey. Its primary mission is to provide basic combat training for newly inducted Army personnel. Accordingly, most of its 55 square miles are devoted to military training activities. The Federal Government exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the entire area within Fort Dix, including the state and county roads that pass through it.[1] Civilian vehicular traffic is permitted on paved roads within the reservation, and civilian pedestrian traffic is permitted on both roads and footpaths. Military police regularly patrol the roads within the reservation, and they occasionally stop civilians and ask them the reason for their presence. Signs posted on the roads leading into the reservation state: "All vehicles are subject to search while on the Fort Dix Military Reservation" and "Soliciting prohibited unless approved by the commanding general." The main entrances to Fort Dix are not normally guarded, and a sign at one of the entrances says "Visitors Welcome." Civilians are freely permitted to visit unrestricted areas of the reservation.

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The District Court for the Eastern District of New York originally dismissed respondent's complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a regulation promulgated by petitioner limiting the length of a policeman's hair. On respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that judgment was reversed, and on remand the District Court took testimony and thereafter granted the relief sought by respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari, 421 U. S. 987 (1975), to consider the constitutional doctrine embodied in the rulings of the Court of Appeals. We reverse.

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The question presented in this case is whether a municipal ordinance requiring advance notice to be given to the local police department by "[a]ny person desiring to canvass, solicit or call from house to house . . . for a recognized charitable cause . . . or . . . political campaign or cause . . . in writing, for identification only" violates the guarantees of freedom of speech and due process of law embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.

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The plaintiff-appellees in this case attack, as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,[1] that portion of § 54-524.35 of Va. Code Ann. (1974), which provides that a pharmacist licensed in Virginia is guilty of unprofessional *750 conduct if he "(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription."[2] The three-judge District Court declared the quoted portion of the statute "void and of no effect," Jurisdictional Statement, App. 1, and enjoined the defendant-appellants, the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and the individual members of that Board, from enforcing it. 373 F. Supp. 683 (ED Va. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. 420 U. S. 971 (1975).

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[*]Zoning ordinances adopted by the city of Detroit differentiate between motion picture theaters which exhibit sexually explicit "adult" movies and those which do not. The principal question presented by this case is whether that statutory classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment.[1]Effective November 2, 1972, Detroit adopted the ordinances challenged in this litigation. Instead of concentrating "adult" theaters in limited zones, these ordinances require that such theaters be dispersed. Specifically, an adult theater may not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area.[2] The term "regulated uses" includes 10 different kinds of establishments in addition to adult theaters.[3]*53 The classification of a theater as "adult" is expressly predicated on the character of the motion pictures which it exhibits. If the theater is used to present "material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to `Specified Sexual Activities' or `Specified Anatomical Areas,' "[4] it is an adult establishment.[5]*54 The 1972 ordinances were amendments to an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" which had been adopted 10 years earlier. At that time the Detroit Common Council made a finding that some uses of property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited areas.[6] The decision to add adult motion picture theaters and adult book stores to the list of businesses which, apart from a special waiver,[7] could not be located within 1,000 feet of two other "regulated uses," was, in part, a response to the significant growth in the number *55 of such establishments.[8] In the opinion of urban planners and real estate experts who supported the ordinances, the location of several such businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to move elsewhere.

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427 U.S. 347 (1976) ELROD, SHERIFF, ET AL. v. BURNS ET AL. No. 74-1520. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 19, 1976. Decided June 28, 1976. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. *349 Thomas A. Foran argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Bernard… Read more

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The respondent State District Judge entered an order restraining the petitioners from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions or admissions made by the accused or facts "strongly implicative" of the accused in a widely reported murder of six persons. We granted certiorari to decide whether the entry of such an order on the showing made before the state court violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.

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The question presented on this appeal from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is whether a State may constitutionally require that an elected board of education prohibit teachers, other than union representatives, to speak at open meetings, at which public participation is permitted, if such speech is addressed to the subject of pending collective-bargaining negotiations.

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Respondent, an untenured teacher (who had previously been involved in an altercation with another teacher, an argument with school cafeteria employees, an incident in which he swore at students, and an incident in which he made obscene gestures to girl students), conveyed through a telephone call to a radio station the substance of a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance that the school principal had circulated to various teachers. The radio station announced the adoption of the dress code as a news item. Thereafter, petitioner School Board, adopting a recommendation of the superintendent, advised respondent that he would not be rehired, and cited his lack of tact in handling professional matters, with specific mention of the radio station and obscene gesture incidents. Respondent then brought this action against petitioner for reinstatement and damages, claiming that petitioner's refusal to rehire him violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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This case presents the question, not fully answered in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the *189 standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detriment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certiorari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the Circuits.[1]

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430 U.S. 308 (1977) OKLAHOMA PUBLISHING CO. v. DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR OKLAHOMA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, ET AL.   No. 76-867. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided March 7, 1977. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.PER CURIAM. A pretrial order entered by the District Court of Oklahoma County… Read more

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New Hampshire statutes require that noncommercial motor vehicles bear license plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die," and make it a misdemeanor to obscure the motto. Appellees, Maynard and his wife, who are followers of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith, view the motto as repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs, and accordingly they covered up the motto on the license plates of their jointly owned family automobiles. Appellee Maynard was subsequently found guilty in state court of violating the misdemeanor statute on three separate charges and upon refusing to pay the fines imposed was sentenced to, and served, 15 days in jail.

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This case presents the question whether the First Amendment permits a municipality to prohibit the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs when the municipality acts to stem what it perceives as the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated community.

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In Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), this Court rejected a plea for a uniform national standard as to what *293 appeals to the prurient interest and as to what is patently offensive; the Court held, instead, that these essentially were questions of fact to be measured by contemporary standards of the community. Id., at 30-34. The instant case presents the issue of the constitutional effect of state law that leaves unregulated the distribution of obscene material to adults, on the determination of contemporary community standards in a prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1461 for a mailing that is wholly intrastate. The case also raises the question whether § 1461 is unconstitutionally vague as applied in these circumstances, and the question whether the trial court, during the voir dire of prospective jurors, correctly refused to ask proffered questions relating to community standards.

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Petitioner Splawn was convicted in 1971 of the sale of two reels of obscene film, a misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code § 311.2 (West 1970). After the conviction was affirmed on appeal by the California First District Court of Appeal and the State Supreme Court denied review, this Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for consideration in light of our decision in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), which had set forth the standards by *597 which the constitutionality of § 311.2 was to be determined. After the State Supreme Court ruled that the statute satisfied the requirements articulated in Miller, see Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 545 P. 2d 229 (1976), the Court of Appeal again affirmed the conviction and the California Supreme Court denied petitioner's motion for a hearing.

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The principal issue in this case is the validity of the Illinois obscenity statute, considered in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). There we reaffirmed numerous prior decisions declaring that "obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment," id., at 23; but acknowledging "the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression," ibid., we recognized that official regulation must be limited to "works which depict or describe sexual conduct" and that such conduct "must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed." Id., at 24. Basic guidelines for the trier of fact, along with more specific suggestions, were then offered:

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431 U.S. 678 (1977) CAREY, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, ET AL. v. POPULATION SERVICES INTERNATIONAL ET AL. No. 75-443. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 10, 1977. Decided June 9, 1977. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. *680 Arlene R. Silverman, Assistant Attorney General of New… Read more

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The Illinois Supreme Court denied a stay of the trial court's injunction prohibiting petitioners from marching, walking, or parading in the uniform of the National Socialist Party of America or otherwise displaying the swastika, and from distributing pamphlets or displaying materials inciting or promoting hatred against Jews or persons of any faith, ancestry, or race, and also denied leave for an expedited appeal. Held: 1. The Illinois Supreme Court's order is a final judgment for purposes of this Court's jurisdiction, since it finally determined the merits of petitioners' claim that the injunction will deprive them of First Amendment rights during the period of appellate review. 2. The State must allow a stay where procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate review, are not provided, and the Illinois Supreme Court's order denied this right. Certiorari granted; reversed and remanded.

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Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Correction, appellants prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join appellee, the North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. (Union), barred all meetings of the Union, and refused to deliver packets of Union publications that had been mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners. The Union instituted this action, based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983, to challenge these policies. It alleged that appellants' efforts to prevent the operation of a prisoners' union violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of it and its members and that the refusal to grant the Union those privileges accorded several other organizations operating within the prison system deprived the Union of equal protection of the laws. A three-judge court was convened. After a hearing, the court found merit in the Union's free speech, association, and equal protection arguments, and enjoined appellants from preventing inmates from soliciting other prisoners to join the Union and from "refus[ing] receipt of the Union's publications on the ground that they are calculated to encourage membership in the organization or solicit joining." The court also held that the Union "shall be accorded the privilege of holding meetings under such limitations and control as are neutrally applied to all inmate organizations . . . ." 409 F. Supp. 937. We noted probable jurisdiction to consider whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments extend prisoner labor unions such protection. 429 U. S. 976. We have decided that they do not, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of the District Court.

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As part of its regulation of the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of that State has imposed and enforces a disciplinary rule that restricts advertising by attorneys. This case presents two issues: whether §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, forbid such state regulation, and whether the operation of the rule violates the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth.[1]

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Title I of Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695, note following 44 U. S. C. § 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V), the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (hereafter Act), directs the Administrator of General Services, an official of the Executive Branch, to take custody of the Presidential papers and tape recordings of appellant, former President Richard M. Nixon, and promulgate regulations that (1) provide for the orderly processing and screening by Executive Branch archivists of such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant those that are personal and private in nature, and (2) determine the terms and conditions upon which public access may eventually be had to those materials that are retained. The question for decision is whether Title I is unconstitutional on its face as a violation of (1) the separation of powers; (2) Presidential privilege doctrines; (3) appellant's privacy interests; (4) appellant's First Amendment associational rights; or (5) the Bill of Attainder Clause.

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Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, is an entertainer. He performs a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet away. Each performance occupies some 15 seconds. In August and September 1972, petitioner was engaged to perform his act on a regular basis at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. He performed in a fenced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds. Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a separate admission fee to observe his act.

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In sustaining a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the First Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that materially affect its business, property, or assets. The court rejected appellants' claim that the statute abridges freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue presented in this context is one of first impression in this Court. We postponed the question of jurisdiction to our consideration of the merits. 430 U. S. 964 (1977). We now reverse.

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We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the court's instructions in a trial for mailing obscene materials prior to 1973, and therefore tried under the Roth-Memoirs standards, could properly include children and sensitive persons within the definition of the community by whose standards obscenity is to be judged. We are also asked to determine whether the evidence supported a charge that members of deviant sexual groups may be considered in determining whether the materials appealed to prurient interest in sex; whether a charge of pandering was proper in light of the evidence; and whether comparison evidence proffered by petitioner should have been admitted on the issue of contemporary community standards.

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We consider on this appeal whether a State may punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, advises a lay person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available from a nonprofit organization with which the lawyer and her associates are affiliated. Appellant, a member of the Bar of South Carolina, received a public reprimand for writing such a letter. The appeal is opposed by the State Attorney General, on behalf of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. As this appeal presents a substantial question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as interpreted in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), we noted probable jurisdiction.

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Upon hearing of an automobile accident, an Ohio lawyer contacted the parents of one of the injured drivers and visited the daughter in the hospital. He met with the 18-year-old daughter in the hospital. He offered to represent her. He also approached her passenger, another 18-year-old girl, who was at home recovering after being released from the hospital. While both young women eventually fired him, he did obtain some of the insurance money in a settlement for the breach of contract claim he brought against the driver. The two young women filed complaints with a bar grievance committee. The Ohio State Bar Association filed a formal complaint with the Disciplinary Board of the Ohio Supreme Court, which rejected appellant's defense that his conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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At issue in these cases are Federal Communications Commission regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or television broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community. Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F. C. C. 2d 1046 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Order), as amended upon reconsideration, 53 F. C. C. 2d 589 (1975), codified in 47 CFR §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1976). The regulations, adopted after a lengthy rulemaking proceeding, prospectively bar formation or transfer of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations. Existing combinations are generally permitted to continue in operation. However, in communities in which there is common ownership of the only daily newspaper and the only broadcast station, or (where there is more than one broadcast station) of the only daily newspaper and the only television station, divestiture of either the newspaper or the broadcast station is required within five years, unless grounds for waiver are demonstrated.

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A New York radio station aired George Carlin’s monologue, “Filthy Words.” Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. Although the station warned listeners before its broadcast that the monologue included “sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some,” the FCC censured the station for violating FCC regulations which prohibited broadcasting indecent material.

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After schools were ordered to be desegregated, an African American school teacher complained frequently to the principal that her students, who were still predominantly black, were not being provided fundamental resources as compared to other classes and schools. At the end of the year, she was told that her teaching contract would not be renewed because of her refusal to cooperate with the administration and her “antagonistic and hostile attitude” throughout the school year.

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Texas law prohibits the practice of optometry under a trade name. It also requires that four of the six members of the State's regulatory board, the Texas Optometry Board, be members of the Texas Optometric Association, a professional organization of optometrists. A three-judge District Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute governing the composition of the Texas Optometry Board against a challenge based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But it held that the prohibition of the practice of optometry under a trade name ran afoul of First Amendment protection of commercial speech. 438 F. Supp. 428 (ED Tex. 1977). These appeals and the cross-appeal bring both of the District Court's holdings before the Court.[1]

I

The Texas Legislature approved the Texas Optometry Act (Act) in 1969, repealing an earlier law governing the practice of optometry in the State. Section 2.01 of the Act establishes the Texas Optometry Board (Board) and § 2.02 prescribes the qualifications for Board members.[2] The Board *4 is responsible for the administration of the Act, and has the authority to grant, renew, suspend, and revoke licenses to practice optometry in the State.[3] The Act imposes numerous regulations on the practice of optometry,[4] and on several aspects of the business of optometry.[5] Many of the Act's business regulations are contained in § 5.13, which restricts fee splitting by optometrists and forbids an optometrist to allow his name to be associated with any optometrical office *5 unless he is present and practicing there at least half of the hours that the office is open or half of the hours that he practices, whichever is less. Section 5.13 (d), at issue here, prohibits the practice of optometry under an assumed name, trade name, or corporate name.[6]The dispute in this case grows out of the schism between "professional" and "commercial" optometrists in Texas. Although all optometrists in the State must meet the same licensing requirements and are subject to the same laws regulating their practices, they have divided themselves informally into two groups according to their divergent approaches to the practice of optometry.[7] Rogers, an advocate of the commercial *6 practice of optometry and a member of the Board, commenced this action by filing a suit against the other five members of the Board. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement of § 2.02 of the Act, prescribing the composition of the Board, and § 5.13 (d) of the Act, prohibiting the practice of optometry under a trade name.

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441 U.S. 463 (1979) SMITH ET AL. v. ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1315, ET AL.         No. 78-1223. Supreme Court of United States.    Decided April 30, 1979. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.PER CURIAM.In grievance proceedings initiated by employees… Read more

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Respondent United States Senator publicizes examples of wasteful governmental spending by awarding his "Golden Fleece of the Month Award." One such award was given to federal agencies that had funded petitioner scientist's study of emotional behavior in which he sought an objective measure of aggression, concentrating upon the behavior patterns of certain animals. The award was announced in a speech prepared with the help of respondent legislative assistant, the text of which was incorporated in a widely distributed press release. Subsequently, the award was also referred to in newsletters sent out by the Senator, in a television interview program on which he appeared, and in telephone calls made by the legislative assistant to the sponsoring federal agencies. Petitioner sued respondents in Federal District Court for defamation, alleging, inter alia, that in making the award and publicizing it nationwide, respondents had damaged him in his professional and academic standing. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that the Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute immunity for investigating the funding of petitioner's research, for the speech in the Senate, and for the press release, since it fell within the "informing function" of Congress. The court further held that petitioner was a "public figure" for purposes of determining respondents' liability; that respondents were protected by the First Amendment, thereby requiring petitioner to prove "actual malice"; and that, based on the depositions, affidavits, and pleadings, there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of actual malice, neither respondents' failure to investigate nor unfair editing and summarizing being sufficient to establish "actual malice." Finally, the court held that, even if petitioner were found to be a "private person," relevant state law required a summary judgment for respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the statements made in the press release and newsletters and that, although the followup telephone calls and the statements made on television were not protected by that Clause, they were protected by the First Amendment, since petitioner was a "public figure," and that on the record there was no showing of "actual malice." Held: 1. While this Court's practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available, special considerations in this case mandate that the constitutional questions first be resolved. If respondents have immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause, no other questions need be considered. And where it appears that the Court of Appeals would not affirm the District Court's state law holding, so that the appeal could not be decided without reaching the First Amendment issue, that issue will also be reached here. Pp. 443 U. S. 122-123. 2. The Speech or Debate Clause does not protect transmittal of information by individual Members of Congress by press releases and newsletters. Pp. 443 U. S. 123-133. (a) There is nothing in the history of the Clause or its language suggesting any intent to create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside the legislative Chambers; precedents support the conclusion that a Member may be held liable for republishing defamatory statements originally made in the Chamber. Pp. 443 U. S. 127-130. (b) Neither the newsletters nor the press release here was "essential to the deliberation of the Senate," and neither was part of the deliberative process. Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306. P. 443 U. S. 130. (c) The newsletters and press release were not privileged as part of the "informing function" of Members of Congress to tell the public about their activities. Individual Members' transmittal of information about their activities by press releases and newsletters is not part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative process; in contrast to voting and preparing committee reports, which are part of Congress' function to inform itself, newsletters and press releases are primarily means of informing those outside t.he legislative forum, and represent the views and will of a single Member. Doe v. McMillan, supra, distinguished. Pp. 443 U. S. 132-133. 3. Petitioner is not a "public figure" so as to make the "actual malice" standard of proof of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, applicable. Neither the fact that local newspapers reported the federal grants to petitioner for his research nor the fact that he had access to the news media as shown by reports of his response to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award demonstrates that he was a public figure prior to the controversy engendered by that award. His access, such as it was, came after the alleged libel, and was limited to responding to the announcement of the award. Those charged with alleged defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure. Nor is the concern about public expenditures sufficient to make petitioner a public figure, petitioner at no time having assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question of such concern. Pp. 443 U. S. 133-136. 579 F.2d 1027, reversed and remanded. BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all but n. 10 of which STEWART, J., joined. STEWART, J., filed a statement concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 443 U. S. 136. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 443 U. S. 136.

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In 1974, respondent Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published a book entitled KGB, the Secret Work of Soviet Agents (KGB), written by respondent John Barron.[1] The book describes the Soviet Union's espionage organization and chronicles its activities since World War II. In a passage referring to disclosures by "royal commissions in Canada and Australia, and official investigations in Great Britain and the United States," the book contains the following statements relating to petitioner Ilya Wolston:

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We granted certiorari to consider whether a West Virginia statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of the juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.

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This case involves challenges to United States Air Force regulations that require members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations violate the First Amendment. The second question is whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to communicate with a Member of Congress.

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444 U.S. 507 (1980) SNEPP v. UNITED STATES. No. 78-1871. Supreme Court of United States. Decided February 19, 1980.[*] ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. PER CURIAM. In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp III seeks review of a judgment enforcing an agreement that he… Read more

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The issue in this case is the validity under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations that do not use at least 75 percent of their receipts for "charitable purposes," those purposes being defined to exclude solicitation expenses, salaries, overhead, and other administrative expenses. The Court of Appeals held the ordinance unconstitutional. We affirm that judgment.

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445 U.S. 308 (1980) VANCE ET AL. v. UNIVERSAL AMUSEMENT CO., INC., ET AL.   No. 78-1588. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued November 28, 1979. Decided March 18, 1980. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.Lonny F. Zwiener, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellants…. Read more

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The question presented is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect an assistant public defender who is satisfactorily performing his job from discharge solely because of his political beliefs.

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Soon after appellees had begun soliciting in appellant privately owned shopping center's central courtyard for signatures from passersby for petitions in opposition to a United Nations resolution, a security guard informed appellees that they would have to leave because their activity violated shopping center regulations prohibiting any visitor or tenant from engaging in any publicly expressive activity that is not directly related to the center's commercial purposes. Appellees immediately left the premises and later filed suit in a California state court to enjoin the shopping center and its owner (also an appellant) from denying appellees access to the center for the purpose of circulating their petitions.

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At issue in this case is the constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of a state statute that generally bars picketing of residences or dwellings, but exempts from its prohibition "the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute."

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In an effort to curb energy use, New York placed a ban on advertisements by public utility companies that promote the use of electricity. After the restriction was placed in effect, Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in court. The regulation was upheld before it was sent to the Supreme Court.

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The question in this case is whether the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly electric bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy.

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The charter of the appellant Democratic Party of the United States (National Party) provides that delegates to its National Convention shall be chosen through procedures in which only Democrats can participate. Consistently with the charter, the National Party's Delegate Selection Rules provide that only those who are willing to affiliate publicly with the Democratic Party may participate in the process of selecting delegates to the Party's National Convention. The question on this appeal is whether Wisconsin may successfully insist that its delegates to the Convention be seated, even though those delegates are chosen through a process that includes a binding state preference primary election in which voters do not declare their party affiliation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the National Convention is bound by the Wisconsin primary election results, and cannot refuse to seat the delegates chosen in accord with Wisconsin law. 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N. W. 2d 519.

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In a prosecution charging petitioners with disseminating obscenity in violation of Ohio law, the trial court granted their motions to dismiss the complaints on the ground that they had been subjected to selective and discriminatory prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial, finding the evidence insufficient to support the allegations of discriminatory prosecution. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.

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In 1973, appellants began operating an adult bookstore in the commercial zone in the Borough of Mount Ephraim in Camden County, N. J. The store sold adult books, magazines, and films. Amusement licenses shortly issued permitting the store to install coin-operated devices by virtue of which a customer could sit in a booth, insert a coin, and watch an adult film. In 1976, the store introduced an additional coin-operated mechanism permitting the customer to watch a live dancer, usually nude, performing behind a glass panel. *63 Complaints were soon filed against appellants charging that the bookstore's exhibition of live dancing violated § 99-15B of Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance, which described the permitted uses in a commercial zone,[1] in which the store was located, as follows:

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Overruled (in part)

452 U.S. 714 (1981) NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY v. BELLANCA, DBA THE MAIN EVENT, ET AL. No. 80-813. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 22, 1981. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. PER CURIAM. The question presented in this case is the power of a… Read more

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A rule (Rule 6.05) of the Minnesota Agricultural Society (Society), a Minnesota public corporation that operates the annual state fair, provides that sale or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written material, except from a duly licensed location on the fairgrounds shall be a misdemeanor. As Rule 6.05 is construed and applied by the Society, all persons, groups, or firms desiring to sell, exhibit, or distribute materials during the fair must do so only from fixed locations. However, the Rule does not prevent organizational representatives from walking about the fairgrounds and communicating the organization's views to fair patrons in face-to-face discussions. Space in the fairgrounds is rented in a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis, and Rule 6.05 applies alike to nonprofit, charitable, and commercial enterprises. Respondents, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), an organization espousing the views of the Krishna religion, and the head of one of its temples filed suit in a Minnesota state court against state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Rule 6.05, on its face and as applied, violated their First Amendment rights. ISKCON asserted that the Rule suppressed the practice of Sankirtan, a religious ritual that enjoins its members to go into public places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna religion. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 6.05, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.

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We noted probable jurisdiction to decide whether the United States District Court for the Southern District of *116 New York correctly determined that 18 U. S. C. § 1725, which prohibits the deposit of unstamped "mailable matter" in a letterbox approved by the United States Postal Service, unconstitutionally abridges the First Amendment rights of certain civic associations in Westchester County, N. Y. 449 U. S. 1076 (1981). Jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U. S. C. § 1252.

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453 U.S. 182 (1981) CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL.   No. 79-1952. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued January 19, 1981. Decided June 26, 1981. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.*184 Rick C. Zimmerman argued the cause for appellants. With him on… Read more

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The question presented is whether the President, acting through the Secretary of State, has authority to revoke a passport on the ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.

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453 U.S. 490 (1981) METROMEDIA, INC., ET AL. v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, ET AL. No. 80-195. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 25, 1981. Decided July 2, 1981. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. *492 Floyd Abrams argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Theodore B. Olson, Dean… Read more

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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), limits the contributions that may be made to candidates or political committees in an election for federal office. One provision of the Act, § 441a(d), authorizes limited expenditures by the national and state committees of a political party in connection with a general election campaign for federal office. After authorizing such expenditures, which otherwise would be impermissible,[1] the section specifies the amount a *29 national committee may spend in connection with a Presidential campaign, § 441a(d)(2), and limits the amount that national and state committees of a political party may spend in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for the Senate or the House of Representatives, § 441a(d)(3). In this litigation we examine whether § 441a(d)(3) is violated when a state committee of a political party designates the national senatorial campaign committee of that party as its agent for the purpose of making expenditures allowed by the Act.

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454 U.S. 90 (1981) CALIFORNIA EX REL. COOPER, CITY ATTORNEY OF SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA v. MITCHELL BROTHERS’ SANTA ANA THEATER ET AL.   No. 81-271. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided November 30, 1981 ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICTPER CURIAM. The petition for… Read more

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The University of Missouri-Kansas City was founded in 1929, the university has an enrollment of approximately 14,000 students. The school allows over 100 recognized non-religious student groups to meet on its campus. All students pay a $41 activity fee (1978-1979) per semester to support this privilege. UMKC is a part of the University of Missouri system, which is governed by the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri. Defendant Gary E. Widmar is a member of the Board of Curators. Cornerstone is a fundamentalist evangelical Christian student-led organization. The group is registered with the university and met on campus from 1973 to 1977. Plaintiffs were all active members of the organization at the time this action was first filed. The parties disagree about whether allowing Cornerstone to have access to university facilities would be a government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause prohibits government speech endorsing religion while private speech in support of religion is protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses. With respect to equal access to limited public forums for religious groups, the Supreme Court typically finds no violation of the Establishment Clause where there is little concern that the public would perceive an endorsement of religion by the government entity and where any benefit to religion is merely incidental.

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The issue on appeal is whether a limitation of $250 on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures violates the First Amendment.

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The Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), required a re-examination of long-held perceptions as to "advertising" by lawyers. This appeal presents the question whether certain aspects of the revised ethical rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri regulating lawyer advertising conform to the requirements of Bates.

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An ordinance of appellant village requires a business to obtain a license if it sells any items that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." Guidelines define the items (such as "roach clips," which are used to smoke cannabis, "pipes," and "paraphernalia"), the sale of which is required to be licensed. Appellee, which sold a variety of merchandise in its store, including "roach clips" and specially designed pipes used to smoke marihuana, upon being notified that it was in possible violation of the ordinance, brought suit in Federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and requesting injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. The District Court upheld the ordinance and awarded judgment to the village defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face.

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Section 310(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 88 Stat. 1285, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 437h(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), lists three categories of plaintiffs who may challenge the constitutional validity of FECA in specially expedited suits: (1) the Federal Election Commission (FEC), (2) "the national committee of any political party," and (3) "any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President." In this case, we address a question we expressly reserved in California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 187, n. 6 (1981): whether a party not belonging to one of the three categories listed in § 437h(a) may nonetheless invoke its procedures.

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The question presented is whether the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, *47 prohibits a State from declaring an election void because the victorious candidate had announced to the voters during his campaign that he intended to serve at a salary less than that "fixed by law."

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Section 16A of Chapter 278 of the Massachusetts General Laws,[1] as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, requires trial judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of that victim. The question presented is whether the statute thus construed violates the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

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457 U.S. 853 (1982) BOARD OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 26, ET AL. v. PICO, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND PICO, ET AL.   No. 80-2043. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued March 2, 1982. Decided June 25, 1982. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT*855… Read more

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The owner of a bookstore in Manhattan was convicted of promoting a sexual performance of a child by selling two sexually explicit films involving young boys to undercover police officers. New York argued this was in violation of a state criminal statute that prohibits knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under 16 by distributing material which depicts such performances. It also prohibits such materials that are produced out of state.

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This case presents the question whether certain disclosure requirements of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.01 et seq. (1972 and Supp. 1981), can be constitutionally applied to the Socialist Workers Party, a minor political party which historically has been the object of harassment by government officials and private parties. The Ohio statute requires every political party to report the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosures by a minor political party that can show a "reasonable probability" that the compelled disclosures will subject those identified to "threats, harassment, or reprisals." Id., at 74. Employing this test, a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party. We affirm.

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The question in the case ultimately comes down to whether respondent National Right to Work Committee (NRWC or respondent) limited its solicitation of funds to "members" within the meaning of 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4)(C).[1]In April 1977, petitioner Federal Election Commission (Commission)[2] determined that there was probable cause to *199 believe that NRWC had violated the above-cited provisions of the Act by soliciting contributions from persons who were not its "members." Shortly thereafter, respondent filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Commission. One month later, the Commission filed an enforcement proceeding against respondent in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to establish respondent's violation of 2 U. S. C. § 441b. The actions were consolidated in the latter court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission on the basis of stipulated facts. 501 F. Supp. 422 (1980).[3] The judgment of the District Court was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 215, 665 F. 2d 371 (1981), and we granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 914 (1982).

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Under a collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education of Perry Township, Ind., and Perry Education Association (PEA) as the exclusive bargaining representative for the School District's teachers, PEA was granted access to the interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes in the Perry Township schools. The bargaining agreement also provided that access rights to the mail facilities were not available to any rival union, such as Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA). PLEA and two of its members filed suit in Federal District Court against PEA and individual members of the School Board, contending that PEA's preferential access to the internal mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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This case presents the question of a State's power to impose a special tax on the press and, by enacting exemptions, to limit its effect to only a few newspapers.

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An Assistant District Attorney circulated internally a questionnaire regarding “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.” She was subsequently fired for circulating the questionnaire.

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In this case we must determine whether 40 U. S. C. § 13k, which prohibits, among other things, the "display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public *173 notice any party, organization, or movement"[1] in the United States Supreme Court building and on its grounds, violates the First Amendment.

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Appellee Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR) is a nonprofit corporation organized to promote what it conceives to be the "public interest" in the area of federal *542 taxation. It proposes to advocate its point of view before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary. This case began when TWR applied for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3). The Internal Revenue Service denied the application because it appeared that a substantial part of TWR's activities would consist of attempting to influence legislation, which is not permitted by § 501(c)(3).[1]TWR then brought this suit in District Court against the appellants, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that it qualifies for the exemption granted by § 501(c)(3). It claimed the prohibition against substantial lobbying is unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.[2] The District Court granted summary judgment for appellants. On appeal, the en banc Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that § 501(c)(3) does not violate the First Amendment but does violate the Fifth Amendment. 219 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 676 F. 2d 715 (1982). Appellants appealed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252, and TWR cross-appealed. *543 We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal, 459 U. S. 819 (1982).[3]TWR was formed to take over the operations of two other nonprofit corporations. One, Taxation With Representation Fund, was organized to promote TWR's goals by publishing a journal and engaging in litigation; it had tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). The other, Taxation With Representation, attempted to promote the same goals by influencing legislation; it had tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4).[4] Neither predecessor organization was required to pay federal income taxes. For purposes of our analysis, there are two principal differences between § 501(c)(3) organizations and § 501(c)(4) organizations. Taxpayers who contribute to § 501(c)(3) organizations are permitted by § 170(c)(2) to deduct the amount of their contributions on their federal income tax returns, while contributions to § 501(c)(4) organizations are not deductible. Section 501(c)(4) organizations, but not § 501(c)(3) organizations, are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying to advance their exempt purposes.

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Title 39 U. S. C. § 3001(e)(2) prohibits the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The District Court held that, as applied to appellee's mailings, the statute violates the First Amendment. We affirm.

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We granted certiorari to decide whether the guarantees of open public proceedings in criminal trials cover proceedings for the voir dire examination of potential jurors.

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The State of Minnesota authorizes its public employees to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment. It also requires public employers to engage in official exchanges of views with their professional employees on policy questions relating to employment but outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. If professional employees forming an appropriate bargaining unit have selected an exclusive representative for mandatory bargaining, their employer may exchange views on nonmandatory subjects only with the exclusive representative. The question presented in these cases is whether this restriction on participation in the nonmandatory-subject exchange process violates the constitutional rights of professional employees within the bargaining unit who are not members of the exclusive representative and who may disagree with its views. We hold that it does not.

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Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits the posting of signs on public property.[1] The question presented *792 is whether that prohibition abridges appellees' freedom of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.[2]In March 1979, Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. A group of his supporters known as Taxpayers for Vincent (Taxpayers) entered into a contract with a political sign service company known as Candidates' Outdoor Graphics Service (COGS) to fabricate and post signs with Vincent's name on them. COGS produced 15- by 44-inch cardboard signs and attached them to utility poles at various locations by draping them over crosswires *793 which support the poles and stapling the cardboard together at the bottom. The signs' message was: "Roland Vincent — City Council."Acting under the authority of § 28.04 of the Municipal Code, employees of the city's Bureau of Street Maintenance routinely removed all posters attached to utility poles and similar objects covered by the ordinance, including the COGS signs. The weekly sign removal report covering the period March 1-March 7, 1979, indicated that among the 1,207 signs removed from public property during that week, 48 were identified as "Roland Vincent" signs. Most of the other signs identified in that report were apparently commercial in character.[3]On March 12, 1979, Taxpayers and COGS filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, naming the city, the Director of the Bureau of Street Maintenance, and members of the City Council as defendants.[4] They sought an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After engaging in discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The District Court entered findings of fact, concluded that the ordinance was constitutional, and granted the City's motion.

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In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), this Court, with one dissenting vote, concluded that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of contributions by a charitable organization that did not use at least 75% of its receipts for "charitable purposes" was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue in the present case is whether a Maryland statute with a like percentage limitation, but with provisions that render it more "flexible" than the *950 Schaumburg ordinance, can withstand constitutional attack. The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that, even with this increased flexibility, the percentage restriction on charitable solicitation was an unconstitutional limitation on protected First Amendment solicitation activity. We agree with that conclusion and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

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Respondents are American citizens who want to travel to Cuba. They are inhibited from doing so by a Treasury Department regulation, first promulgated in 1963, which prohibits any transaction involving property in which Cuba, or any national thereof, has "any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." 31 CFR § 515.201(b) (1983) (Regulation 201(b)). For a period of about five years, "transactions ordinarily incident to" travel to and from as well as within Cuba were, with some limitations, exempted from the broad prohibition of Regulation 201(b) by a general license. See 31 CFR § 515.560 (1983). But this general license was amended in 1982, and the scope of permissible economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba was significantly narrowed. 47 Fed. Reg. 17030 (1982).

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The issue in this case is whether a National Park Service regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks violates the First Amendment when applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall in connection with a demonstration intended to call attention to the plight of the homeless. We hold that it does not and reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals.

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Moved to action by a widely felt need to sponsor independent sources of broadcast programming as an alternative to commercial broadcasting, Congress set out in 1967 to support and promote the development of noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations. A keystone of Congress' program was the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U. S. C. § 390 et seq., which established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit corporation authorized to disburse federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations in support of station operations and educational programming. Section 399 of that Act, as amended by the Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730, forbids any "noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation" to "engage in editorializing." 47 U. S. C. § 399. In this case, we are called upon to decide whether Congress, by imposing that restriction, has passed a "law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

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United States Jaycees, a nonprofit national membership corporation with the goal to promote and foster the growth and development of young men’s civic organizations, limited regular membership to young men between 18 and 35 years old. Associate membership was open to those ineligible for regular membership, such as women and older men. Two local chapters in Minnesota were found to be violating the bylaws by admitting women as regular members. After the chapters were notified by the national organization that revocation of their charters was to be considered, members filed discrimination charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. They alleged that the exclusion of women from full membership violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which makes it “an unfair discriminatory practice … [t]o deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex.”

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468 U.S. 641 (1984) REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ET AL. v. TIME, INC.   No. 82-729. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued November 9, 1983 Decided July 3, 1984 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK*643 Elliott Schulder argued the cause for appellants. With him on… Read more

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[††]The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act), 26 U. S. C. § 9001 et seq., offers the Presidential candidates of major political parties the option of receiving public financing for their general election campaigns. If a Presidential candidate elects public financing, § 9012(f) makes it a criminal offense for independent "political committees," such as appellees National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and Fund For A Conservative Majority (FCM), to expend more than $1,000 to further that candidate's election. A three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in companion lawsuits brought respectively by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and by the Democratic Party of the United States and the Democratic National *483 Committee (DNC), held § 9012(f) unconstitutional on its face because it violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. These plaintiffs challenge that determination on this appeal, and the FEC also appeals from that part of the judgment holding that the Democratic Party and the DNC have standing under 26 U. S. C. § 9011(b)(1) to seek a declaratory judgment against appellees upholding the constitutionality of § 9012(f). We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to the statutory appeal provision of § 9011(b)(2), which provides for a direct appeal to this Court from three-judge district courts convened in proceedings under § 9011(b)(1). 466 U. S. 935 (1984). We reverse the judgment of the District Court on the issue of the standing of the Democratic Party and the DNC, but affirm its judgment as to the constitutional validity of § 9012(f).

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Since the decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), in which the Court held for the first time that the First Amendment precludes certain forms of regulation of purely commercial speech, we have on a number of occasions addressed the constitutionality of restraints on advertising and solicitation by attorneys. See In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). This case presents additional unresolved questions regarding the regulation of commercial speech by attorneys: whether a State may discipline an attorney for soliciting business by running newspaper advertisements containing nondeceptive illustrations and legal advice, and whether a State may seek to prevent potential deception of the public by requiring attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding fee arrangements.

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The question is whether petitioners may be permanently enjoined from publishing nonpersonalized investment advice and commentary in securities newsletters because they are not registered as investment advisers under § 203(c) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Act), 54 Stat. 850, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-3(c).

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The question in these cases is whether the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred in invalidating in its entirety a Washington statute aimed at preventing and punishing the publication of obscene materials.

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We granted certiorari to decide whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment provides absolute immunity to a defendant charged with expressing libelous and damaging falsehoods in letters to the President of the United States.

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This case requires us to decide whether the Federal Government violates the First Amendment when it excludes legal defense and political advocacy organizations from participation in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC or Campaign), a charity drive aimed at federal employees. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the respondent organizations could not be excluded from the CFC, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 234 U. S. App. D. C. 148, 727 F. 2d 1247 (1984). We granted certiorari, 469 U. S. 929 (1984), and we now reverse.

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This case involves a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance, enacted by appellant city of Renton, Washington, that prohibits adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. Appellees, Playtime Theatres, Inc., and Sea-First Properties, Inc., filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking a declaratory judgment that the Renton ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The District Court ruled in favor of Renton and denied the permanent injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for reconsideration. 748 F. 2d 527 (1984). We noted probable jurisdiction, 471 U. S. 1013 (1985), and now reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.[1]*44 In May 1980, the Mayor of Renton, a city of approximately 32,000 people located just south of Seattle, suggested to the Renton City Council that it consider the advisability of enacting zoning legislation dealing with adult entertainment uses. No such uses existed in the city at that time. Upon the Mayor's suggestion, the City Council referred the matter to the city's Planning and Development Committee. The Committee held public hearings, reviewed the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and received a report from the City Attorney's Office advising as to developments in other cities. The City Council, meanwhile, adopted Resolution No. 2368, which imposed a moratorium on the licensing of "any business. . . which . . . has as its primary purpose the selling, renting or showing of sexually explicit materials." App. 43. The resolution contained a clause explaining that such businesses "would have a severe impact upon surrounding businesses and residences." Id., at 42.

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475 U.S. 1 (1986) PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA ET AL.   No. 84-1044. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued October 8, 1985 Decided February 25, 1986 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA*3 Robert L. Harris argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was… Read more

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This case concerns the proper standard for issuance of a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment. Respondents P. J. Video, Inc., and James Erhardt were charged in the village of Depew, New York, Justice Court with six counts of obscenity in the third degree under § 235.05(1) of the New York Penal Law.[1] Respondents moved to suppress five videocassette movies that had been seized from respondents' store, and that formed the basis for the obscenity charges *870 against respondents, on the ground that the warrant authorizing the seizure was issued without probable cause to believe that the movies were obscene. The Justice Court granted the motion and dismissed the informations under which respondents were charged, and both the County Court of Erie County and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 65 N. Y. 2d 566, 483 N. E. 2d 1120 (1985). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the instant case and the decisions in Sequoia Books, Inc. v. McDonald, 725 F. 2d 1091 (CA7 1984), and United States v. Pryba, 163 U. S. App. D. C. 389, 502 F. 2d 391 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1127 (1975). 474 U. S. 918 (1985). We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

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Respondent Preferred Communications, Inc., sued petitioners City of Los Angeles (City) and the Department of Water and Power (DWP) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The complaint alleged a violation of respondent's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, by reason of the City's refusal to grant respondent a cable television franchise and of DWP's refusal to grant access to DWP's poles or underground conduits used for power lines. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed with respect to the Sherman Act, but reversed as to the First Amendment claim. 754 F. 2d 1396 (1985). We granted certiorari with respect to the latter issue, 474 U. S. 979 (1985).

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In this case we address the facial constitutionality of a Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, doing business in Puerto Rico as Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino, filed suit against appellee Tourism Company of Puerto Rico in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section. Appellant *331 sought a declaratory judgment that the statute and regulations, both facially and as applied by the Tourism Company, impressibly suppressed commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment and the equal protection and due process guarantees of the United States Constitution.[1] The Superior Court held that the advertising restrictions had been unconstitutionally applied to appellant's past conduct. But the court adopted a narrowing construction of the statute and regulations and held that, based on such a construction, both were facially constitutional. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed an appeal on the ground that it "d[id] not present a substantial constitutional question." We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. 474 U. S. 917 (1985). We now hold that we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and we affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico with respect to the facial constitutionality of the advertising restrictions.

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We granted certiorari to decide whether the First Amendment bars enforcement of a statute authorizing closure of a premises found to be used as a place for prostitution and lewdness because the premises are also used as an adult bookstore.

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A public high school student delivered a speech at a school assembly nominating another student for a student office. During the speech, he referred to his candidate using a graphic and explicit sexual metaphor. The auditorium contained approximately 600 students, including 14-year-old students. Some of the students enjoyed the speech, while others appeared embarrassed. Prior to the assembly, several teachers warned the student against giving the speech because of the inappropriate content.

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The petitioners, United States citizen employees of the Panama Canal Commission and their spouses, seek refunds of income taxes collected on salaries paid by the Commission between 1979 and 1981. We granted certiorari to resolve conflicting appellate interpretations of an international agreement. 474 U. S. 1050 (1986).

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Overruled (in part)

479 U.S. 92 (1986) CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY, ET AL. v. IACOBUCCI, DBA TALK OF THE TOWN, ET AL. No. 86-139. Supreme Court of United States. Decided November 17, 1986 ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PER CURIAM. In 1982, the City Commission of… Read more

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479 U.S. 238 (1986) FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC.   No. 85-701. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued October 7, 1986 Decided December 15, 1986 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT*240 Charles N. Steele argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs… Read more

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The question presented in this case is whether a state sales tax scheme that taxes general interest magazines, but exempts newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals, violates the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press.

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The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 631-633, as amended in 1942 and 1966, 22 U. S. C. §§ 611-621 (Act), uses the term "political propaganda," as defined in the Act, to identify those expressive materials that must comply with the Act's registration, filing, and disclosure requirements. The constitutionality of those underlying requirements and the validity of the characteristics used to define the regulated category of expressive materials are not at issue in this case. The District Court concluded, however, that Congress violated the First Amendment by using the term "political propaganda" as the statutory name for the regulated category of expression.

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In Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), the Court set out a tripartite test for judging whether material is obscene. The third prong of the Miller test requires the trier of fact to determine "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id., at 24. The issue in this case is whether, in a prosecution for *499 the sale of allegedly obscene materials, the jury may be instructed to apply community standards in deciding the value question.

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The issue presented in this case is whether a resolution banning all "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violates the First Amendment.

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The issue in this case is whether a clerical employee in a county Constable's office was properly discharged for remarking, *380 after hearing of an attempt on the life of the President, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him."

I

On January 12, 1981, respondent Ardith McPherson was appointed a deputy in the office of the Constable of Harris County, Texas. The Constable is an elected official who functions as a law enforcement officer.[1] At the time of her appointment, McPherson, a black woman, was 19 years old and had attended college for a year, studying secretarial science. Her appointment was conditional for a 90-day probationary period.

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In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. §§ 371-396, that authorizes the United States Olympic Committee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olympic."

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Three former editors of the Spectrum, a student newspaper run as part of a journalism class and funded by the Board of Educators, sued after the principal removed two articles from the May 1983 issue that described student experiences with pregnancy and divorce. The principal believed that the students interviewed and parents discussed in the articles could be identified and found the discussions of birth control and sexual activity inappropriate for younger students.

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The courts below declared unconstitutional the following Virginia statute: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to knowingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and peruse" visual or written material that "depicts sexually explicit nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to juveniles." Va. Code § 18.2-391(a) (Supp. 1987). The unique factual and procedural setting of this case leads us to conclude that an authoritative construction of the Virginia statute by the Virginia Supreme Court would substantially aid our review of this constitutional holding, and might well determine the case entirely. Accordingly, we certify two questions to the Virginia Supreme Court.[1]

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Title 5 U.S.C. Ch. 75, provides a "two-track" system for undertaking "adverse actions" against certain Government employees. An employee removed for "cause," §§ 7511-7514, has a right of appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), § 7513(d), that includes a hearing. The Board reviews such removals under a preponderance of the evidence standard. § 7701. An employee is also subject to summary removal based on national security concerns. Such a removal is not appealable to the Board, but the employee has certain specified procedural rights, including a hearing by an agency authority. § 7532. Respondent was removed from his laborer's job at a submarine facility after the Navy denied him a required security clearance. Without a security clearance, respondent was not eligible for any job at the facility. Upon respondent's appeal of his removal under § 7513(d), the Board's presiding official reversed the Navy's decision, holding that the Board had the authority to review the merits of the underlying security clearance determination and that the Navy had failed to show that it reached a reasonable and warranted decision on this question. The full Board reversed and sustained the Navy's removal action, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that, since the Navy had chosen to remove respondent under § 7512 rather than § 7532, review under § 7513 applied, including review of the merits of the underlying security clearance determination.

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Hustler magazine parodied Jerry Falwell, a nationally-known minister and public commentator, in a cartoon that imagined Falwell recalling his first sexual experience with his mother in an outhouse. The cartoon included a disclaimer that it was an “ad parody not to be taken seriously.” Falwell received damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress from the trial court and the Fourth Circuit.

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485 U.S. 312 (1988) BOOS ET AL. v. BARRY, MAYOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL. No. 86-803. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 9, 1987 Decided March 22, 1988 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT *314 Raymond D. Battocchi argued the cause for petitioners…. Read more

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A 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act states that no household shall become eligible to participate in the food stamp program during the time that any member of the household is on strike or shall increase the allotment of food stamps that it was receiving already because the income of the striking member has decreased. We must decide whether this provision is valid under the First and the Fifth Amendments.

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In Colorado the proponents of a new law, or an amendment to the State Constitution, may have their proposal placed on the ballot at a general election if they can obtain enough signatures of qualified voters on an "initiative petition" within *416 a 6-month period. One section of the state law regulating the initiative process makes it a felony to pay petition circulators.[1] The question in this case is whether that provision is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the statute abridged appellees' right to engage in political speech and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. We agree.

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486 U.S. 466 (1988) SHAPERO v. KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION No. 87-16. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 1, 1988 Decided June 13, 1988 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY *468 Donald L. Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Mary Janice Lintner. Frank P. Doheny, Jr., argued the… Read more

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Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 498, as amended, provides that:

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The city of Lakewood, a suburban community bordering Cleveland, Ohio, appeals a judgment of the Court of Appeals *753 for the Sixth Circuit enjoining enforcement of its local ordinance regulating the placement of newsracks. The court's decision was based in part on its conclusion that the ordinance vests the mayor with unbridled discretion over which publishers may place newsracks on public property and where.

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Brookfield, Wisconsin, has adopted an ordinance that completely bans picketing "before or about" any residence. This case presents a facial First Amendment challenge to that ordinance.

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The North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act governs the solicitation of charitable contributions by professional fundraisers. As relevant here, it defines the prima facie "reasonable fee" that a professional fundraiser may charge as a percentage of the gross revenues solicited; requires professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the gross percentage of revenues retained in prior charitable solicitations; and requires professional fundraisers to obtain a license before engaging in solicitation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that these aspects of the Act unconstitutionally infringed upon freedom of speech. We affirm.

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The issue in this case is whether the National Security Agency (NSA) invoked the proper statutory authority when it terminated respondent John Doe, an NSA employee. The Court of Appeals held that NSA did not — a decision with which we disagree. We first describe the statutes relevant to this case.

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[††]We have before us two decisions of the Indiana courts, involving the application of that State's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) and Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity (CRRA) Acts to cases involving bookstores containing allegedly obscene materials.

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The California Elections Code prohibits the official governing bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates in party primaries. It also dictates the organization and composition of those bodies, limits the term of office of a party chair, and requires that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern California. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that these provisions violate the free speech and associational rights of political parties and their members guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 826 F. 2d 814 (1987). We noted probable jurisdiction, 485 U. S. 1004 (1988), and now affirm.

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Petitioner city of Dallas adopted an ordinance restricting admission to certain dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18. Respondent, the owner of one of these "teenage" dance halls, sued to contest the constitutional validity of the ordinance. The Texas Court of Appeals held that the ordinance violated the First Amendment right of persons between the ages of 14 and 18 to associate with persons outside *21 that age group. We now reverse, holding that the First Amendment secures no such right.

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Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 26 U. S. C. § 170, permits a taxpayer to deduct from gross income the amount of a "charitable contribution." The Code defines that term as a "contribution or gift" to certain eligible donees, including entities organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes.[1] We granted certiorari to determine *684 whether taxpayers may deduct as charitable contributions payments made to branch churches of the Church of Scientology (Church) in order to receive services known as "auditing" and "training." We hold that such payments are not deductible.

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491 U.S. 576 (1989) MASSACHUSETTS v. OAKES No. 87-1651. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 17, 1989 Decided June 21, 1989 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS *578 James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Phyllis N. Segal and A. John… Read more

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During the 1984 Republican National Convention, respondent Gregory Lee Johnson participated in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and some Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, although several witnesses were offended by the flag burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a state court of appeals affirmed. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the state, consistent with the First Amendment, could not punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances.

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Respondent Rock Against Racism (RAR), furnishing its own sound equipment and technicians, has sponsored yearly programs of rock music at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in New York City's Central Park. The city received numerous complaints about excessive noise at RAR's concerts. Rejecting various other solutions to the excessive noise and inadequate amplification problems, the city adopted a Use Guideline for the bandshell which specified that the city would furnish high quality sound equipment and retain an independent, experienced sound technician for all performances. After the city implemented this guideline, RAR amended a preexisting District Court complaint against the city to seek damages and a declaratory judgment striking down the guideline as facially invalid under the First Amendment.

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The issue before us is the constitutionality of § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U. S. C. § 223(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V). The statute, as amended in 1988, imposes an outright ban on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. The District Court upheld the prohibition against obscene interstate telephone communications for commercial purposes, but enjoined the enforcement of the statute insofar as it applied to indecent messages. We affirm the District Court in both respects.

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This case presents the question whether governmental restrictions upon commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond the least restrictive means to achieve the desired end.

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493 U.S. 215 (1990) FW/PBS, INC., DBA PARIS ADULT BOOKSTORE II, ET AL. v. CITY OF DALLAS ET AL.     No. 87-2012. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued October 4, 1989 Decided January 9, 1990[*] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT*219 John H. Weston argued the cause… Read more

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Overruled

In this appeal, we must determine whether § 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 388, violates either the First or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Section 54(1) prohibits corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state office. Mich. Comp. Laws § 169.254(1) (1979). Corporations *655 are allowed, however, to make such expenditures from segregated funds used solely for political purposes. § 169.255(1). In response to a challenge brought by the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), the Sixth Circuit held that § 54(1) could not be applied to the Chamber, a Michigan nonprofit corporation, without violating the First Amendment. 856 F. 2d 783 (1988). Although we agree that expressive rights are implicated in this case, we hold that application of § 54(1) to the Chamber is constitutional because the provision is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

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In order to combat child pornography, Ohio enacted Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989), which provides in pertinent part:

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Petitioners, members of respondent State Bar of California, sued that body, claiming its use of their membership dues to finance certain ideological or political activities to which they were opposed violated their rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of California rejected this challenge on the grounds that the State Bar is a state agency and, as such, may use the dues for any purpose within its broad statutory authority. We agree that lawyers admitted to practice in the State may be required to join and pay dues to the State Bar, but disagree as to the scope of permissible dues-financed activities in which the State Bar may engage.

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496 U.S. 91 (1990) PEEL v. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS No. 88-1775. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 17, 1990 Decided June 4, 1990 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS *93 Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Stephen J. Marzen argued the cause for… Read more

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Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989 after the Supreme Court overturned a Texas statute criminalizing the knowingly offensive destruction American flag in Texas v. Johnson. The Flag Protection Act criminalized "knowingly" mutilating, defacing, physically defiling, burning, or tampling upon an American flag. The Supreme Court found the Flag Protection Act to be unconstitutional. Although it did not contain a content-based limitation like the Texas statute did, the Government's interest in protecting the "physical integrity" of the flag in order to preserve its symbolism is related to the suppression of free expression and violates the First Amendment.

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To the victor belong only those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980), decided that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge or threaten to discharge public employees solely for not being supporters of the political party in power, unless party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position involved. *65 Today we are asked to decide the constitutionality of several related political patronage practices — whether promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees may be constitutionally based on party affiliation and support. We hold that they may not.

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Government property that is designated by the government as being open and available to the pubic for expressive purposes is as classified as a public forum. The government regulation of speech in a public forum must pass strict scrutiny.Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Speech in a public forum may also be regulated by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions which do not target the content of speech. If on the other hand, the Government has not made their property available for public expression, or the function of the property would be substantially hampered by expression, the property will be classified as a non-public forum. The Government may regulate or ban all types of speech in a nonpublic forum. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Lastly, a quasi-public or limited public forum may exist where the government has opened to certain First Amendment uses. A government-operated limited public forum is not required to and does not allow individuals to engage in all types of speech. The regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness.

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Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act imposed a sales tax on dozens of services, including the provision of cable television. The Act, however, exempted from taxation receipts from newspaper and magazine sales. The cable television industry in Arkansas brought suit challenging the Act, arguing that Arkansas could not constitutionally tax cable television when it was not taxing the print media. The trial court rejected this argument. While the case was on appeal, Arkansas amended the Act to tax all television and radio services. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, stating that the First Amendment does not prohibit different taxation of different members of the media. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, also held that the First Amendment does prohibit differential taxation among member of the same medium and therefore found that the Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it, before the amendment, taxed cable television differently from satellite television services. Differential taxation of speakers and publishers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. A tax also is suspect if it targets a small group of speakers. Moreover, a tax triggers heightened scrutiny if it discriminates among speakers based on the content of their speech.Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

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An Indiana public indecency statute prohibits, among other things, appearing nude in public. Two adult entertainment establishments and an erotic dancer sued to prevent enforcement of this statute as it applied to nude dancing. The trial court eventually held that nude dancing is not expressive activity protected by the First Amendment and upheld the statute. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that non-obscene nude dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection. When speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct (such as burning a draft card), the government can regulate that conduct if (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on the speech element of the conduct is not greater than necessary to further the substantial governmental interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

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The question before us is whether the First Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information. We hold that it does not.

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A Nevada criminal defense attorney called a press conference after his client was indicted to maintain his client's innocence. He also indicated that the evidence would show that a police officer actually was guilty of the offense for which his client was charged. After his client was acquitted, the attorney was charged by the state bar association with violating Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, which prohibits an attorney from making a statement to the press that he or she knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. A subsection of Rule 177 provides that an attorney may comment on general matters such as the nature of the defense. The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board found that the attorney had violated Rule 177, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. Speech critical of the government and its officials generally cannot be prohibited or punished absent a compelling governmental interest. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). On the other hand, the Court has held that the speech of attorneys participating in a particular case can be regulated if the regulation is necessary to further the ends of justice. Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In any event, a regulation of speech cannot be enforced if it is so vague that it forces the regulated party to guess as to the limits of the regulation. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).

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In 1977, New York passed legislation commonly known as the "Son of Sam" law, which required any entity contracting with an accused or convicted criminal for the production of a work describing the crime to turn over to the state's Crime Victims Board any income earned under that contract. The Board then made payments from that fund for legal and literary representation, compensation to victims, and payments to other creditors. In 1986, the Board became aware of a contract between publisher Simon & Schuster and organized crime figure Henry Hill for a book entitled Wiseguy. After the Board sought to enforce the Son of Sam law against Simon & Schuster, the publisher brought suit seeking a ruling that the legislation violated the First Amendment. The trial court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the statute. A statute is presumed to violate the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). Such a statute can be upheld only if it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).

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David Dawson was convicted of first degree murder and various other crimes. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecution introduced evidence that Mr. Dawson was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a white racist prison gang. This evidence was not clearly relevant to any other evidence offered by the prosecution or the defense. The trial court ultimately imposed the death penalty. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The First Amendment protects an individual's right to join groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The Constitution, however, does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of relevant evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).

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A Tennessee statute prohibits the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. Mary Rebecca Freeman, the treasurer for the campaign of a city council candidate in Nashville, challenged the statute in Tennessee state court. Freeman argued that the statute violated the freedom of speech provisions in the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. The trial judge rejected her challenge. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was unconstitutional.

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In mid-1990, a white juvenile in St. Paul was arrested for burning a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family. The juvenile was charged with violating St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibited the placement of any symbol on public or private property that aroused anger in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. The juvenile moved to dismiss this charge, claiming that it was overbroad and impermissibly content-based under the First Amendment. The trial court granted this motion. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance prohibited only “fighting words,” which, since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), had been deemed unworthy of any First Amendment protection.

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The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owns and operates the Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark airports, adopted regulations prohibiting persons or groups from soliciting money or distributing literature within the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members perform a ritual known as sankirtan, which consists of going into public places, disseminating literature, and soliciting funds to support the religion. The Society challenged the Port Authority's regulations on the grounds that the regulations deprived the Society's members of their free speech rights under the First Amendment. The trial court ruled in favor of the Society, holding that the airports were public forums and that the regulations were too broad. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the airports were not public forums and that the ban on solicitations was reasonable. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's ruling that the ban on distributing literature violated the First Amendment. When evaluating a governmental regulation of speech on government-owned property, the property first must be categorized as a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Traditional public forums are places, such as streets and sidewalks, where public discourse and debate have traditionally occurred. Designated public forums are places, such as university auditoriums, that the government has expressly opened to certain types of expression. Nonpublic forums are all other government-owned property. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Any regulation of speech in a public forum, traditional or designated, must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. A regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum, however, need only be reasonable and content-neutral. Perry Education Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983).

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505 U.S. 830 (1992) LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT AUTHORITY POLICE v. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., et al. No. 91-339. United States Supreme Court. Argued March 22, 1992. Decided June 26, 1992. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Arthur P. Berg argued the cause for petitioner. With him… Read more

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The Discovery Network sought to distribute commercial flyers from newspaper racks on city-owned property. Cincinnati had a policy against allowing commercial distribution for reasons of safety and aesthetics.

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Scott Fane, a certified public accountant, built a successful solo practice in New Jersey by making unsolicited telephone calls to business executives and then arranging meetings to explain his expertise and services. Fane then moved to Florida, where he learned that such calls were prohibited by the Florida Board of Accountancy. Fane challenged this prohibition on First Amendment grounds, and the district court held that the rule was invalid as it applied to solicitations of business clients. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized that commercial speech speech that concerns only commercial or economic activity is entitled to some First Amendment protection. The government therefore may regulate commercial speech only if it is false or misleading or if the restriction directly and narrowly advances a substantial state interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1978).

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The school district of Center Moriches, New York, adopted rules that permitted its facilities to be used for social, civic, and recreational purposes, but that prohibited any group from using the facilities for religious purposes. Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical church, applied for permission to show a six-part film series in one of the buildings. The series presented a religious perspective on family issues and child rearing. The school district denied the application, relying on the prohibition against using the facilities for religious purposes. Lamb's Chapel sued in federal court, but both the trial court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the school district. A government is not obligated to make its non-public facilities available for use by the general public. Even when it does so, it may limit the purposes for which the facilities may be used. The government may not, however, deny access to the facilities based upon the viewpoint of the person who seeks access to them.Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985). A government may deny access to a religious group if allowing access would violate the First Amendment's prohibition against establishing a religion. One test for evaluating whether the Establishment Clause is being violated is set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) — whether the challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, whether the action has the principal effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and whether it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. While never quite repudiated, this test has proven unpopular with many members of the Court.

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Respondent Todd Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced because he intentionally selected his victim on account of the victim's race. The question presented in this case is whether this penalty enhancement is prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that it is not.

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Edge Broadcasting Company owns a radio station in Moyock, North Carolina. Moyock is approximately three miles from the border between North Carolina and Virginia, and 92.2% of the station's audience lives in Virginia. Virginia allows state-run lotteries; North Carolina does not. The Federal Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. _ 1304, prohibits television and radio stations operating in non-lottery states from broadcasting lottery advertisements. Edge challenged the constitutionality of this prohibition, at least as the prohibition was applied to Edge. A federal district court in Virginia ruled in Edge's favor, holding that the prohibition was ineffective in shielding North Carolina residents from lottery advertising. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized that commercial speech speech that concerns only commercial or economic activity is entitled to some First Amendment protection. The government therefore may regulate commercial speech only if it is false or misleading or if the restriction directly and narrowly advances a substantial state interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1978).

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After a full criminal trial, petitioner Ferris J. Alexander, owner of more than a dozen stores and theaters dealing in sexually explicit materials, was convicted on, inter alia, 17 obscenity counts and 3 counts of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The obscenity convictions, based on the jury's findings that four magazines and three videotapes sold at several of petitioner's stores were obscene, served as the predicates for his three RICO convictions. In addition to imposing a prison term and fine, the District Court ordered petitioner to forfeit, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 1963 (1988 ed. and Supp. III), certain assets that were directly related to his racketeering activity as punishment for his RICO violations. Petitioner argues that this forfeiture violated the First and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. We reject petitioner's *547 claims under the First Amendment but remand for reconsideration of his Eighth Amendment challenge.

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Three women's organizations sued various pro-life groups under RICO, alleging that the groups were conspiring to close abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity, including extortion. The district court dismissed the case, holding that RICO could be used only against "profit-generating" enterprises. The Court of Appeals affirmed. RICO, among other things, prohibits a person from participating in a pattern of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. _ 1962(c). "Racketeering activity" is broadly defined in RICO to include extortion, bribery, fraud, and other crimes. 18 U.S.C. _ 1961(1). RICO is silent as to whether the racketeering must be motivated by profit.

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A nurse in the obstetrics unit at a public hospital was fired after she spoke with a nurse who was being recruited to join the unit. According to some witnesses, the nurse spoke inappropriately and negatively about the unit and her supervisor. According to the nurse and other witnesses, she spoke primarily about whether some policies being followed on the unit were diminishing the quality of nursing care. The nurse's supervisors learned of the discussion and fired the nurse after a brief investigation. The nurse sued, complaining that her termination violated the rule set forth by the Court inConnick v. Myers — that a public employee's speech is protected if it involves a matter of public concern and is not disruptive of the employment setting. The district court held that the nurse's speech was not of public concern and dismissed her case. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the speech (if it was as described by the terminated nurse) was of public concern. The court of appeals noted that inquiry must turn on what the speech actually was, and not on what the hospital concluded had been said. In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a public employee's speech is protected if it involves a matter of public concern and is not disruptive of the employment setting. The Court, however, had never before been asked to decide a case in which the public employer and employee disagreed about what had been said.

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An ordinance in Ladue, Missouri, prohibited homeowners from displaying all signs on their property except residence identification signs, "for sale" signs, and signs warning of safety hazards. A homeowner displayed a letter-sized sign stating "For Peace in the Gulf" and challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The district and appellate courts held that the ordinance violated the First Amendment. While governments may regulate the physical characteristics of signs, they may not allow some signs and ban others based upon their content. Nor may governments ban all signs and foreclose an important form of communication. Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).

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Silvia Ibanez, an attorney, included "CPA" and "CFP" designations after her listing in the yellow pages. Those designations were truthful. The Florida Board of Accountancy, however, believed the designations were misleading and reprimanded her for deceptive conduct. Despite the fact that the Board was unable to point to any person who claimed to have been misled, the Board's decision was affirmed by the Florida District Court of Appeal. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized that commercial speech speech that concerns only commercial or economic activity is entitled to some First Amendment protection. The government therefore may regulate commercial speech only if it is false or misleading or if the restriction directly and narrowly advances a substantial state interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1978)

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Congress in 1992 passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, which required, among other things, that cable television systems carry local broadcast stations. Several cable operators filed suit, claiming that the legislation violated the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The district court held that the "must-carry" provisions of the Act were constitutional. The extent to which the government can regulate speech often depends upon whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. Content based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, while content-neutral regulations need only reasonably advance a substantial state interest. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).

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A Florida state court ordered that antiabortion protestors could not demonstrate within 36 feet of an abortion clinic, make loud noises within earshot of the clinic, display images observable from the clinic, approach patients within 300 feet of the clinic, and demonstrate within 300 feet of the residence of any clinic employee. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the injunction in its entirety. When speech in a public forum is prohibited because of its content, the state must be able to demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental issue. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983). If the regulation is neutral as to the speaker's content, the regulation need only be a reasonable restriction on the time, place, or manner of the speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).

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The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, as amended, prohibits the interstate transportation, *66 shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U. S. C. § 2252. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of respondents for violation of this Act. It held that the Act did not require that the defendant know that one of the performers was a minor, and that it was therefore facially unconstitutional. We conclude that the Act is properly read to include such a requirement.

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In this case we consider whether actions of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, commonly known as Amtrak, are subject to the constraints of the Constitution.

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In 1989, Congress adopted legislation that, among other things, prohibited all governmental employees from receiving compensation for their speaking and writing. Lower level executive branch employees who in the past had received compensation for writing and speaking on subjects unrelated to their employment challenged the law, claiming that it unconstitutionally infringed on their First Amendment rights. The district court and appellate court agreed. In Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress may impose restraints on job-related speech of public employees, even if these restraints would be unconstitutional if applied to non-public employees. When these restraints are challenged, courts must balance the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern against the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services that it performs through its employees.

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Margaret McIntyre, a resident of Westerville, Ohio, opposed her local school district's request for a tax levy. She expressed her opposition by preparing and distributing a handbill to persons attending a meeting concerning the levy. Some of the handbills identified her as the author, but others were signed "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS." The handbills were not false, misleading, or libelous. A school official informed Mrs. McIntyre that the handbills did not conform to Ohio's election laws because they did not identify the author. Mrs. McIntyre nevertheless distributed the handbills at another meeting. The Ohio Elections Commission found that Mrs. McIntyre's conduct was unlawful and fined her $100. The local trial court reversed the Commission's decision, holding that the prohibition against anonymous handbilling was unconstitutional as it was applied to Mrs. McIntyre. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and reinstated the fine. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. In 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Regulation of political speech is not permitted under the First Amendment unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In 1989, the Court held that states have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of their electorial process. Eu v. San Francisco City Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). The Court had never before been asked to decide whether states could ban anonymous polictical handbilling.

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The Federal Alcohol Administration Act prohibits beer labels from displaying alcohol content. The Coors Brewing Co. claimed that it had a First Amendment right to disseminate the alcohol content of its products. Although the proffered purpose of the legislation was to prevent "strength wars," i.e., marketplace competition based on the potency of different beers, other regulation of alcoholic beverages allows brewers to advertise alcohol content and requires wine and hard liquor manufacturers to display such information. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized that commercial speech speech that concerns only commercial or economic activity is entitled to some First Amendment protection. The government therefore may regulate commercial speech only if it is false or misleading or if the restriction directly and narrowly advances a substantial state interest. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1978).

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Since 1947, the city of Boston has authorized the Council, a private group, to organize the city’s St. Patrick’s Day parade. The Council did not admit GLIB to the 1993 parade claiming such an admission would violate the parade’s “traditional religious and social values.” Massachusetts courts required the Council to admit GLIB based on a state public-accommodation law.

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Rules of the Florida Bar prohibit personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster. This case asks us to consider whether such Rules violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. We hold that in the circumstances presented here, they do not.

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The University of Virginia, a public university, used public money to subsidize publishing costs for nonreligious student groups. The university denied funds to a Christian student group that requested financial assistance to publish a newspaper that would “challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.”

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In 1956, Rhode Island adopted two statutes, R.I. Gen. Laws __ 3-8-7 and 3-8-8.1, that forbid both sellers and the media from advertising the price of any alcoholic beverage. The stated purpose of this legislation is to promote temperance by increasing the price of alcoholic beverages. These statutes were upheld by Rhode Island state courts. S & S Liquormart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1985);Rhode Island Liquor Stores Ass'n. v. The Evening Call Pub. Co., 497 A.2d 331 (R.I. 1985). In early 1992, 44 Liquormart, a Rhode Island retail store that sells alcoholic beverages, and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, a Massachusetts retailer that would advertise in Rhode Island if it could, challenged the Rhode Island laws in federal court. The trial court, after a trial on the merits, held that the advertising ban was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court held that, under the First Amendment, truthful, non-misleading commercial speech can be restricted only if (1) the government has a substantial interest in regulating the speech, (2) the regulation directly advances that substantial interest, and (3) the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to advance that interest. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Council of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), the Court held that a legislature's power to ban a particular product or activity included the power to ban all advertising of that product or activity.

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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. _ 431 et seq., imposes limits on contributions to candidates for federal office. The Act, for example, provides that individuals may contribute no more than $1,000 to any candidate with respect to any election. 2 U.S.C. _ 441a. The Act similarly provides that multicandidate political committees may contribute no more than $5,000 to any candidate. Expenditures that are made by a person or committee in cooperation with a candidate are deemed to be contributions under the Act. Political committee expenditures are also deemed to be contributions attributable to a particular candidate if the expenditures create a communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate and contains an electioneering message. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court held that limitations on expenditures for political speech must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. In Buckley, the Court also held that the First Amendment prohibited restrictions on an individual's ability to make expenditures not coordinated with a candidate. In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985), the Court extended the holdings in Buckley to apply to "independent" expenditures made by political committees. In early 1986, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee sponsored radio advertisements critical of then-Representative Tim Wirth, a Democrat seeking his party's nomination for the U.S. Senate. At the time that the advertisement was broadcast, the Republican Party had not yet nominated a candidate for the Senate seat. After the Colorado Democratic Party filed an administrative complaint under the Act, the Federal Election Commission determined that the expenditure for the advertisement was a coordinated party expenditure subject to the limitations of the Act. The FEC then filed a civil complaint in the federal district court, claiming that the Republican Committee had exceeded the limits set forth in the Act. The Committee argued that the advertisement was not an expenditure in connection with a general election and that the Act violated the Committee's rights of free speech and association. The district court agreed that the expenditure was not made in connection with a general election and that it therefore was not subject to the Act. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the advertisement was subject to the Act because it was directed at a clearly identified candidate and contained an electioneering message. The court of appeals also rejected the Committee's First Amendment argument.

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Keen Umbehr had a contract with Wabaunsee County, Kansas, under which he hauled trash for participating cities in the county. While the contract was in force, Mr. Umbehr spoke at county commission meetings and wrote letters and columns in local newspapers concerning, among other things, alleged violations of law and other improprieties by the county commission and its road and bridge department. The county later terminated the hauling contract. Mr. Umbehr filed suit against three of the commissioners, alleging that they had terminated the contract because of his public criticisms and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court rejected Mr. Umbehr's claim, holding that the First Amendment did not prohibit the county from considering Mr. Umbehr's statements when it decided to terminate the contract. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals recognized that its decision was contrary to cases in other Circuits but it held that the rationales used in the other cases were no longer valid. The First Amendment prevents the government from terminating employees who speak on matters of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Governmental workers also are constitutionally protected from dismissal for supporting or affiliating with a political party, unless such affiliation reasonably can be considered an appropriate job qualification. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). To prevail in an unlawful termination claim, the employee must show that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination. Even upon such a showing, the government can prevail if it can show that it would have taken the same action absent the protected conduct or if sufficiently strong countervailing governmental interests exist. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

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O'Hare Truck Service had provided towing services for the City of Northlake, Illinois, since 1965. In 1993, the mayor of Northlake, who was seeking reelection, asked O'Hare for a campaign contribution. O'Hare refused and instead publicly supported the mayor's opponent. Shortly thereafter, O'Hare was removed from the list of towing services used by Northlake. O'Hare sued in federal court, alleging that Northlake had violated its First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the First Amendment protections available to governmental employees did not extend to independent contractors. The First Amendment prevents the government from terminating employees who speak on matters of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Governmental workers also are constitutionally protected from dismissal for supporting or affiliating with a political party, unless such affiliation reasonably can be considered an appropriate job qualification. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). To prevail in an unlawful termination claim, the employee must show that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination. Even upon such a showing, the government can prevail if it can show that it would have taken the same action absent the protected conduct or if sufficiently strong countervailing governmental interests exist. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

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Section 10 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. _ 532, regulates indecent programming on local access cable television channels. Indecent speech is speech that, while not obscene, describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in an offensive manner. Local access channels are those channels set aside by the cable operator for use by persons not affiliated with the operator. The operator is prohibited from exercising any editorial control over these channels. Local access channels usually either are leased or are the "public, educational, or governmental" channels that a local government requires the operator to set aside as partial consideration for the operator's right to install cables under city streets and to otherwise use public right of ways. Section 10(a) of the Act permits cable operators to refuse to carry indecent speech on leased local access channels. Section 10(b) of the Act directs the Federal Communications Commission to adopt rules requiring operators who choose to carry indecent programming on local access channels to place the programs on a separate channel and to block the channel until the subscriber, in writing, requests unblocking. Section 10(c) permits cable operators to refuse to carry indecent speech on public, educational, or governmental channels. A combination of groups that produce and watch local access programming challenged the Act and the FCC regulations implementing it on First Amendment grounds. The groups argued that the Act and regulations unconstitutionally censored indecent speech. A panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed with this argument and struck down the Act. On rehearing, however, the full court reversed and held that the Act was constitutional because it did not require censorship of indecent speech and because the blocking provisions were the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest in shielding children from indecent programming. When, as in this case, a governmental restriction of speech is based upon the content of that speech, the restriction can be upheld only if it constitutes the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). In the broadcasting context, the least restrictive means analysis often involves determining whether the broadcasts are available to children, whether the type of broadcasting is pervasively present in society, whether the indecent material can "confront" the audience with little or no warning, and whether adults have other means to receive similar speech. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

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The question presented is whether an injunction that places restrictions on demonstrations outside abortion clinics violates the First Amendment. We uphold the provisions imposing "fixed bubble" or "fixed buffer zone" limitations, as hereinafter described, but hold that the provisions imposing "floating bubble" or "floating buffer zone" limitations violate the First Amendment.

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Congress in 1992 passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, which required, among other things, that cable television systems carry local broadcast stations. Several cable operators filed suit, claiming that the legislation violated the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. In 1993, the district court held that the "must-carry" provisions of the Act were constitutional. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court, in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Comm., 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), held that the "must-carry" provisions constituted a content-neutral regulation and could be constitutional. The Court then ordered the district court to determine whether the government could demonstrate that the provisions reasonably advanced an important governmental interest. On remand, a divided district court held that Congress had before it "substantial evidence" from which to conclude that the must-carry provisions were necessary to protect the local broadcast industry. When examining content-neutral regulations, courts apply an "intermediate" level of scrutiny. Under this analysis, legislation that affects speech but that does not favor the message of one speaker over another can be constitutional if the legislation (1) furthers an important governmental interest and (2) does not burden more speech than necessary to advance that interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

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Under regulations (7 C.F.R. pts. 916 and 917) issued by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. _ 601 et seq., all handlers of California peaches, nectarines, and plums are, among other things, annually assessed an amount that is used in part to finance generic advertising of these products. A number of handlers, whose total annual assessment chargeable to this advertising has been in excess of $500,000, challenged the regulations on several grounds, including that the regulation that required them to support the generic advertising campaign violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The administrative law judge ruled in favor of the handlers, but the Judicial Officer of the U.S. Department of Agriculture reversed that decision. The handlers then appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, which also rejected the handlers' First Amendment argument. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Agriculture could not constitutionally require the handlers to finance the generic advertising campaign. Since 1980, the Court usually has analyzed First Amendment issues involving commercial speech under the standard that it set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Under Central Hudson, regulation of lawful, non-misleading commercial speech must be evaluated under a three-part test: whether the governmental interest asserted in support of the regulation is substantial, whether the regulation directly advances that interest, and whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), however, the Court held that members of organizations can be required to contribute financially to speech with which they disagree, as long as the speech is germane to the governmental interest that justifies the compelled membership.

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The Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 223, prohibits the transmission of indecent and patently offensive materials to minors over the Internet. A number of civil rights and computer groups challenged the constitutionality of these provisions on First Amendment grounds. In essence, these groups argued that the inability of Internet users and providers to verify the age of information recipients effectively prevented them from engaging in indecent speech, which traditionally has received significant First Amendment protection. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing that included many online demonstrations, a special three-judge district court (which was created by the CDA to hear the expected constitutional challenges) agreed with the groups and ruled that the provisions violated the First Amendment. Indecent speech, unlike obscenity, is entitled to constitutional protection because it often has substantial social value and lacks prurient interest. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). This speech therefore cannot be regulated unless the restrictions are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). The Court already has held that the government has a compelling interest in protecting minors from indecent speech. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court also has held that the government may prohibit dissemination of indecent materials to minors as long it does not at the same time prohibit dissemination to adults. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

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The Arkansas Educational Television Commission, a state agency, sponsored a debate between the Democratic and Republican candidates for a U.S. House of Representatives seat in Arkansas' Third Congressional District. The Commission only invited the two major party candidates and excluded Ralph Forbes, a legally qualified independent candidate. AETC determined Forbes did not have sufficient "political viability" for inclusion. Forbes sued the agency. After a federal district court dismissed the claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed, finding that AETC had created a limited public forum to which Forbes had a presumptive right of access. Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television Commission, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996). The appeals court determined that AETC's assessment of "political viability" was not a compelling enough interest nor narrowly tailored enough reason to pass constitutional review. The Court analyzes right of access cases using the public forum doctrine. There are three types of fora: traditional public fora, limited or designated public fora and nonpublic fora. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Even in a nonpublic forum, government officials cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, discriminate based on viewpoint. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). However, television broadcasters enjoy &"the widest possible journalistic freedom" consistent with their public responsibilities. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).

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In 1990, Congress amended the statute governing the National Endowment for the Arts to require that the NEA chairperson consider "general standards of respect and decency for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" when awarding art grants. Four artists—Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes and Tim Miller, known collectively as the "NEA 4"—sued in federal court, claiming the so-called "decency clause" violated the First Amendment and forced artists to engage in self-censorship in order to obtain NEA funding. The trial judge ruled in favor of the "NEA 4," ruling that the decency clause was both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed for "essentially the same reasons as the district court." The 9th Circuit determined the decency clause was void for vagueness and for violating the First Amendment’s general prohibition against content- and viewpoint-based discrimination. A bedrock principle of the First Amendment is that government may not prohibit speech just because it finds the speech offensive or disagreeable. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is also protected by the First Amendment. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The First Amendment protects against viewpoint discrimination above other forms of content discrimination. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). When the government promotes a particular program and defines the limit of a program, it can fund speech that promotes its goals, even to the detriment of other goals. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). "There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).

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Colorado amended the state law regulating the ballot initiative and referendum petition process. Several plaintiffs, including the public interest group American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., sued. The group claimed various provisions of the law violated First Amendment political free-speech rights: (1) a six-month restriction on when circulations must be filed; (2) a requirement that all circulators sign an affidavit; (3) requirement that circulators be 18 years or older; (4) a requirement that circulators be registered Colorado voters; (5) a requirement that circulators wear identification badges; and (6) disclosure requirements. The appeals court upheld the six-month restriction, the age of majority requirement and the affidavit-signing provisions. However, the appeals court ruled that the registered voter, badge identification and disclosure requirements infringed on First Amendment rights. The circulating of petitions during elections represents core political speech which receives the highest level of protection under the First Amendment. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). Though a state may regulate such activity, the state must show that its regulations serve a compelling state interest without burdening speech. However, states must have the ability to regulate elections to ensure a fair and honest democratic process. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).

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Concerned about an increase in street crime, the City of Chicago conducted hearings about gang-related crime in 1992. These hearings resulted in a "gang loitering" ordinance which prohibits people police "reasonably believe" to be gang members from "loitering in any public place with one or more persons." The city arrested over 43,000 people under the law until an appeals court struck it down on First Amendment grounds in 1995, finding that the law "violates the freedom of association, assembly and expression secured by the First Amendment" and a similar provision in the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court also ruled the law unconstitutional, though it struck the law down on due-process, rather than First Amendment, grounds. More than 70 defendants convicted under the ordinance appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. A law must provide adequate notice of proscribable conduct and not grant unfettered discretion to the police. A law must establish sufficient standards for the police and public — or it can be ruled unconstitutionally vague. The freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, a non-profit trade association of various radio and television broadcasters in the New Orleans area, challenged the federal law banning broadcast advertisements of casino gaming. The law, 18 U.S.C. _ 1304 prohibits the broadcasting of "any advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance." The lower federal courts upheld the law, ruling that it did not violate the First Amendment under the U.S. Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. In order for a regulation of commercial speech to survive constitutional review, the regulation must directly and materially advance the government's substantial interests in the regulation. The government must demonstrate that the harms the speech- restriction advances are real and that the restriction will alleviate them in to a "material degree." The government cannot satisfy its constitutional burden by citing speculative harms.

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In 1996, California law was amended to prohibit the release of the addresses of persons arrested if the information would be used for commercial purposes. The same law allowed the release of such information if used for a "scholarly, journalistic, political or governmental purpose" or for "investigative purposes" by a licensed investigator. Both lower courts ruled the law unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. Laws that burden commercial speech must advance a substantial governmental interest in a direct and material way and be narrowly drawn. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). "Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's control." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).

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In 1994 Missouri enacted a statute limiting contributions to candidates for state and local offices. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (a political action committee) and Zev David Fredman (a candidate for state auditor) sued the parties responsible for enforcing the statute, challenging its constitutionality. They claimed that the contribution limits violated their First Amendment free-speech rights and that Fredman could not run an effective campaign with the limits in place. The district court upheld Missouri's campaign-contribution limits. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and held that the Missouri campaign limits violate the First Amendment. In Buckley, the Supreme Court struck down federal expenditure regulations as violating the First Amendment, but upheld contribution restrictions. The Respondents in this case claim that the State must justify the imposition of these limits by showing actual evidence of their claim that the absence of limits encourages corruption in the political process.

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The University of Wisconsin-Madison requires its students to pay an annual fee, in addition to tuition, that is used to support an array of student services and organizations. Three University of Wisconsin law students challenged the fee system in 1996 as unconstitutional. The students, all Christians, said it violated their free-speech and religious liberty rights for the university to funnel their money to groups they oppose on moral grounds. Both a federal district court and federal appeals court ruled that the fee system violated the students' free-speech rights. In 1977, the high court ruled in Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Education,that union members could "prevent the Union's spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative." The three Wisconsin students argued that the university must grant them the choice not to fund student groups that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to their beliefs.

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In 1994, the Erie City Council enacted a public indecency ordinance that purports to criminalize public nudity. However, statements by several council members indicate the real intent of the law was to target nude dancing at adult entertainment businesses. PAP's A.M., the owner of an adult business called Kandyland, challenged the law in state court under the First Amendment and the free-speech provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution. After a trial judge granted a permanent injunction against the ordinance, the city appealed. In 1996, the intermediate state appeals court, called the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, reversed, finding the law constitutional based on the U.S. Supreme Court case Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., which upheld a similar Indiana public indecency law. In 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, finding the law unconstitutional. The state supreme court said that it could find "no clear precedent" from the fragmented Barnes decision. The city contends the state supreme court erred in failing to apply the result of Barnes. Nude dancing is a form of expressive conduct that merits at least some degree of First Amendment protection. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,501 U.S. 560 (1991). Laws that are not designed to suppress freedom of expression but to target harmful secondary effects associated with certain expression are to be considered content-neutral for purposes of First Amendment review. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).

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Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires cable television operators to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block the video and audio portion" of channels that provide primarily "sexually explicit adult programming." The act provides that cable operators can comply with _ 505 by showing the "indecent" or "sexually explicit adult programming" only during so-called safe-harbor hours, 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., when children are not likely to view the programming. In 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware seeking to prohibit the enforcement of Section 505. After the three-judge panel denied Playboy's motion for a preliminary injunction, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1997 refused to review the denial of the preliminary injunction. On Dec. 28, 1998, the district court ruled that _ 505 violated the First Amendment. The court ruled the law was content-based because it restricted only sexually explicit adult programming. The government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Indecent speech, unlike obscene speech, is entitled to First Amendment protection. Government officials cannot suppress the free-speech rights of adults in order to protect minors from objectionable material unless the law is very narrowly drafted. Content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and the government bears the burden of showing that the law advances a compelling state interest in the least restrictive way.

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At issue is the constitutionality of a 1993 Colorado statute that regulates speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility. The specific section of the statute that is challenged, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9—122(3) (1999), makes it unlawful within the regulated areas for any person to "knowingly approach" within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person . . . ."[1] Although the statute prohibits speakers from *708 approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities.

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Congress created the nonprofit Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1974 to distribute federal funds to local legal-aid organizations as the primary means of providing basic legal services for the indigent. Restrictions on the use of funds precluded litigation concerning: abortion, political activity, criminal proceedings, school desegregation, and military desertion. In 1996, restrictions were extended to encompass challenges to welfare laws, although representation of individuals in suits-for-benefits were permitted. The 1996 Act also forbid LSC recipients from using non-LSC funds for those purposes, although such activity by an affiliate not under the control of the recipient was allowed. In 1997, legal-aid lawyers challenged the law as a violation of the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association and sought a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. The judge for the federal District Court in New York denied the injunction. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, with the exception of the suit-for-benefits provision. The 2nd Circuit ruled that the restriction on challenging the constitutionality of existing welfare laws constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. The government has greater leeway to selectively fund speech when the government is the speaker. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). The First Amendment generally prohibits discrimination against speech based on viewpoint. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

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Montana State prison inmate Kevin Murphy writes a letter to fellow inmate Pat Tracy that urges Tracy not to plead guilty to a charge of assaulting a guard. Tracy had requested Murphy's assistance in the matter in part because Murphy, a trained inmate law clerk, had assisted Tracy with past legal issues. Murphy's letter stated in part, "It wasn't your fault and I know he provoked whatever happened! Don't plead guilty because we can get at least 100 witnesses to testify that Galle is an over zealous [sic] guard who has a personal agenda to punish and harass inmates. You tell your lawyer to get ahold [sic] of me on this. Don't take a plea bargain unless it's for no more time." Because Murphy was classified as high-security and Tracy was classified as maximum-security, Murphy could not visit Tracy in the prison. Maximum-security inmates could only be visited by an inmate law clerk classified as low-security. Defendant prison guard Robert Shaw intercepted Murphy's letter and charged him with violating three prison rules: insolence, interference with due process hearings, and conduct which disrupts the orderly operation of the prison. After a hearing officer found Murphy guilty of violating the prison rules against insolence and interference with due process hearings, Shaw sued in federal court, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. A federal trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant prison officials. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that inmates possess a First Amendment right to assist prison officials with legal matters. The prison officials appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. Prison officials do not violate inmates' First Amendment rights if the prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Inmate-to-inmate correspondence poses special security concerns for prison officials. Id.

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About 500 students attend the Milford Central School (Milford, N.Y.), which houses grades K-12. The Child Evangelism Fellowship, a non-sectarian, Christian missionary organization, sponsors some 4,400 Good News clubs in the United States for children ages 6 to 12. The 'tender age' of the children in question is central to the Court's analysis of the case. Rev. Stephen Fournier and his wife lead the Good News Club of Milford; it has approximately 25 members. New York state allows local school boards to adopt their own regulations for community use of school property. The Milford school district's policy is stated in a handbook: (1) School facilities "may be used by district residents for holding social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment events and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community …" (2) "School premises shall not be used by any individual or organization for religious purposes." In 1996 the Good News Club of Milford, for reasons not relevant to the case, seeks a new place in which to conduct its meetings. It submits a 'District Use of Facilities Request' asking to use the school as a meeting place. An interim superintendent refuses access, finding that the Good News Club's meetings would be "the equivalent of religious worship … rather than the expression of religious views or values on a secular subject." After an attorney raises the issue that denial of access to the Good News Club while access is allowed to the Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, and the 4-H Club may violate the club's rights, school official solicit additional information about the meetings of the club, reconsider the request for facility access, and again deny access to the club. Both parties agreed that the school district created a limited public forum by issuing its community use policy for school facilities. A government-operated limited public forum is not required to and does not allow individuals to engage in all types of speech. Under Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), content-based discrimination is allowed in a limited public forum so long as the restricted speech falls outside the purpose of the limited forum. Viewpoint-based discrimination, however, is impermissible if the speech in question falls within the purpose of the limited forum. Thus, the government may restrict speech within the limited public forum if the restriction is not a viewpoint-based limitation and if the restriction is reasonable in light of the forum's purpose. The parties disagree, however, about whether club access would be a government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The clause prohibits government speech endorsing religion while private speech in support of religion is protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses. With respect to equal access to limited public forums for religious groups, the Supreme Court typically finds no violation of the Establishment Clause where there is little concern that the public would perceive an endorsement of religion by the government entity and where any benefit to religion is merely incidental. In 1997 the Good News Club files in federal district court and offers arguments related to freedom of speech, equal protection and religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court holds in summary judgment for the Milford Central School. In 2000 Hearing an appeal limited to the First Amendment issue claim, the 2nd Circuit panel (2-1) affirms the district court's dismissal of the free speech claim. The appellate court finds that the school was not discriminating between viewpoints but rather had excluded the club because the content of its meetings consisted of "religious instruction and prayer" — a permissible viewpoint-neutral reason. The Supreme Court grants the petition for cert. on October 10.

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In 1986, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee paid for several radio ads attacking the voting record of Tim Wirth, the potential Democratic senatorial candidate. The ads ran before the Republican nominee for senator had been selected. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed an action alleging that the party had violated the Party Expenditure Provision (PEP) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 by exceeding spending limits for political parties. The Colorado Republican Party sued in federal court, claiming that the provision violated the First Amendment. The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, which ruled in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)("Colorado I") that the provision could not be applied to independent expenditures by political parties. In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a plurality decision that the PEP was unconstitutional as applied to the particular expenditure at issue. The Court characterized the radio ads as "independent expenditures" (not subject to the PEP) as opposed to "coordinated expenditures" (subject to the PEP). The majority determined the Wirth ads were "independent expenditures" because the chairman of the Colorado Republican Party had approved the ad and had not consulted with the respective Republican candidates. The Colorado I court then remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings with regard to the broader issue of whether the PEP of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violates a political party's First Amendment rights by limiting the amount of money a party may spend in "coordination" with its congressional candidates. Four justices in Colorado I (Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy and Rehnquist) ruled that they would have struck down the PEP with regards to both independent and coordinated expenditures. In 1999, the U.S. District Court granted summary judgment to the Colorado Republican Party, ruling that the limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures violated the First Amendment. In May of 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on Oct. 10, 2000.

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In 1996, United Foods, Inc., a mushroom producer in Tennessee, refused to pay assessments under a generic ad program promulgated pursuant to the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990. The United States then filed an action against United Food seeking to enforce the terms of a mushroom order. United Foods filed an action, alleging that the act and the generic ad program violated its First Amendment rights. The two actions were stayed until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a generic ad program for California fruits in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457 (1997). After the Supreme Court ruled the California program constitutional, an administrative law judge ruled in favor of the government. United Foods then sued in a federal district court. After United Foods' First Amendment suit was consolidated with the government's enforcement action, a federal district court ruled in 1998 that the Supreme Court's 1997 decision was "clearly dispositive." On appeal, a three-judge panel of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the mushroom industry was far less regulated than the California fruit industry. The panel wrote: "The Court's holding in Wileman, we believe, is that nonideological, compelled, commercial speech is justified in the context of the extensive regulation of an industry but not otherwise. The government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on Nov. 27, 2000.

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In January 1999, the Massachusetts attorney general implements regulations limiting tobacco advertising. A key provision limits outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of any public playground, playground in public parks and any secondary or elementary school. Another provision prohibits "point of sale advertising" within 1,000 feet of playgrounds or schools. The law defines point of sale advertising to include advertising placed lower than five feet in any store accessible to minors. In May 1999, several tobacco companies challenge the constitutionality of the regulations on preemption and First Amendment grounds. With respect to the First Amendment argument, the companies argue that the restrictions are too broad and violate their rights to engage in commercial speech. After a federal district court rejects the companies' preemption and the vast majority of its First Amendment claims, the companies appeal to the 1st Circuit. The 1st Circuit also rules in favor of nearly all the regulations, including the 1,000 foot ban. The 1st Circuit wrote: "although the geographical scope of the advertising restrictions is substantial, we do not find the restrictions equivalent to a 'blanket ban' on speech." Regulations on truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech are constitutional if the government: (1) has a substantial interest for its regulation; (2) the regulation advances the governmental interest in a direct and material way; and (3) the regulation is narrowly drawn. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Governmental interests in protecting minors from harmful speech do not justify a wholesale suppression of the free-speech rights of adults. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

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In 1997, Robert MacDonald sought to obtain a permit to hold a political rally in Grant Park in Chicago on behalf of the Ad Hoc Coalition for Drug Law Reform. Park officials denied MacDonald's request in part because they said he had violated the terms of his permit in 1996 for a prior rally. After being denied by the park district's general superintendent, MacDonald sued in federal court. He challenged the constitutionality of the park-permit rules on their face. Among his challenges, MacDonald argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because it did not contain adequate procedural safeguards. For example, MacDonald argued that the park-permit rules violate the First Amendment because they do not provide for a prompt judicial decision on the merits if a permit applicant appeals a negative decision. After MacDonald lost at the federal trial court level, he appealed to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the 7th Circuit, MacDonald died. The appeals court allowed Caren Cronk Thomas and the Windy City Hemp Development Board Inc. to substitute as the plaintiffs. In 2000, the 7th Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments. The appeals court noted that several federal courts had determined that "judicial review of the denial of a permit must indeed be 'deadlined.' " However, the appeals court panel distinguished those cases, finding that they all involved "special licensing regimes for sexually oriented businesses." The panel reasoned that the speech by those adult businesses needed "greater judicial vigilance" or more protection than the speech at issue in the Chicago park case.

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The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 prohibited “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” This includes visuals that seem to depict children but are virtually constructed or use adult actors. The statute was successfully challenged for being overbroad and vague by The Free Speech Coalition, a trade association for the adult entertainment industry.

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Section 127(a) of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA or Act), 111 Stat. 2328, 21 U. S. C. ง 353a, exempts "compounded drugs" from the Food and Drug Administration's standard drug approval requirements as long as the providers of those drugs abide by several restrictions, including that they refrain from advertising or promoting particular compounded drugs. Respondents, a group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs, sought to enjoin enforcement of the subsections of the Act dealing with advertising and solicitation, arguing that those provisions violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. The District Court agreed with respondents and granted their motion for summary judgment, holding that the provisions do not meet the test for acceptable government regulation of commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). The court invalidated the relevant provisions, severing them from the rest of ง 127(a).

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In 1977, soon after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the city of Los Angeles' planning commission studies the effects of adult businesses on the city. The study concludes that a proliferation of adult businesses leads to an increase in crime and a decrease in surrounding property values. Based on this study, the city council passes a zoning law that prohibits adult businesses from locating within 1,000 feet of another adult business or 500 feet within a church, school, or public park. Then, in 1983, the city passes an ordinance banning so-called multiple use adult businesses, such as businesses that operate as both adult bookstores and adult arcades. Many years later, two adult businesses Alameda Books and Highland Books that operate as both bookstores and arcades sue in federal court, contending that the 1983 law is unconstitutional. In 1998, a federal district court eventually sides with the adult businesses and prevents the city from enforcing the law. In 2000, a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision. The 9th Circuit reasons that the city did not have sufficient evidence that multiple-use adult businesses caused harmful, secondary effects. The panel writes: "The study did not identify any harmful secondary effects resulting from bookstore/arcade combinations as individual business units." The city appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, which grants review on March 5, 2001.

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In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, this Court found that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)-Congress' first attempt to protect children from exposure to pornographic material on the Internet-ran afoul of the First Amendment in its regulation of indecent transmissions and the display of patently offensive material. That conclusion was based, in part, on the crucial consideration that the CDA's breadth was wholly unprecedented. After the Court's decision in Reno, Congress attempted to address this concern in the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). Unlike the CDA, COPA applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors," 47 U. S. C. § 231(a)(I). In defining "material that is harmful to minors," COPA draws on the three-part obscenity test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, see § 231(e)(6), and thus requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material, see §231(e)(6)(A). Respondents-who post or have members that post sexually oriented material on the Web-filed a facial challenge before COPA went into effect, claiming, inter alia, that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of COPA because it concluded that the statute was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny. The Third Circuit affirmed but based its decision on a ground not relied upon by the District Court: that COPA's use of "contemporary community standards," § 231(e)(6)(A), to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.

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In 1998, the village of Stratton, Ohio, passes an ordinance designed to regulate canvassing and soliciting of its residents at their homes. The ordinance requires would-be canvassers to obtain a permit at no cost from the village. The ordinance requires canvassers to carry their permits when they go door-to-door and show their identification when asked by either the police or a resident. The ordinance imposes criminal penalties on those who fail to comply with this ordinance. In June 1999, the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. and individual Jehovah Witnesses sue in federal court, seeking a declaration that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. They argue it infringes on their free-speech, free-press, free-association and free exercise of religion rights. They also argue that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it infringes on the right to engage in anonymous speech. In August 1999, U.S. District Judge Edmund A. Sargus Jr. rules that the ordinance validly applies to the Jehovah's Witnesses. The judge determines that the plaintiffs were "canvassers" who went to homes for the purpose of "explaining their cause." The judge strikes down, or modifies, three portions of the ordinance. On Feb. 20, 2001, a three-judge panel of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upholds the remaining portions of the ordinance in a 2-1 opinion. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 240 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2001). The panel majority determined that the ordinance was content-neutral and applied generally to everyone, rather than specifically targeting Jehovah Witnesses. The majority determined that the ordinance was designed to help prevent fraud and to protect residential privacy. The panel rejected the anonymity argument, finding that the canvassers already lose their anonymity when they reveal their physical identities at residents' doorsteps.

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Minneapolis attorney Gregory Wersal announced that he was running for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme Court for the 1998 elections. Wersal sent a letter to the state judicial ethics officials asking if they would enforce certain provisions of Canon 5 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. These provisions included a ban on judicial candidates attending political party gatherings, seeking endorsements from political parties and announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. After the state officials informed Wersal that they would enforce certain provisions, he sued in federal court. He challenged the constitutionality of the "attend" clause, the "endorsement clause" and the "announce" clause on First Amendment grounds. The Republican Party of Minnesota and others also joined in the suit. Wersal challenged the announce clause in part because he wanted to announce that he favored a strict construction of the Constitution and because he wanted to continue criticizing certain decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Both a federal district court and a federal appeals court upheld the constitutionality of all the challenged provisions of Canon 5. These courts reasoned that the provisions of Canon 5 were necessary to ensure judicial independence and judicial impartiality. The challengers then filed an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court agreed to review the case with respect to the announce clause only.

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In 1998, President Bill Clinton signs into law the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA). This law generally extends the copyright term of existing copyrights an additional 20 years. A group of individuals and publishers who rely on works in the public domain for their businesses file a lawsuit in federal court, seeking a declaration that the CTEA is unconstitutional. They argue that Congress exceeded its powers under the Copyright Clause when they passed the CTEA. They also argue that the CTEA violates the First Amendment. Both a federal district court and a federal appeals court uphold the federal law. The federal appeals court says that copyright law already adequately protects free-speech values through doctrines such as fair use. The appeals court reasons that "copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment." The appeals court also determines that Congress had the authority under the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution to pass the CTEA. The petitioners appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court agreed to review the First Amendment and Copyright Clause questions.

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This case arises out of two separate cross-burning incidents. In May 1998, two men Richard J. Elliott and Jonathan OMara burned a cross in the yard of James Jubilee, an African-American neighbor of Elliott. In August 1998, Barry Elton Black leads a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property with the consent of the owner. Black burns a cross at the rally, which frightens a neighbor of the property owner. Prosecutors charge all three men with violating Virginias cross-burning statute, which provides: It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or to cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. All three men lose their criminal cases before the trial court. A jury convicts Elliott and Black in separate proceedings. OMara enters a conditional plea of guilty. This means he pleas guilty to the offense but reserves the right to challenge the constitutionality of the cross-burning law. The court of appeals affirms the convictions of the three men in two separate cases. The appeals court reasons that the statute only proscribes true threats, a category of expression not protected by the First Amendment. The appeals court also determines that the burning of the cross is a form of fighting words, another category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court consolidates, or combines, the two cases. In a 4-3 decision, the state supreme court reverses, finding the statute violates the First Amendment. The majority reasons that the statute regulates speech based on hostility to the underlying message of cross burning.

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Respondents, Illinois for-profit fundraising corporations and their owner (collectively Telemarketers), were retained by VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts between those parties provided, among other things, that Telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors, leaving 15 percent for VietNow. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging, inter alia, that Telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for specifically identified charitable endeavors, and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false, constituted a fraud, and were made for Telemarketers' private pecuniary benefit. The trial court granted Telemarketers' motion to dismiss the fraud claims on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Courts placed heavy weight on Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, and Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781. Those decisions held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising, and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment. The state high court acknowledged that this case involved no such prophylactic proscription of high-fee charitable solicitation. Instead, the court noted, the Attorney General sought to enforce the State's generally applicable antifraud laws against Telemarketers for specific instances of deliberate deception. However, the Illinois Supreme Court said, Telemarketers' solicitation statements were alleged to be false only because Telemarketers contracted for 85 percent of the gross receipts and failed to disclose this information to donors. The court concluded that the Attorney General's complaint was, in essence, an attempt to regulate Telemarketers' ability to engage in a protected activity based upon a percentage-rate limitation-the same regulatory principle rejected in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley.

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Since 1907, federal law has barred corporations from contributing directly to candidates for federal office. We hold that applying the prohibition to nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment.

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The issue presented in this case is whether the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy is facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine.

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The State of Michigan, by regulation, places certain restrictions on visits with prison inmates. The question before the Court is whether the regulations violate the substantive due process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the First or Eighth Amendments as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

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539 U.S. 194 (2003) UNITED STATES et al. v. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.         No. 02-361. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued March 5, 2003. Decided June 23, 2003. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA*195 *196 *197 REHNQUIST, C. J., announced the… Read more

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In 1996 and 1997, various media outlets report on allegedly unsafe working conditions at Nike facilities in Southeast Asia. Nike responds to these allegations and negative publicity with a series of press releases, letters to university presidents and athletic directors and editorial advertisements. These documents deny that Nike mistreats workers, subjects them to unsafe working conditions and fails to pay proper overtime pay. In 1998, consumer activist Marc Kasky files a lawsuit against Nike and five of its corporate officers in San Francisco Superior Court, alleging negligent misrepresentation, intentional or reckless misrepresentation, unlawful business practices, and false advertising. The lawsuit claims that Nike violated state consumer laws prohibiting false advertising and unfair competition. Nike files a demurrer (motion to dismiss) on First Amendment grounds. In 1999, a trial court dismisses the suit on First Amendment grounds. A state appeals court affirms this ruling next year in Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (Cal.App. 2000). The California appeals court disagrees with plaintiffs theory that Nikes expression is commercial speech deserving reduced First Amendment protection. The court writes that a public relations campaign focusing on corporate image, such as that at issue here, calls for a different analysis than that applying to product advertisement. Instead, the court determines that Nikes speech is noncommercial speech and public dialogue on a matter of public concern. On May 2, the California Supreme Court reverses in Kasky v. Nike, Inc. , 27 Cal. 4th 939, 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) by a vote of 4-3. The majority determines that because the messages in question were directed by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and because they made representations of fact about the speakers own business operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its products, we conclude that these messages are commercial speech for purposes of applying state laws barring false and misleading commercial messages. Nike appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agrees to hear the case. The Court schedules oral arguments for April 23, 2003.

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Overruled

540 U.S. 93 (2003) McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL.   No. 02-1674. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued September 8, 2003. Decided December 10, 2003[*] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA*94 *95 *96 *97 *98 *99 *100 *101 *102 *103 *104… Read more

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In this case we examine a city's "adult business" licensing ordinance to determine whether it meets the First Amendment's requirement that such a licensing scheme assure prompt judicial review of an administrative decision denying a license. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215 (1990); cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965). We conclude that the ordinance before us, considered on its face, is consistent with the First Amendment's demands.

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This case presents a challenge to a statute enacted by Congress to protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet, the Child Online Protection Act *660 (COPA), 112 Stat. 2681-736, codified at 47 U. S. C. § 231. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct to affirm a ruling by the District Court that enforcement of COPA should be enjoined because the statute likely violates the First Amendment.

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543 U.S. 77 (2004) CITY OF SAN DIEGO ET AL. v. ROE No. 03-1669. Supreme Court of United States. Decided December 6, 2004. ON PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT *78 PER CURIAM. The city of San Diego (City), a petitioner here, terminated a police officer, respondent,… Read more

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544 U.S. 581 (2005) CLINGMAN, SECRETARY, OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD, ET AL. v. BEAVER ET AL. No. 04-37. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 19, 2005. Decided May 23, 2005. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT. JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part… Read more

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For the third time in eight years, we consider whether a federal program that finances generic advertising to promote an agricultural product violates the First Amendment. In these cases, unlike the previous two, the dispositive question is whether the generic advertising at issue is the Government's own speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.

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546 U.S. 410 (2006) WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.     No. 04-1581. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued January 17, 2006. Decided January 23, 2006.James Bopp, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Richard E. Coleson and M. Miller Baker.Solicitor General Clement argued the… Read more

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When law schools began restricting the access of military recruiters to their students because of disagreement with the Government's policy on homosexuals in the military, Congress responded by enacting the Solomon Amendment. See 10 U. S. C. § 983 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). That provision specifies that if any part of an institution of higher education denies military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution would lose certain federal funds. The law schools responded by suing, alleging that the Solomon Amendment infringed their First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. The District Court disagreed but was reversed by a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which ordered the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Solomon Amendment. We granted certiorari.

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This is a Bivens action against criminal investigators for inducing prosecution in retaliation for speech. The question is whether the complaint states an actionable violation of the First Amendment without alleging an absence of probable cause to support the underlying criminal charge. We hold that want of probable cause must be alleged and proven.

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It is well settled that "a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression." Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 142 (1983). The question presented by the instant case is whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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127 S.Ct. 2489 (2007) TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. BRENTWOOD ACADEMY.     No. 06-427. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued April 18, 2007. Decided June 21, 2007.*2491 Maureen Mahoney, Washington, DC, for the petitioner.*2492 Dan Himmelfarb, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the… Read more

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127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007) FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Appellant, v. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC. Senator John McCain, et al., Appellants, v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.       Nos. 06-969, 06-970. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued April 25, 2007. Decided June 25, 2007.*2658 Paul D. Clement, Solicitor General, Washington, DC, for appellant… Read more

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The State of New York requires that political parties select their nominees for Supreme Court Justice at a convention of delegates chosen by party members in a primary election. We consider whether this electoral system violates the First Amendment rights of prospective party candidates.

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In 2004, a special agent entered an internet chat room to combat online child exploitation. The agent, under an alias, engaged in a private chat with Michael Williams and exchanged photos with him. Williams shared a hyperlink with the agent that contained several images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Williams was arrested and charged with violations of the PROTECT Act, including the pandering of “material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe” that the material is illegal child pornography. Williams filed a motion to dismiss the charges as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Williams and struck down the pandering portion of the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.

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128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008) Jack DAVIS, Appellant, v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.   No. 07-320. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued April 22, 2008. Decided June 26, 2008.*2765 Andrew D. Herman, for Appellant. Paul D. Clement, for Appellee. Thomasenia P. Duncan, David Kolker, Associate General Counsel, Kevin Deeley, Assistant General Counsel, Holly J. Baker, Claire… Read more

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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Pioneer Park (Park), a public park in petitioner Pleasant Grove City (City), has at least 11 permanent, privately donated displays, including a Ten Commandments monument. In rejecting the request of respondent Summum, a religious organization, to erect a monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of Summum, the City explained that it limited Park monuments to those either directly related to the City’s history or donated by groups with longstanding community ties. After the City put that policy and other criteria into writing, respondent renewed its request, but did not describe the monument’s historical significance or respondent’s connection to the community. The City rejected the request, and respondent filed suit, claiming that the City and petitioner officials had violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause by accepting the Ten Commandments monument but rejecting respondent’s proposed monument. The District Court denied respondent’s preliminary injunction request, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. Noting that it had previously found the Ten Commandments monument to be private rather than government speech and that public parks have traditionally been regarded as public forums, the court held that, because the exclusion of the monument was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny, the City was required to erect it immediately.

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Federal law banned the broadcasting of “any … indecent … language,” 18 U. S. C. §1464, which includes references to sexual or excretory activity or organs, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726. Having first defined the prohibited speech in 1975, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) took a cautious, but gradually expanding, approach to enforcing the statutory prohibition. In 2004, the FCC’s Golden Globes Order declared for the first time that an expletive (nonliteral) use of the F-Word or the S-Word could be actionably indecent, even when the word is used only once. This case concerned isolated utterances of the F- and S-Words during two live broadcasts aired by Fox Television Stations, Inc. In its order upholding the indecency findings, the FCC, inter alia, stated that the Golden Globes Order eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be actionable; declared that under the new policy, a lack of repetition weighs against a finding of indecency, but is not a safe harbor; and held that both broadcasts met the new test because one involved a literal description of excrement and both invoked the F-Word. The order did not impose sanctions for either broadcast. The Second Circuit set aside the agency action, declining to address the constitutionality of the FCC’s action but finding the FCC’s reasoning inadequate under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

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The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibited corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary election, §434(f)(3)(A), and that is “publicly distributed,” 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2), which in “the case of a candidate for nomination for President … means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election … is being held within 30 days,” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). In January 2008, appellant Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a documentary (hereinafter Hillary) critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for her party’s Presidential nomination. Anticipating that it would make Hillary available on cable television through video-on-demand within 30 days of primary elections, Citizens United produced television ads to run on broadcast and cable television. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating §441b, it sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that (1) §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary; and (2) BCRA’s disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements, BCRA §§201 and 311, were unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads.

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Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA or Act) to correct perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system.

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Congress passed a federal statute that banned any depictions in which “a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.” The law was intended to target so-called “crush videos,” which “depict women slowly crushing animals to death ‘with their bare feet or while wearing high heeled shoes[.]’” Stevens was charged under this law for producing videos containing dogfighting.

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It is a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” 18 U. S. C. §2339B(a)(1). The authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” rests with the Secretary of State, and is subject to judicial review. Among the entities the Secretary of State has designated “foreign terrorist organization[s]” are the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which aim to establish independent states for, respectively, Kurds in Turkey and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Although both groups engage in political and humanitarian activities, each has also committed numerous terrorist attacks, some of which have harmed American citizens. Claiming they wish to support those groups’ lawful, nonviolent activities, two U. S. citizens and six domestic organizations (hereinafter plaintiffs) initiated this constitutional challenge to the material-support statute. Plaintiffs challenge §2339B’s prohibition on providing four types of material support—“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel”—asserting violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause on the ground that the statutory terms are impermissibly vague, and violations of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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The Westboro Baptist Church picketed on public land one thousand feet from the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who had been killed in the line of duty in Iraq, with signs with statements that read “Fags Doom Nations,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.” Snyder’s father sued under state civil law, including for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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The Nevada Supreme Court invalidated a recusal provision of the State’s Ethics in Government Law as unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

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After petitioner borough fired respondent Guarnieri as its police chief, he filed a union grievance that led to his reinstatement. When the borough council later issued directives instructing Guarnieri how to perform his duties, he filed a second grievance, and an arbitrator ordered that some of the directives be modified or withdrawn. Guarnieri then filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the directives were issued in retaliation for the filing of his first grievance, thereby violating his First Amendment “right . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”; he later amended his complaint to allege that the council also violated the Petition Clause by denying his request for overtime pay in retaliation for his having filed the § 1983 suit. The District Court instructed the jury, inter alia, that the suit and the grievances were constitutionally protected activity, and the jury found for Guarnieri. Affirming the compensatory damages award, the Third Circuit held that a public employee who has petitioned the government through a formal mechanism such as the filing of a lawsuit or grievance is protected under the Petition Clause from retaliation for that activity, even if the petition concerns a matter of solely private concern. In so ruling, the court rejected the view of every other Circuit to have considered the issue that, to be protected, the petition must address a matter of public concern.

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Vermont law restricts the sale, disclosure, and use ofpharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices ofindividual doctors. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §4631 (Supp.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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Respondents, representing the video-game and software industries, filed a preenforcement challenge to a California law that restricts the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.

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Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AMERICAN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC., FKA WESTERN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC., ET AL. v. STEVE BULLOCK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MONTANA, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA No. 11–1179. Decided June 25, 2012 PER… Read more

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The Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals and provides an enhanced penalty if the Congressional Medal of Honor is involved. 18 U. S. C. §§704 (b), (c). Respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of falsely claiming that he had received the Medal of Honor, but reserved his right to appeal his claim that the Act is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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In 2001, Congress created the Transportation SecurityAdministration (TSA) to assess and manage threats againstair travel. Aviation and Transportation Security Act(ATSA), 49 U. S. C. §44901 et seq. To ensure that theTSA would be informed of potential threats, Congress gaveairlines and their employees immunity against civil liabil-ity for reporting suspicious behavior. §44941(a). But thisimmunity does not attach to “any disclosure made withactual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate,or misleading” or “any disclosure made with recklessdisregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure.”§44941(b).

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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. Base limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee while aggregate limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. 2 U. S. C. §441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, appellant McCutcheon contributed to 16 different federal candidates, complying with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to 12 additional candidates and to a number of noncandidate political committees. He also alleges that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future, all within the base limits. McCutcheon and appellant Republican National Committee filed a complaint before a three-judge District Court, asserting that the aggregate limits were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

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As Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth, a program for underprivileged youth operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC), petitioner Edward Lane conducted an audit of the program’s expenses and discovered that Suzanne Schmitz had not been reporting for work. Lane eventually terminated Schmitz’ employment. Shortly thereafter, federal authorities indicted Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft. Lane testified, under subpoena, regarding the events that led to his termination of Schmitz. Schmitz was convicted and sentenced to 30 months in prison. Later, respondent Franks, then CACC’s president, terminated Lane along with 28 other employees in a claimed effort to address the financial difficulties. A few days later, however, Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those of Lane and one other. Lane sued Franks in his individual and official capacities, alleging that Franks had violated the 1st Amendment by firing him in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for… Read more

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A local church without a permanent location often advertised its temporary meeting locations. The church’s signs were subject to a set of provisions in the local code that differed from others because of the sign’s purpose as a temporary sign. The church was notified that it had violated the sign provisions and subsequently sued the town.

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Texas offers automobile owners a choice between general-issue and specialty license plates. Those who want the State to issue a particular specialty plate may propose a plate design, comprising a slogan, a graphic, or both. If the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the State will make it available for display on vehicles registered in Texas. Here, the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans and its officers (collectively SCV) filed suit against the Chairman and members of the Board (collectively Board), arguing that the Board’s rejection of SCV’s proposal for a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate battle flag violated the Free Speech Clause. The District Court entered judgment for the Board, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Texas’s specialty license plate designs are private speech and that the Board engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination when it refused to approve SCV’s design.

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