Opinions & Commentaries

The Espionage Act (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219) provides that: "Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States . . . shall be punished." Sugarman was charged with having violated this section on July 24, 1917, by words spoken in an address made at a Socialist meeting which was attended by many registrants under the Selective Service Act, sustained in Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366. He was tried in the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, found guilty by the jury, and sentenced. See 245 Fed. Rep. 604. Thirty-one exceptions were taken to rulings of the trial judge. Instead of seeking review by the Circuit Court of Appeals under § 128 of the Judicial Code, the case is brought here under § 238.

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This is an indictment in three counts. The first charges a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, by causing and attempting to cause insubordination, &c., in the military and naval forces of the United States, and to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war with the German Empire, to-wit, that the defendants willfully conspired to have printed and circulated to men who had been called and accepted for military service under the Act of May 18, 1917, a document set forth and alleged to be calculated to cause such insubordination and obstruction. The count alleges overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy, ending in the distribution of the document set forth. The second count alleges a conspiracy to commit an offence against the United States, to-wit, to use the mails for the transmission of matter declared to be nonmailable by Title XII, § 2 of the Act of June 15, 1917, to-wit, the above mentioned document, with an averment of the same overt acts. The third count charges an unlawful use of the mails for the transmission of the same matter and otherwise as above.

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This is an indictment in thirteen counts. The first alleges a conspiracy between the plaintiff in error and one Carl Gleeser, they then being engaged in the preparation and publication of a newspaper, the Missouri Staats Zeitung, to violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219. It alleges as overt acts the preparation and circulation of twelve articles, &c. in the said newspaper at different dates from July 6, 1917, to December 7 of the same year. The other counts allege attempts to cause disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States, by the same publications, each count being confined to the publication of a single date. Motion to dismiss and a demurrer on constitutional and other grounds, especially that of the First Amendment as to free speech, were overruled, subject to exception, and the defendant refusing to plead the Court ordered a plea of not guilty to be filed. There was a trial and Frohwerk was found guilty on all *206 the counts except the seventh, which needs no further mention. He was sentenced to a fine and to ten years imprisonment on each count, the imprisonment on the later counts to run concurrently with that on the first.

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Eugene V. Debs was indicted on four counts under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, Tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 219, as amended by the Act of May 16, 1918, c. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553. Two counts remained for the Supreme Court to condider. The first alleged that, on or about June 16, 1918, at Canton, Ohio, the defendant caused and incited and attempted to cause and incite insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States and with intent so to do delivered, to an assembly of people, a public speech. The second alleged that he obstructed and attempted to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States and to that end and with that intent delivered the same speech.

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On a single indictment, containing four counts, the five plaintiffs in error, hereinafter designated the defendants, were convicted of conspiring to violate provisions of the *617 Espionage Act of Congress (§ 3, Title I, of Act approved June 15, 1917, as amended May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 553).

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Indictment in nine counts under the Espionage Act. Preliminary to indicating the special offenses we may say that the indictment charges that at the dates mentioned therein the Philadelphia Tageblatt and the Philadelphia Sonntagsblatt were newspapers printed and published in the German language in Philadelphia by the Philadelphia Tageblatt Association, a Pennsylvania corporation of which defendants were officers; Peter Schaefer being president, Vogel treasurer, Werner chief editor, Darkow managing editor, and Lemke business manager.

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Plaintiffs in error were jointly indicted October 2, 1917, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, upon six counts, of which the 4th and 5th were struck out by agreement at the trial and the 1st is now abandoned by the Government.

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Appellant, Dirk De Jonge, was indicted in Multnomah County, Oregon, for violation of the Criminal Syndicalism Law of that State.[1] The Act, which we set forth in *357 the margin, defines "criminal syndicalism" as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution." With this preliminary definition the Act proceeds to describe a number of offenses, embracing the teaching of criminal syndicalism, the printing or distribution of books, pamphlets, etc., advocating that doctrine, the organization of a society or assemblage which advocates it, and presiding at or assisting in conducting a meeting of such an organization, society or group. The prohibited acts are made felonies, punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both.

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The appellant claims his conviction in a state court deprived him of his liberty contrary to the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. He assigns as error the action of the Supreme Court of Georgia in overruling his claim and refusing him a discharge upon habeas corpus. The petition for the writ, presented to the Superior Court of Fulton County, asserted the appellant was unlawfully detained by the appellee as sheriff under the supposed authority of a judgment pronouncing him guilty of attempting to incite insurrection, as defined in § 56 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to imprisonment *244 for not less than eighteen nor more than twenty years. Attached were copies of the judgment and the indictment and a statement of the evidence upon which the verdict and judgment were founded. The petition alleged the judgment and sentence were void and appellant's detention illegal because the statute under which he was convicted denies and illegally restrains his freedom of speech and of assembly and is too vague and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt, and further alleged that there had been no adjudication by any court of the constitutional validity of the statute as applied to appellant's conduct. A writ issued. The appellee answered, demurred specially to, and moved to strike, so much of the petition as incorporated the evidence taken at the trial. At the hearing the statement of the evidence was identified and was conceded by the appellee to be full and accurate. The court denied the motion to strike, overruled the special demurrer and an objection to the admission of the trial record, decided that the statute, as construed and applied in the trial of the appellant, did not infringe his liberty of speech and of assembly but ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because too vague and indefinite to provide a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt, and ordered the prisoner's discharge from custody. The appellee took the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, assigning as error the ruling upon his demurrer, motion, and objection, and the decision against the validity of the statute. The appellant, in accordance with the state practice, also appealed, assigning as error the decision with respect to his right of free speech and of assembly. The two appeals were separately docketed but considered in a single opinion which reversed the judgment on the appellee's appeal and affirmed on that of the appellant,[1] concluding: "Under *245 the pleadings and the evidence, which embraced the record on the trial that resulted in the conviction, the court erred, in the habeas corpus proceeding, in refusing to remand the prisoner to the custody of the officers."

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May the United States exclude without hearing, solely upon a finding by the Attorney General that her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, the alien wife of a citizen who had served honorably in the armed forces of the United States during World War II? The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that it could, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 173 F. 2d 599. We granted certiorari to examine the question especially in the light of the War Brides Act of December 28, 1945. 336 U. S. 966.

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These cases present for decision the constitutionality of § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.[1] This section, commonly referred to as the non-Communist affidavit provision, reads as follows: "No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under section 9 (e) (1) shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or *386 constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits."

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339 U.S. 846 (1950) OSMAN ET AL. v. DOUDS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 12. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 5, 1950. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Victor Rabinowitz and Samuel A. Neuberger for appellants. PER CURIAM. This case was heretofore held for, and presents the same issues involved in, American Communications Association v. Douds, and United Steelworkers of America v. Labor Board, decided May 8, 1950, 339 U. S. 382. In these cases the Court upheld the constitutionality of § 9 (h) of the […]

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341 U.S. 56 (1951) GERENDE v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS OF BALTIMORE. No. 577. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 9, 1951. Decided April 12, 1951. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. I. Duke Avnet and William H. Murphy argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Harold Buchman and Mitchell A. Dubow. Hall Hammond, Attorney General of Maryland, and J. Edgar Harvey, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of […]

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341 U.S. 123 (1951) JOINT ANTI-FASCIST REFUGEE COMMITTEE v. McGRATH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.   NO. 8. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued October 11, 1950. Decided April 30, 1951. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.[*]*124 O. John Rogge and Benedict Wolf argued the cause for petitioner in No. 8. With them on the brief was Murray A. Gordon. David Rein argued the cause for petitioners in No. 7. With him on the brief were Abraham J. Isserman and Joseph Forer. Allan R. Rosenberg argued the cause and filed a brief […]

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The National Labor Relations Board entertained a complaint by the Textile Workers Union of America against respondent, Highland Park Manufacturing Company, and ordered respondent to bargain with that Union. At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Textile Workers Union was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations and, while the Textile Workers Union officers had filed the non-Communist affidavits pursuant to statute, the officers of the C. I. O. at that time had not. The statute provides that "No investigation shall be made by the Board . . ., no petition under subsection (e) (1) of this section shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party [etc.]." § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 159 (h). (Italics added.) The order was challenged upon the grounds, among others, that the failure of the C. I. O. officers to file non-Communist *324 affidavits disabled its affiliate, the Textile Workers Union, and the Board could not entertain their complaint and enter the order.

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341 U.S. 494 (1951) DENNIS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 336. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued December 4, 1950. Decided June 4, 1951. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.*495 George W. Crockett, Jr., Abraham J. Isserman and Harry Sacher argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief was Richard Gladstein. Solicitor General Perlman and Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. With them on the brief were Attorney General McGrath, Assistant Attorney General McInerney, Irving H. Saypol, Robert W. Ginnane, Frank H. Gordon, Edward C. […]

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In 1941 the California Legislature amended the Charter of the City of Los Angeles to provide in part as follows:

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Overruled

Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, praying that § 12-a of the Civil Service Law,[1] as implemented by *487 the so-called Feinberg Law,[2] be declared unconstitutional, and that action by the Board of Education of the City of New York thereunder be enjoined. On motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court held that subdivision (c) of § 12-a, the Feinberg Law, and the Rules of the State Board of Regents promulgated thereunder violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and issued an injunction. 196 Misc. 873, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 114. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed, 276 App. Div. 527, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 466, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, 301 N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. 2d 806. The appellants come here by appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

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These cases present a narrow question with several related issues. May the Attorney General, as the executive head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,[1] after taking into custody active alien Communists on warrants,[2] charging either membership in a group that advocates *527 the overthrow by force of this Government[3] or inclusion in any prohibited classes of aliens,[4] continue them in custody without bail, at his discretion pending determination as to their deportability, under § 23 of the *528 Internal Security Act?[5] Differing views of the Courts of Appeals led us to grant certiorari. 342 U. S. 807, 810.

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The ultimate question in these three cases is whether the United States constitutionally may deport a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist Party which terminated before enactment of the Alien Registration Act, 1940.[1]

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This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upholding the validity of a loyalty oath[1] prescribed by Oklahoma statute for all state officers and *185 employees. Okla. Stat. Ann., 1950, Tit. 51, §§ 37.1-37.8 (1952 Supp.). Appellants, employed by the State as members of the faculty and staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, failed, within the thirty days permitted, to take the oath required by the Act. Appellee Updegraff, as a citizen and taxpayer, thereupon brought this suit in the District Court of Oklahoma County to enjoin the necessary state officials from paying further compensation to employees who had not subscribed to the oath. The appellants, who were permitted to intervene, attacked the validity of the Act on the grounds, among others, that it was a bill of attainder; an ex post facto law; impaired the obligation of their contracts with the State and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also sought a mandatory injunction directing the state officers to pay *186 their salaries regardless of their failure to take the oath. Their objections centered largely on the following clauses of the oath:

". . . That I am not affiliated directly or indirectly. . . with any foreign political agency, party, organization or Government, or with any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization; . . . that I will take up arms in the defense of the United States in time of War, or National Emergency, if necessary; that within the five (5) years immediately preceding the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of . . . any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized public agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization . . . ."
The court upheld the Act and enjoined the state officers from making further salary payments to appellants. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed, sub nom. Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131 (1951).[2] We noted probable jurisdiction because of the public importance of this type of legislation and the recurring serious constitutional questions which it presents.

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The National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on March 27, 1950, following a charge filed August 3, 1949, by the International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-7, against respondent, Dant & Russell, Ltd. The charge was filed in accordance with the procedure of the Act, § 10 (b), and was based on violations of § 8 (a) (1) and (3).[1] After the usual proceedings, the Board ordered respondent to take appropriate remedial action to correct the charged unfair labor practices. The International Woodworkers Union was and is an affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. There were on file with the Board at the time the charge was made the non-Communist affidavits executed by the officers of the local union as required by § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 101. Affidavits executed by *377 the officers of the C. I. O. were filed with the Board prior to the issuance of the complaint but subsequent to the filing of the charge.

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347 U.S. 439 (1954) LINEHAN ET AL. v. WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR ET AL. No. 557. Supreme Court of United States. Decided April 12, 1954. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.[*] George A. Brenner for appellants. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General of New York, Lawrence E. Walsh and Wendell P. Brown for appellees. Whitman Knapp was also for appellees in No. 558. PER CURIAM. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgments are affirmed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting. This case illustrates what I […]

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The principal question here presented is whether the New York State Education Law,[1] on its face or as here construed and applied, violates the Constitution of the United States by authorizing the suspension from practice, for six months, of a physician because he has been convicted, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, of failing to produce, before a Committee of the United States House of Representatives, certain papers subpoenaed by that Committee.[2] For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it does not.

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This action was instituted by petitioner in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The principal relief sought is a declaration that petitioner's removal and debarment from federal employment were invalid. Prior to trial, the District Court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judgment was affirmed, one judge dissenting, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, relying on its decision in Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 F. 2d 46, sustained here by an equally divided vote, 341 U. S. 918. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 882, because the case appeared to present the same constitutional question left unresolved by this Court's action in Bailey v. Richardson, supra.

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The respondent Steve Nelson, an acknowledged member of the Communist Party, was convicted in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, of a violation of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act[1] and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years and to a fine of $10,000 and to costs of prosecution in the sum of $13,000. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction. 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. 2d 431. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, recognizing but not reaching many alleged serious trial errors and conduct of the trial court infringing upon respondent's right to due process of law,[2] decided *499 the case on the narrow issue of supersession of the state law by the Federal Smith Act.[3] In its opinion, the court stated:

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This appeal brings into question the constitutionality of § 903 of the Charter of the City of New York. That section provides that whenever an employee of the City utilizes the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering a question relating to his official conduct, "his term or tenure of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or employment under the city or any agency."[1] Appellant Slochower invoked the privilege against self-incrimination *553 under the Fifth Amendment before an investigating committee of the United States Senate, and was summarily discharged from his position as associate professor at Brooklyn College, an institution maintained by the City of New York. He now claims that the charter provision, as applied to him, violates both the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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This case is here to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirming an order of the Subversive Activities Control Board that petitioner register with the Attorney General as a "Communist-action" organization, as required by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. That Act sets forth a comprehensive plan for regulation of "Communist-action" organizations.[1] Section 2 of the Act describes a *117 world Communist movement directed from abroad and designed to overthrow the Government of the United States by any means available, including violence. Section 7 requires all Communist-action organizations to register as such with the Attorney General. If the Attorney General has reason to believe that an organization, which has not registered, is a Communist-action organization, he is required by § 13 (a) to bring a proceeding to determine that fact before the Subversive Activities Control Board, a five-man board appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and created for the purpose of holding hearings and making such determinations. Section 13 (e) lays down certain standards for judgment by the Board.

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351 U.S. 536 (1956) COLE v. YOUNG ET AL. No. 442. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 6, 1956. Decided June 11, 1956. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. *537 David I. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were James H. Heller and Osmond K. Fraenkel. Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Burger, Samuel D. Slade and Benjamin Forman. *538 Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, announced by MR. JUSTICE BURTON. This […]

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This is a review by certiorari of a conviction under 2 U. S. C. § 192 for "contempt of Congress." The misdemeanor is alleged to have been committed during a *182 hearing before a congressional investigating committee. It is not the case of a truculent or contumacious witness who refuses to answer all questions or who, by boisterous or discourteous conduct, disturbs the decorum of the committee room. Petitioner was prosecuted for refusing to make certain disclosures which he asserted to be beyond the authority of the committee to demand. The controversy thus rests upon fundamental principles of the power of the Congress and the limitations upon that power. We approach the questions presented with conscious awareness of the far-reaching ramifications that can follow from a decision of this nature.

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In an investigation conducted by a State Attorney General, acting on behalf of the State Legislature under a broad resolution directing him to determine whether there were "subversive persons" in the State and to recommend further legislation on that subject, appellant answered most questions asked him, including whether he was a Communist; but he refused to answer questions related to (1) the contents of a lecture he had delivered at the State University, and (2) his knowledge of the Progressive Party of the State and its members. He did not plead his privilege against self-incrimination, but based his refusal to answer such questions on the grounds that they were not pertinent to the inquiry and violated his rights under the First Amendment. Persisting in his refusal when haled into a State Court and directed to answer, he was adjudged guilty of contempt. This judgment was affirmed by the State Supreme Court, which construed the term "subversive persons" broadly enough to include persons engaged in conduct only remotely related to actual subversion and done completely apart from any conscious intent to be a part of such activity. It also held that the need of the Legislature to be informed on the subject of self-preservation of government outweighed the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred in the process.

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Overruled (in part)

We brought these cases here to consider certain questions arising under the Smith Act which have not heretofore been passed upon by this Court, and otherwise to review the convictions of these petitioners for conspiracy to violate that Act. Among other things, the convictions are claimed to rest upon an application of the Smith Act which is hostile to the principles upon which its constitutionality was upheld in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494.

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On December 14, 1951, petitioner, John S. Service, was discharged by the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, from his employment as a Foreign Service Officer in the Foreign Service of the United States. This case brings before us the validity of that discharge.

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Petitioner is an alien who has been ordered deported by virtue of § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 1006,[1] for past membership in the Communist Party. He attacks the judgment below on the ground—the only claim we need to consider—that he was not a "member" of the Communist Party within the scope of that section.

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356 U.S. 576 (1958) SACHER v. UNITED STATES. No. 828. Supreme Court of United States. Decided May 19, 1958. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Hubert T. Delany, Frank J. Donner and Telford Taylor for petitioner. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, Philip R. Monahan and Doris H. Spangenburg for the United States. PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is granted. Charged in a three-count indictment for violation of R. S. […]

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This case concerns two applications for passports, denied by the Secretary of State. One was by Rockwell Kent who desired to visit England and attend a meeting of an organization known as the "World Council of Peace" in Helsinki, Finland. The Director of the Passport Office informed Kent that issuance of a passport was precluded by § 51.135 of the Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State on two grounds:[1] (1) that he was a *118 Communist and (2) that he had had "a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line." The letter of denial specified in some detail the facts on which those conclusions were based. Kent was also advised of his right to an informal hearing under § 51.137 of the Regulations. But he was also told that whether or not a hearing was requested it would be necessary, before a passport would be issued, to submit an affidavit as to whether he was then or ever had been a Communist.[2] Kent did not ask for a hearing but filed a new passport application listing several European countries he desired to visit. When advised that a hearing was still available to him, his attorney replied that Kent took the position *119 that the requirement of an affidavit concerning Communist Party membership "is unlawful and that for that reason and as a matter of conscience," he would not supply one. He did, however, have a hearing at which the principal evidence against him was from his book It's Me O Lord, which Kent agreed was accurate. He again refused to submit the affidavit, maintaining that any matters unrelated to the question of his citizenship were irrelevant to the Department's consideration of his application. The Department advised him that no further consideration of his application would be given until he satisfied the requirements of the Regulations.

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Petitioner, a native-born citizen, is a physicist who has been connected with various federal projects and who has been associated as a teacher with several of our universities. In March 1954 he applied for a passport to enable him to travel to India in order to accept a position as research physicist at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, affiliated with the University of Bombay. In April 1954 the Director of the Passport Office advised him that his application was denied because the Department of State "feels that it would be contrary to the best interest of the United States to provide you passport facilities at this time."

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The question before us is whether the Board of Public Education for the School District of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States when the Board, purporting to act under the Pennsylvania Public School Code, discharged a public school teacher on the ground of "incompetency," evidenced by the teacher's refusal of his Superintendent's request to confirm or refute information as to the teacher's loyalty and his activities in certain allegedly subversive organizations. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it did not.

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In an investigation conducted under the New York Security Risk Law, appellant, a subway conductor employed by the New York City Transit Authority, was summoned to the office of the Commissioner of Investigation of New York City and asked whether he was then a member of the Communist Party. He refused to answer, claiming his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and he persisted in this refusal after being warned that it might lead to his dismissal and after being given time to reconsider and to obtain counsel. Based upon this refusal, appellees found that "reasonable grounds exist for belief that, because of his doubtful trust and reliability," appellant's continued employment would endanger national and state security, and they suspended him and later discharged him after he failed to avail himself of an opportunity to submit statements or affidavits showing why he should be reinstated

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The appellants are honorably discharged veterans of World War II who claimed the veterans' property-tax *515 exemption provided by Art. XIII, § 1 1/4, of the California Constitution. Under California law applicants for such exemption must annually complete a standard form of application and file it with the local assessor. The form was revised in 1954 to add an oath by the applicant: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the support of a foreign government against the United States in event of hostilities." Each refused to subscribe the oath and struck it from the form which he executed and filed for the tax year 1954-1955. Each contended that the exaction of the oath as a condition of obtaining a tax exemption was forbidden by the Federal Constitution. The respective assessors denied the exemption solely for the refusal to execute the oath. The Supreme Court of California sustained the assessors' actions against the appellants' claims of constitutional invalidity.[1] We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals. 355 U. S. 880.

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These are companion cases to Speiser v. Randall and Prince v. City and County of San Francisco, ante, p. 513. The petitioners claimed the property-tax exemption provided by Art. XIII, § 1 1/2, of the California Constitution for real property and buildings used solely and exclusively for religious worship. The Los Angeles assessor denied the exemptions because each petitioner refused to subscribe, and struck from the prescribed application form, the oath that they did not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States and of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means nor advocate the support of a foreign government against the United States in the event of hostilities. Each petitioner sued in the Superior Court in and for the County of Los Angeles to recover taxes paid under protest and for declaratory relief. Both contended that the exaction of the oath pursuant to § 19 of Art. XX of the State Constitution and § 32 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code was forbidden by the Federal Constitution. The court upheld the validity of the provisions in the action brought by petitioner First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P. 2d 508. We granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 853. The Superior Court in the action brought by petitioner Valley Unitarian-Universalist Church, Inc., upheld the validity of the provisions under the Federal Constitution but held that § 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code violated the California Constitution because it excluded or exempted householders from the requirement. The Supreme Court of California reversed, 48 Cal. 2d 899, 311 P. 2d 540, and we granted certiorari, 355 U. S. 854.

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357 U.S. 568 (1958) FIRST METHODIST CHURCH OF SAN LEANDRO ET AL. v. HORSTMANN, ASSESSOR OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. No. 485. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 30, 1958. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. Stanley A. Weigel, Lawrence Speiser and Frank B. Frederick for appellants. J. F. Coakley for appellees, and Arthur M. Carden for the City of San Leandro, appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgment is reversed. No. 382, First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, ante, p. 545; No. 385, Valley Unitarian-Universalist Church, Inc., v. County of Los Angeles, ante, […]

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Petitioner was found guilty, after jury trial, of failure to produce, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a Subcommittee of a Senate Committee,[1] records of a *148 union[2] showing the names and addresses of members of that organization who were employed either by the United States or by any state, county, or municipal government in the country.[3] The District Court denied a motion for acquittal or new trial. 112 F. Supp. 669. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed by a divided vote. 98 U. S. App. D. C. 324, 235 F. 2d 821. On petition for a writ of certiorari we vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, an intervening decision. 354 U. S. 929. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, once more affirmed by a divided vote. 103 U. S. App. D. C. 319, 258 F. 2d 413. We again granted certiorari. 357 U. S. 904.

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359 U.S. 344 (1959) SCULL v. VIRGINIA EX REL. COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM AND RACIAL ACTIVITIES. No. 51. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 18, 1958. Decided May 4, 1959. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John Silard and Karl Sorg. Leslie Hall argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE BLACK, announced by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN. David H. Scull was convicted of contempt in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, for […]

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This case concerns the legality of petitioner's discharge as an employee of the Department of the Interior. Vitarelli, an educator holding a doctor's degree from Columbia University, was appointed in 1952 by the Department of the Interior as an Education and Training Specialist in the Education Department of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, at Koror in the Palau District, a mandated area for which this country has responsibility.

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This case is here again on appeal from a judgment of civil contempt entered against appellant by the Merrimack County Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. It arises out of appellant's refusal to produce certain documents before a New Hampshire legislative investigating committee which was authorized and directed to determine, inter alia, whether there were subversive persons or organizations present in the State of New Hampshire. Upon the first appeal from the New Hampshire court, 100 N. H. 436, 130 A. 2d 278, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case to it, 355 U. S. 16, for consideration in the light of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957). That court reaffirmed its former decision, 101 N. H. 139, 136 A. 2d 221, deeming Sweezy not to control the issues in the instant case. For *74 reasons which will appear, we agree with the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

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Once more the Court is required to resolve the conflicting constitutional claims of congressional power and of an individual's right to resist its exercise. The congressional power in question concerns the internal process of Congress in moving within its legislative domain; it involves the utilization of its committees to secure "testimony needed to enable it efficiently to exercise a legislative function belonging to it under the Constitution." McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 160. The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it has similarly been utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national purse, or whether to appropriate. The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.

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These two appeals involve convictions of four appellants for refusal to answer certain questions put to them at sessions of the "Un-American Activities Commission" of the State of Ohio, established in the legislative branch of the Ohio Government.[1] The appellants had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to answer each of the questions. The cases are before us for the second time; on prior appeals the judgments below were vacated and the causes remanded for reconsideration in the light of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, and Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178. See 354 U. S. 929. The remand resulted in a reaffirmance of the prior judgment without discussion, 167 Ohio St. 295, 147 N. E. 2d 847, and on the present appeals we postponed *425 further consideration of the jurisdictional questions presented until the arguments on the merits. 358 U. S. 862, 863.

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This case involves the validity of the Government's revocation of security clearance granted to petitioner, an aeronautical engineer employed by a private manufacturer which produced goods for the armed services. Petitioner was discharged from his employment solely as a consequence of the revocation because his access to classified information was required by the nature of his job. After his discharge, petitioner was unable to secure *476 employment as an aeronautical engineer and for all practical purposes that field of endeavor is now closed to him.

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360 U.S. 709 (1959) TAYLOR v. McELROY ET AL. No. 504. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 31-April 1, 1959. Decided June 29, 1959. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John Silard, Eugene Gressman, Harold A. Cranefield, Daniel H. Pollitt and Richard Lipsitz. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade and Bernard Cedarbaum. J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. […]

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Petitioners, when employees of the County of Los Angeles, California, were subpoenaed by and appeared before a Subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee, but refused to answer certain questions concerning subversion. Previously, each petitioner had been ordered by the County Board of Supervisors to answer any questions asked by the Subcommittee relating to his subversive activity, and § 1028.1 of the Government Code of the State of California[1] made it the duty of any *3 public employee to give testimony relating to such activity on pain of discharge "in the manner provided by law." Thereafter the County discharged petitioners on the ground of insubordination and violation of § 1028.1 of the Code. Nelson, a permanent social worker employed by the County's Department of Charities, was, upon his request, given a Civil Service Commission hearing which resulted in a confirmation of his discharge. Globe was a temporary employee of the same department and was denied a hearing on his discharge on the ground that, as such, he was not entitled to a hearing under the Civil Service Rules adopted pursuant to the County Charter. Petitioners then filed these petitions for mandates seeking *4 reinstatement, contending that the California statute and their discharges violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nelson's discharge was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, 163 Cal. App. 2d 607, 329 P. 2d 978, and Globe's summary dismissal was likewise affirmed, 163 Cal. App. 2d 595, 329 P. 2d 971. A petition for review in each of the cases was denied without opinion by the Supreme Court of California, three judges dissenting. 163 Cal. App. 2d 614, 329 P. 2d 983; 163 Cal. App. 2d 606, 329 P. 2d 978. We granted certiorari. 360 U. S. 928. The judgment in Nelson's case is affirmed by an equally divided Court and will not be discussed. We conclude that Globe's dismissal was valid.

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362 U.S. 474 (1960) NOSTRAND ET AL. v. LITTLE ET AL. No. 342. Supreme Court of United States. Argued March 30-31, 1960. Decided May 2, 1960. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. Francis Hoague and Solie M. Ringold argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants. Herbert H. Fuller, Chief Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was John J. O’Connell, Attorney General. PER CURIAM. Washington requires every public employee to subscribe to an oath that he is “not a subversive person or a member of the Communist Party or […]

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From a decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia holding § 202 (n) of the Social Security Act (68 Stat. 1083, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (n)) unconstitutional, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare takes this direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. The challenged section, set forth in full in the margin,[1] provides for the termination of old-age, survivor, *605 and disability insurance benefits payable to, or in certain cases in respect of, an alien individual who, after September 1, 1954 (the date of enactment of the section), is deported under § 241 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)) on any one of certain grounds specified in § 202 (n).

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We here review petitioner's conviction under 2 U. S. C. § 192[1] for willful failure to comply with a subpoena of the House of Representatives commanding him to produce certain records of the Civil Rights Congress before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The principal question presented is whether the evidence justified the trial court's rulings that the records called for by the subpoena were in existence, subject to petitioner's control, and pertinent to the Committee's inquiry.

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364 U.S. 388 (1960) UPHAUS v. WYMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. No. 336. Supreme Court of United States. Decided November 14, 1960. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. Louis Lusky, Grenville Clark, Marvin H. Morse, Dudley W. Orr, Royal W. France, Hugh H. Bownes and Leonard B. Boudin for appellant. Louis C. Wyman, Attorney General of New Hampshire, appellee, pro se. PER CURIAM. In view of the Court’s decision in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72, rehearing denied, 361 U. S. 856, the motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal herein is dismissed for want […]

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An Arkansas statute compels every teacher, as a condition of employment in a state-supported school or college, to file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every organization to which he has belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years. At issue in these two cases is the validity of that statute under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. No. 14 is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge Federal District Court upholding the statute's validity, 174 F. Supp. 351. No. 83 is here on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which also held the statute constitutionally valid. 231 Ark. 641, 331 S. W. 2d 701.

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In this case[1] petitioner was charged on four counts of an indictment with the making and filing of false non-Communist affidavits[2] required by § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley *633 Act, 61 Stat. 136, 146, and further amended by the Act of Oct. 22, 1951, § 1 (d), 65 Stat. 601, 602. The indictment charged that the affidavits were false writings or documents made and executed in Colorado and filed in Washington, D. C., with the National Labor Relations Board.

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The petitioner was convicted for having unlawfully refused to answer a question pertinent to a matter under inquiry before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities at a hearing in Atlanta, *401 Georgia, on July 30, 1958.[1] His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that our decision in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, was "controlling." 272 F. 2d 783. We granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 926, to consider the petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals had misconceived the meaning of the Barenblatt decision. For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the Court of Appeals was correct, and that its judgment must be affirmed.

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This case is a companion to Wilkinson v. United States, decided today, ante, p. 399. The petitioner was the witness immediately preceding Wilkinson at the hearing of a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee, in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 30, 1958. He refused to answer many of the questions directed to him, basing his refusal upon the grounds that the questions were not pertinent to a question under inquiry by the subcommittee and that the interrogation invaded his First Amendment rights. He was subsequently indicted and, after a jury trial, convicted for having violated 2 U. S. C. § 192, in refusing to answer six specific questions which had been put to him by the subcommittee.[1] The Court of Appeals affirmed, 272 F. 2d 653, relying on Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, and we granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 960.

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This case, involving California's second rejection of petitioner's application for admission to the state bar, is a sequel to Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252, in which this Court reversed the State's initial refusal of his application.

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The questions presented by this case are similar to those involved in No. 28, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, decided today, ante, p. 36.

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Pursuing its statutory powers and duties to investigate subversive activities in Ohio,[1] the Ohio Un-American *261 Activities Commission scheduled a hearing to commence at the Stark County Courthouse on the morning of October 21, 1953, and subpoenaed these five appellants to appear and testify before it at that time and place. Each appeared with counsel, was sworn and examined. Though having both constructive and actual knowledge of Ohio's immunity statute,[2] each objected to most of the questions propounded[3] on the ground that an answer would compel him to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Ohio Constitution and of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[4] Appellants were *262 not, in most instances, directed to answer, but in a few instances some of them (Perry, Cooper and Mladajan) were directed to answer the question, yet flatly refused to do so.[5]

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This is a proceeding pursuant to § 14 (a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 to review an order of the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring the Communist Party of the United States to register as a Communist-action organization under § 7 of the Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has affirmed the Board's registration order. Because important questions of construction and constitutionality of the statute were raised by the Party's petition for certiorari, we brought the case here. 361 U. S. 951.

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Our writ issued in this case (358 U. S. 917) to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals (260 F. 2d 21) affirming petitioner's conviction under the so-called membership clause of the Smith Act. 18 U. S. C. § 2385. The Act, among other things, makes a felony the acquisition or holding of knowing membership in any organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.[1] The indictment charged that from January 1946 to the date of its filing (November 18, 1954) the Communist Party of the United States was such an organization, and that petitioner *206 throughout that period was a member thereof, with knowledge of the Party's illegal purpose and a specific intent to accomplish overthrow "as speedily as circumstances would permit."

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This case, like No. 1, Scales v. United States, ante, p. 203, was brought here to test the validity of a conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act. 361 U. S. 813. The case comes to us from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which affirmed petitioner's conviction in the District Court for the Western District of New York, after a jury trial. 262 F. 2d 501.

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We here review the upholding by the New York Court of Appeals of the action of the New York State Industrial *390 Commissioner terminating petitioners' registration and liability to state taxation as employers under the New York State Unemployment Insurance Law. N. Y. Labor Law, §§ 511-512, 517-518, 570, 577, 581. This determination was effected under what was conceived to be the compulsion of a federal statute, the Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U. S. C. §§ 841-844. which provides, in pertinent part:

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Once again we are called upon to review a criminal conviction for refusal to answer questions before a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives.[1] See Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155; Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431. The petitioner was brought to trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia upon an indictment which charged that he had violated 2 U. S. C. § 192 by refusing to answer five questions "which were pertinent to the question then under inquiry" by the subcommittee. He waived a jury and was convicted upon four of the five counts of the indictment. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 143, 280 F. 2d 691, and we brought the case here because of doubt as to the validity of the conviction in the light of our previous *458 decisions.[2] 364 U. S. 812. A careful review of the trial record convinces us that the District Court should have ordered an acquittal.

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In 1956 the petitioner Rachel Brawner was a short-order cook at a cafeteria operated by her employer, M & M Restaurants, Inc., on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory[1] in the city of Washington. She had worked there for more than six years, and from her employer's point of view her record was entirely satisfactory.

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For the purpose of enabling a labor union of which he was then an officer to comply with § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (h), and hence to use the processes of the National Labor Relations Board,[1] petitioner made on December 9, and caused to be filed with the Board on December 11, 1952, an affidavit reciting, inter alia, "I am not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such Party." Upon receipt of that affidavit and like ones of all other officers of the union, the Board advised the union that it had complied with § 9 (h) and could make use of the Board's processes.

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A Florida statute requires each employee of the State or its subdivisions to execute a written oath in which he must swear that, among other things, he has never lent his "aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party."[1] Failure to subscribe to this oath *280 results under the law in the employee's immediate discharge.[2]

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368 U.S. 436 (1962) NOSTRAND ET AL. v. LITTLE ET AL. No. 571. Supreme Court of United States. Decided January 22, 1962. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. Francis Hoague for appellants. John J. O’Connell, Attorney General of Washington, Herbert H. Fuller, Deputy Attorney General, and Timothy R. Malone, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. The disposition that the Court makes of the case resolves one of the questions presented by the appeal, viz., that appellants […]

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In these six cases we review judgments of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,[1] which affirmed convictions obtained in the District Court under 2 U. S. C. *752 § 192.[2] Each of the petitioners was convicted for refusing to answer certain questions when summoned before a congressional subcommittee.[3] The cases were separately briefed and argued here, and many issues were presented. We decide each case upon a single ground common to all, and we therefore reach no other questions.

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370 U.S. 288 (1962) GRUMMAN v. UNITED STATES. No. 436. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 19, 1962. Decided June 18, 1962. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. David Rein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Joseph Forer. Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and Kevin T. Maroney. PER CURIAM. The judgment is reversed. Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749. MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN […]

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370 U.S. 717 (1962) SILBER v. UNITED STATES. No. 454. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 19, 1962. Decided June 25, 1962. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Victor Rabinowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Leonard B. Boudin. Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, George B. Searls and Kevin T. Maroney. PER CURIAM. The judgment is reversed. Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749. The indictment upon which the […]

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370 U.S. 724 (1962) HARTMAN v. UNITED STATES. No. 447, Misc. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 25, 1962. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. Lawrence Speiser for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and George B. Searls for the United States. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the motion for leave to supplement the petition for certiorari and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749; Silber v. […]

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This case is the culmination of protracted litigation involving legislative investigating committees of the State of Florida and the Miami branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

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Petitioner Dawson[1] was served with a subpoena to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee. He alleges that the subpoena was signed in blank by the Committee Chairman and that respondent Wheeler, an investigator for the Committee, filled in Dawson's name without authorization of the Committee. We read the complaint, as does the Solicitor General, most favorably to Dawson and conclude that the complaint alleges that no member of the Committee even attempted to delegate the Committee's subpoena power to Wheeler. The complaint also alleges that Wheeler intended to subject petitioner, when he appeared as a witness before the Committee, to public shame, disgrace, ridicule, stigma, scorn and obloquy, and falsely place upon him the stain of disloyalty without any opportunity of fair defense, to petitioner's irreparable injury. The complaint alleges not only the lack of authority of respondent Wheeler to fill in the blank subpoena but also the unconstitutionality of the House Resolution and the Act of Congress, 60 Stat. 828, authorizing the Committee to act and to subpoena witnesses. The complaint alleges that the mere service of the subpoena on Dawson cost him his job and that Wheeler caused service to be made while petitioner was at work knowing that loss of employment would result. It prays that the subpoena be declared void and of no force or effect, and asks for damages and for an injunction.

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This contempt of Congress case, stemming from investigations conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, involves, among others, questions of whether the House Committee on Un-American Activities failed to comply with its rules and whether such a failure excused petitioner's refusal to answer the Committee's questions.

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Petitioner, the prevailing party in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, comes to this Court for a second time. Prior to April 23, 1953, petitioner was employed by a private corporation producing mechanical and electrical parts for military agencies of the United States. On that date the corporation discharged him because of the revocation of his security clearance by the Department of the Navy. Following his challenge of this revocation, this Court held in 1959 in Greene v. McElroy, supra, that "in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." Id., at 508. On remand the District Court, declaring that revocation of petitioner's security clearance was "not validly authorized," ordered that all rulings denying petitioner's security clearance be *151 "expunged from all records of the Government of the United States."[1]

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376 U.S. 221 (1964) LORD v. WINCHESTER STAR ET AL. No. 732. Supreme Court of United States. Decided March 2, 1964. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. PER CURIAM. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.

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Petitioners, attorneys engaged in the general practice of law, instituted this declaratory judgment action, 28 *606 U. S. C. § 2201, against respondent, the Attorney General of the United States, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint alleged that petitioners had been:

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Appellants, approximately 64 in number, are members of the faculty, staff and student body of the University of Washington who brought this class action asking for a judgment declaring unconstitutional two Washington statutes requiring the execution of two different oaths by state employees and for an injunction against the enforcement of these statutes by appellees, the President of the University, members of the Washington State Board of Regents and the State Attorney General.

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Appellants, native-born citizens and residents of the United States, are ranking officials of the Communist Party of the United States. After hearings under State Department regulations, appellants' passports were revoked under § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which provides that, when a Communist organization is registered, or under final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member with knowledge or notice thereof to apply for or use a passport. Appellants filed suit asking that § 6 be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that the Secretary of State be ordered to issue passports to them.

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Pursuant to a Texas statute, a district judge issued a warrant describing petitioner's home and authorizing the search and seizure there of "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas." Officers conducted a search for more than four hours, seizing more than 2,000 items, including stock in trade of petitioner's business and personal books, papers, and documents, but no "records of the Communist Party" or any "party lists and dues payments." Petitioner filed a motion with the magistrate who issued the warrant to have it annulled and the property returned, but the motion was denied.

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380 U.S. 503 (1965) AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN BORN v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD. No. 44. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 8-9, 1964. Decided April 26, 1965. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Joseph Forer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was David Rein. Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney, George B. Searls and Doris H. Spangenburg. Melvin L. Wulf and Marvin M. Karpatkin filed a […]

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380 U.S. 513 (1965) VETERANS OF THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN BRIGADE v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD. No. 65. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 9, 1964. Decided April 26, 1965. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Victor Rabinowitz and David Rein. Kevin T. Maroney and Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and Robert L. Keuch. Melvin L. Wulf and Marvin M. Karpatkin filed […]

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The questions for decision are whether the Secretary of State is statutorily authorized to refuse to validate the passports of United States citizens for travel to Cuba, and, if he is, whether the exercise of that authority is constitutionally permissible. We answer both questions in the affirmative.

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In this case we review for the first time a conviction under § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which makes it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or (except in clerical or custodial positions) as an employee of a labor union.[1] Section 504, the purpose of which is to protect *439 the national economy by minimizing the danger of political strikes,[2] was enacted to replace § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which conditioned a union's access to the National Labor Relations Board upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union's officers attesting that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party.[3]

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The Communist Party of the United States of America failed to register with the Attorney General as required by the order of the Subversive Activities Control Board *72 sustained in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U. S. 1.[1] Accordingly, no list of Party members was filed as required by § 7 (d) (4) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993-994, 50 U. S. C. § 786 (d) (4) (1964 ed.).[2] Sections 8 (a) and (c) of the Act provide that, in that circumstance, each member of the organization must register and file a registration statement; in default thereof, § 13 (a) authorizes the Attorney General to petition the Board for an order requiring the member to register.[3] The *73 Attorney General invoked § 13 (a) against petitioners, and the Board, after evidentiary hearings, determined that petitioners were Party members and ordered each of them to register pursuant to §§ 8 (a) and (c). Review of the orders was sought by petitioners in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under § 14 (a).[4] The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 332 F. 2d 317. We granted certiorari, 381 U. S. 910. We reverse.[5]

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383 U.S. 825 (1966) DeGREGORY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.   No. 396. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued February 24, 1966. Decided April 4, 1966. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.*826 Howard S. Whiteside argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. R. Peter Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General of New Hampshire, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were William Maynard, Attorney General, and Joseph F. Gall, Special Assistant Attorney General. Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, announced by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN. This is the third time that the […]

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This case, which involves questions concerning the constitutionality of an Arizona Act requiring an oath from state employees, has been here before. We vacated the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court which had sustained the oath (94 Ariz. 1, 381 P. 2d 554) and remanded the cause for reconsideration in light of Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360. See 378 U. S. 127. On reconsideration the Supreme Court of Arizona reinstated the original judgment. 97 Ariz. 140, 397 P. 2d 944. The case is here on certiorari. 382 U. S. 810.

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This case is a sequel to this Court's decision in Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749, and companion cases. One of those cases related to the same person who is petitioner here and to the same events.

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Petitioners were indicted in 1956 under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring fraudulently to obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on behalf of the union of which they were officers or members by filing false affidavits in purported satisfaction of the requirements of § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Section 9(h), later repealed, provided that a union could not secure NLRB services unless it had filed with the NLRB so-called non-Communist affidavits of each union officer. The Government alleged that, pursuant to a conspiracy, four of the petitioners, union officials who purported to resign from the Communist Party but in reality retained their Party affiliations, filed the required affidavits during 1949-1955, enabling the union to use the NLRB. Petitioners were convicted, but the Court of Appeals, while sustaining the indictment, reversed on the ground that prejudicial hearsay evidence had been admitted. On retrial, petitioners were again convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted, limited to the following questions: whether the indictment stated the offense of conspiracy to defraud the United States; whether § 9(h) is constitutional; and whether the trial court erred in denying petitioners' motion for production to the defense of grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses, or alternatively, for in camera inspection of the grand jury testimony.

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Appellees were indicted under 18 U. S. C. § 371 for conspiring to violate § 215 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. *477 § 1185 (b). The alleged conspiracy consisted of recruiting and arranging the travel to Cuba of 58 American citizens whose passports, although otherwise valid, were not specifically validated for travel to that country.[1]

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This is a companion case to No. 176, United States v. Laub, ante, p. 475. Petitioner was tried on a stipulation of facts, under an indictment which alleged that on two occasions she "did unlawfully, knowingly and willfully depart from the United States without bearing a valid passport, for the Republic of Cuba, via Mexico, the Republic of Cuba being a place outside the United States for which a valid passport is required" in violation of § 215 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. § 1185 (b). The parties stipulated that "At no time pertinent or material herein did defendant. Helen Maxine Levi Travis, bear a valid *492 United States passport specifically endorsed for travel to the Republic of Cuba . . . ." This stipulation is all that the record in this case reveals as to petitioner's possession of a valid passport. Petitioner was convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari in light of the important questions raised by petitioner, and the apparent conflict with the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of New York in the Laub case, supra, which we affirm today.

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Appellants, faculty members of the State University of New York and a non-faculty employee, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that New York's teacher loyalty laws and regulations are unconstitutional. Their continued employment had been terminated or was threatened when each appellant faculty member refused to comply with a requirement of the University trustees that he certify that he was not a Communist and that, if he had ever been one, he had so advised the university president, and the non-faculty employee refused to state under oath whether he had advocated or been a member of a group which advocated forceful overthrow of the government. Under § 3021 of New York's Education Law, "treasonable or seditious" utterances or acts are grounds for dismissal from the public school system, as well as under § 105, subd. 3, of the Civil Service Law. Other provisions of § 105 of the Civil Service Law disqualify from the civil service or employment in the educational system any person advocating or involved with the distribution of written material which advocates the forceful overthrow of the government. Section 3021 does not define "treasonable or seditious." Section 105, subd. 3, provides that "treasonable word or act" shall mean "treason" as defined in the Penal Law, and "seditious word or act" shall mean "criminal anarchy" as therein defined. Section 3022 (the Feinberg Law) of the Education Law requires the State Board of Regents to issue regulations for the disqualification or removal on loyalty grounds of faculty or other personnel in the state educational system, to make a list of "subversive" organizations, and to provide that membership therein constitutes prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment. The Board listed the National and State Communist Parties as "subversive organizations" under the law, but, shortly before the trial of this case, the university trustees' certificate requirement was rescinded and it was announced that no person would be ineligible for employment "solely" because he refused to sign the certificate, and that §§ 3021 and 3022 of the Education Law and § 105 of the Civil Service Law constituted part of the employment contract. A three-judge District Court sustained the constitutionality of these provisions against appellants' challenges of vagueness and overbreadth and dismissed the complaint. Held: 1. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, in which this Court upheld some aspects of the New York teacher loyalty plan before its extension to state institutions of higher learning, is not controlling, the vagueness issue presented here involving § 3021 and § 105 not having been decided in Adler, and the validity of the subversive organization membership provision of § 3022 having been upheld for reasons subsequently rejected by this Court. Pp. 385 U. S. 593-595. 2. The rescission of the certificate requirement does not moot this case, as the substance of the statutory and regulatory complex challenged by appellants remains. P. 385 U. S. 596. 3. Section 3021 of the Education Law and § 105, subds. 1(a), 1(b), and 3, of the Civil Service Law, as implemented by the machinery created pursuant to § 3022 of the Education Law, are unconstitutionally vague, since no teacher can know from § 3021 of the Education Law and § 105, subd. 3, of the Civil Service Law what constitutes the boundary between "seditious" and nonseditious utterances and acts, and the other provisions may well prohibit the employment of one who advocates doctrine abstractly, without any attempt to incite others to action, and may be construed to cover mere expression of belief. Pp. 385 U. S. 597-604. (a) These provisions, which have not been interpreted by the New York courts, can have a stifling effect on the "free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice" (Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 344 U. S. 195 (concurring opinion)). Pp. 385 U. S. 601-602. (b) Academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. P. 385 U. S. 603. (c) The prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative machinery, and manifold cross-references to interrelated enactments and rules aggravate the problem of vagueness of wording. P. 385 U. S. 604. 4. The provisions of the Civil Service Law (§ 105, subd. 1(c)) and the Education Law (§ 3022, subd. 2) which make Communist Party membership, as such, prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment in the public school system are "overbroad," and therefore unconstitutional. Pp. 385 U. S. 605-610. (a) Constitutional doctrine after this Court's upholding of § 3022, subd. 2, in Adler has rejected its major premise that public employment may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government action. P. 385 U. S. 605. (b) Mere knowing membership, without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization, is not a constitutionally adequate basis for imposing sanctions. Pp. 385 U. S. 606-610. 255 F.Supp. 981, reversed and remanded.

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Petitioners claimed that respondents, Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee's chief counsel, tortiously entered into and participated in a conspiracy with Louisiana officials to seize petitioners' property and records in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Louisiana courts held the arrests and searches illegal. Here, the court below, while recognizing difficulty in concluding that there were no disputed issues of fact respecting petitioners' claim, upheld summary dismissal of the action on the ground of respondents' legislative immunity.

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This suit for declaratory relief that a Maryland teacher's oath required of appellant was unconstitutional was heard by a three-judge court and dismissed. 258 F. Supp. 589. We noted probable jurisdiction. 386 U. S. 906.

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This appeal draws into question the constitutionality of § 5 (a) (1) (D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 992, 50 U. S. C. § 784 (a) (1) (D),[1]*260 which provides that, when a Communist-action organization[2] is under a final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of the organization "to engage in any employment in any defense facility." In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1 (1961), this Court sustained an order of the SACB requiring the Communist Party of the United States to register as a Communist-action organization under the Act. The Board's order became final on October 20, 1961. At that time appellee, a member of the Communist Party, was employed as a machinist at the Seattle, Washington, shipyard of Todd Shipyards Corporation. On August 20, 1962, the Secretary of Defense, acting under authority delegated by § 5 (b) of the Act, designated that shipyard a "defense facility." Appellee's continued employment at the shipyard after that date subjected him to prosecution under § 5 (a) (1) (D), and on May 21, 1963, an indictment was filed charging him with a violation of that section. The indictment alleged in substance that appellee had "unlawfully and willfully engage[d] in employment" at the shipyard with knowledge of the outstanding order against the Party and with knowledge and notice of the shipyard's designation as *261 a defense facility by the Secretary of Defense. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment on October 4, 1965. To overcome what it viewed as a "likely constitutional infirmity" in § 5 (a) (1) (D), the District Court read into that section "the requirements of active membership and specific intent." Because the indictment failed to allege that appellee's Communist Party membership was of that quality, the indictment was dismissed. The Government, unwilling to accept that narrow construction of § 5 (a) (1) (D) and insisting on the broadest possible application of the statute,[3] initially took its appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On the Government's motion, the case was certified here as properly a direct appeal to this Court under 18 U. S. C. § 3731. We noted probable jurisdiction. 384 U. S. 937.[4] We affirm the judgment of the District Court, but on the ground that § 5 (a) (1) (D) is an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association protected by the First Amendment.[5]

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Appellant, who has served on board American-flag commercial vessels in various capacities, is now qualified to act as a second assistant engineer on steam vessels. But between 1949 and 1964 he was employed in trades other than that of a merchant seaman. In October 1964 he applied to the Commandant of the Coast Guard for a validation of the permit or license which evidences his ability to act as a second assistant engineer.

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Petitioner asks this Court to set aside his 1955 jury conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 1001[1] for having falsely and fraudulently denied affiliation with the Communist Party in an affidavit he had filed with the National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.[2] This collateral proceeding was *66 brought in the District Court for the Northern District of California in 1967, some 10 years after his original conviction was upheld over a variety of challenges on direct review.[3] The District Court distinguished Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966), and decided that § 9 (h), which had been upheld in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950), could no longer be thought constitutionally valid, particularly in light of United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 (1965). Having concluded that the Government had no right to ask the questions which petitioner answered falsely in his affidavit, the District Court ruled that petitioner's conviction under § 1001 should be "without effect." It therefore set aside petitioner's conviction and discharged his parole (unreported opinion).[4]

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397 U.S. 238 (1970) COLE, BOSTON STATE HOSPITAL SUPERINTENDENT, ET AL. v. RICHARDSON. No. 679. Supreme Court of United States. Decided March 16, 1970[*] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Mark L. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, and Gregor I. McGregor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for appellants in No. 679. Messrs. Quinn, Cohen, McGregor, and Walter H. Mayo III, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees in No. 774. Ernest Winsor and John F. Cogan, Jr., for appellee in No. 679 and appellant in No. 774. PER CURIAM. The judgment […]

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401 U.S. 1 (1971) BAIRD v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA.   No. 15. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued December 8-9, 1969. Reargued October 14, 1970. Decided February 23, 1971. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA.*2 Peter D. Baird reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John P. Frank and Paul G. Ulrich. Mark Wilmer reargued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. MR. JUSTICE BLACK announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join. This is one of […]

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401 U.S. 23 (1971) IN RE STOLAR.   No. 18. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued December 9, 1969. Reargued October 14-15, 1970. Decided February 23, 1971. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.*24 Leonard B. Boudin reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was David Rosenberg. Robert D. Macklin, Assistant Attorney General, reargued the cause for the State of Ohio and the Columbus Bar Association. With him on the brief were Paul W. Brown, Attorney General, Shelby V. Hutchins, and William H. Schneider. MR. JUSTICE BLACK announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an […]

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An applicant for admission to the Bar of New York must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the State for at least six months, and pass a written examination conducted by the State Board of Law Examiners. In addition, New York requires that the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court in the judicial department where an applicant resides must "be satisfied that such person possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law." New York Judiciary Law § 90, subd. 1, par. a (1968).[1] To carry out this provision, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules require the appointment, in each of the four Judicial Departments into which the Supreme Court is divided, of a Committee or Committees on Character and Fitness.[2] Section 528.1 of the Rules of the New York Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counsellors-at-Law requires that the character and general fitness specified in Judiciary Law § 90 "must be shown by the affidavits of two reputable persons residing in the city or county in which [the applicant] resides, one of whom must be a practicing attorney of the Supreme Court of this State."[3] The Committees also require *157 the applicant himself to fill out a questionnaire.[4] After receipt of the affidavits and questionnaire, the Committees conduct a personal interview with each applicant. As a final step before actual admission to the Bar, an applicant must take an oath that he will support the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of New York.[5]This case involves a broad attack, primarily on First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds, upon this system for screening applicants for admission to the New York Bar. The appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, are organizations and individuals claiming to represent a class of law students and law graduates similarly situated, seeking or planning to seek admission to practice law in New York. They commenced two separate actions for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, naming as defendants two Committees on Character and Fitness and their members and two Appellate Divisions and their judges.[6] The complaints attacked the statutes, rules, and screening procedures as invalid on their face or as applied in the First and Second Departments. A three-judge court was convened and consolidated the two suits.

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403 U.S. 207 (1971) CONNELL v. HIGGINBOTHAM ET AL. No. 79. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 19, 1970 Decided June 7, 1971 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA. Sanford Jay Rosen argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Tobias Simon and Melvin L. Wulf. Stephen Marc Slepin argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Rivers Buford, Jr., and James W. Markel. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an action commenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida […]

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In this appeal we review the decision of the three-judge District Court holding a Massachusetts loyalty oath unconstitutional.

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Appellant Socialist Labor Party has engaged in a prolonged legal battle to invalidate various Ohio laws restricting minority party access to the ballot. Concluding that "the totality of the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a whole" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court struck down those laws in Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 34 (1968).[1] Following that decision the Ohio Legislature revised the state election code, but the Party was dissatisfied with the revisions and instituted the present suit in 1970.

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The application of appellants (the Communist Party of Indiana, certain of its officers and potential voters, and its candidates for President and Vice President) for a place on the Indiana ballot for the 1972 general election was rejected for failure to submit a statutory loyalty oath stating that the Party "does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence." Appellants, contending that the statute was unconstitutional, thereupon filed this action in the District Court for injunctive and declaratory relief.

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We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may enjoin the issuance by Congress of a subpoena duces tecum that directs a bank to produce the bank records of an organization which claims a First Amendment *493 privilege status for those records on the ground that they are the equivalent of confidential membership lists. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that compliance with the subpoena "would invade the constitutional rights" of the organization, and that judicial relief is available to prevent implementation of the subpoena.

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The question presented is whether the President, acting through the Secretary of State, has authority to revoke a passport on the ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.

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Respondents are American citizens who want to travel to Cuba. They are inhibited from doing so by a Treasury Department regulation, first promulgated in 1963, which prohibits any transaction involving property in which Cuba, or any national thereof, has "any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." 31 CFR § 515.201(b) (1983) (Regulation 201(b)). For a period of about five years, "transactions ordinarily incident to" travel to and from as well as within Cuba were, with some limitations, exempted from the broad prohibition of Regulation 201(b) by a general license. See 31 CFR § 515.560 (1983). But this general license was amended in 1982, and the scope of permissible economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba was significantly narrowed. 47 Fed. Reg. 17030 (1982).

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Title 5 U.S.C. Ch. 75, provides a "two-track" system for undertaking "adverse actions" against certain Government employees. An employee removed for "cause," §§ 7511-7514, has a right of appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), § 7513(d), that includes a hearing. The Board reviews such removals under a preponderance of the evidence standard. § 7701. An employee is also subject to summary removal based on national security concerns. Such a removal is not appealable to the Board, but the employee has certain specified procedural rights, including a hearing by an agency authority. § 7532. Respondent was removed from his laborer's job at a submarine facility after the Navy denied him a required security clearance. Without a security clearance, respondent was not eligible for any job at the facility. Upon respondent's appeal of his removal under § 7513(d), the Board's presiding official reversed the Navy's decision, holding that the Board had the authority to review the merits of the underlying security clearance determination and that the Navy had failed to show that it reached a reasonable and warranted decision on this question. The full Board reversed and sustained the Navy's removal action, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that, since the Navy had chosen to remove respondent under § 7512 rather than § 7532, review under § 7513 applied, including review of the merits of the underlying security clearance determination.

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Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 498, as amended, provides that:

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The issue in this case is whether the National Security Agency (NSA) invoked the proper statutory authority when it terminated respondent John Doe, an NSA employee. The Court of Appeals held that NSA did not — a decision with which we disagree. We first describe the statutes relevant to this case.

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It is a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” 18 U. S. C. §2339B(a)(1). The authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” rests with the Secretary of State, and is subject to judicial review. Among the entities the Secretary of State has designated “foreign terrorist organization[s]” are the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which aim to establish independent states for, respectively, Kurds in Turkey and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Although both groups engage in political and humanitarian activities, each has also committed numerous terrorist attacks, some of which have harmed American citizens. Claiming they wish to support those groups’ lawful, nonviolent activities, two U. S. citizens and six domestic organizations (hereinafter plaintiffs) initiated this constitutional challenge to the material-support statute. Plaintiffs challenge §2339B’s prohibition on providing four types of material support—“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel”—asserting violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause on the ground that the statutory terms are impermissibly vague, and violations of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. MACLEAN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT No. […]

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June 15, 1917

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March 3, 1911

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