This case presents the question whether governmental restrictions upon commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond the least restrictive means to achieve the desired end.

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This case presents the question whether the State of California may, consistent with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, use a so-called "blanket" primary to determine a political party's nominee for the general election.

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Ohio law maked Capitol Square, the statehouse plaza in Columbus, a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gave petitioner Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board (Board) responsibility for regulating access to the square. To use the square, a group must simply fill out an official application form and meet several speechneutral criteria. After the Board denied, on Establishment Clause grounds, the application of respondent Ku Klux Klan to place an unattended cross on the square during the 1993 Christmas season, the Klan filed this suit. The District Court entered an injunction requiring issuance of the requested permit, and the Board permitted the Klan to erect its cross. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment, adding to a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a private, unattended display of a religious symbol in a public forum violates the Establishment Clause.

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In 1997, Robert MacDonald sought to obtain a permit to hold a political rally in Grant Park in Chicago on behalf of the Ad Hoc Coalition for Drug Law Reform. Park officials denied MacDonald's request in part because they said he had violated the terms of his permit in 1996 for a prior rally. After being denied by the park district's general superintendent, MacDonald sued in federal court. He challenged the constitutionality of the park-permit rules on their face. Among his challenges, MacDonald argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because it did not contain adequate procedural safeguards. For example, MacDonald argued that the park-permit rules violate the First Amendment because they do not provide for a prompt judicial decision on the merits if a permit applicant appeals a negative decision. After MacDonald lost at the federal trial court level, he appealed to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the 7th Circuit, MacDonald died. The appeals court allowed Caren Cronk Thomas and the Windy City Hemp Development Board Inc. to substitute as the plaintiffs. In 2000, the 7th Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments. The appeals court noted that several federal courts had determined that "judicial review of the denial of a permit must indeed be 'deadlined.' " However, the appeals court panel distinguished those cases, finding that they all involved "special licensing regimes for sexually oriented businesses." The panel reasoned that the speech by those adult businesses needed "greater judicial vigilance" or more protection than the speech at issue in the Chicago park case.

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Respondents, representing the video-game and software industries, filed a preenforcement challenge to a California law that restricts the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.

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Respondents Smith and Black were fired by a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church. Their applications for unemployment compensation were denied by the State of Oregon under a state law disqualifying employees discharged for work-related "misconduct." Holding that the denials violated respondents' First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals reversed. The State Supreme Court affirmed, but this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a determination whether sacramental peyote use is proscribed by the State's controlled substance law, which makes it a felony to knowingly or intentionally possess the drug. Pending that determination, the Court refused to decide whether such use is protected by the Constitution. On remand, the State Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from, the state law prohibition, but concluded that that prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause.

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Federal law banned the broadcasting of “any … indecent … language,” 18 U. S. C. §1464, which includes references to sexual or excretory activity or organs, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726. Having first defined the prohibited speech in 1975, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) took a cautious, but gradually expanding, approach to enforcing the statutory prohibition. In 2004, the FCC’s Golden Globes Order declared for the first time that an expletive (nonliteral) use of the F-Word or the S-Word could be actionably indecent, even when the word is used only once. This case concerned isolated utterances of the F- and S-Words during two live broadcasts aired by Fox Television Stations, Inc. In its order upholding the indecency findings, the FCC, inter alia, stated that the Golden Globes Order eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be actionable; declared that under the new policy, a lack of repetition weighs against a finding of indecency, but is not a safe harbor; and held that both broadcasts met the new test because one involved a literal description of excrement and both invoked the F-Word. The order did not impose sanctions for either broadcast. The Second Circuit set aside the agency action, declining to address the constitutionality of the FCC’s action but finding the FCC’s reasoning inadequate under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

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The State of Washington prohibits labor unions from using the agency-shop fees of a nonmember for election-related purposes unless the nonmember affirmatively consents. We decide whether this restriction, as applied to public-sector labor unions, violates the First Amendment.

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In this case we consider whether actions of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, commonly known as Amtrak, are subject to the constraints of the Constitution.

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For the third time in eight years, we consider whether a federal program that finances generic advertising to promote an agricultural product violates the First Amendment. In these cases, unlike the previous two, the dispositive question is whether the generic advertising at issue is the Government's own speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.

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The Nevada Supreme Court invalidated a recusal provision of the State’s Ethics in Government Law as unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

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The State of New York requires that political parties select their nominees for Supreme Court Justice at a convention of delegates chosen by party members in a primary election. We consider whether this electoral system violates the First Amendment rights of prospective party candidates.

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The petitioners, United States citizen employees of the Panama Canal Commission and their spouses, seek refunds of income taxes collected on salaries paid by the Commission between 1979 and 1981. We granted certiorari to resolve conflicting appellate interpretations of an international agreement. 474 U. S. 1050 (1986).

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In mid-1990, a white juvenile in St. Paul was arrested for burning a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family. The juvenile was charged with violating St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibited the placement of any symbol on public or private party that aroused anger in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. The juvenile moved to dismiss this charge, claiming that it was overbroad and impermissibly content-based under the First Amendment. The trial court granted this motion. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance prohibited only "fighting words," which, since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), had been deemed unworthy of any First Amendment protection. Regulation of speech based on the content of the speech is presumptively invalid under the First Amendment. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980). In some cases, however, such as "fighting words," defamation, and obscenity, the Court has held that the content of the speech is of such slight social value that the speech is unworthy of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).

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Minneapolis attorney Gregory Wersal announced that he was running for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme Court for the 1998 elections. Wersal sent a letter to the state judicial ethics officials asking if they would enforce certain provisions of Canon 5 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. These provisions included a ban on judicial candidates attending political party gatherings, seeking endorsements from political parties and announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. After the state officials informed Wersal that they would enforce certain provisions, he sued in federal court. He challenged the constitutionality of the "attend" clause, the "endorsement clause" and the "announce" clause on First Amendment grounds. The Republican Party of Minnesota and others also joined in the suit. Wersal challenged the announce clause in part because he wanted to announce that he favored a strict construction of the Constitution and because he wanted to continue criticizing certain decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Both a federal district court and a federal appeals court upheld the constitutionality of all the challenged provisions of Canon 5. These courts reasoned that the provisions of Canon 5 were necessary to ensure judicial independence and judicial impartiality. The challengers then filed an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court agreed to review the case with respect to the announce clause only.

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541 U.S. 267 (2004) VIETH ET AL. v. JUBELIRER, PRESIDENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SENATE, ET AL. No. 02-1580. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 10, 2003. Decided April 28, 2004. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA *268 *269 *270 SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O’CONNOR and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 306. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 317. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, […]

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Section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of Title 18, United States Code, criminalizes, in certain specified circumstances, the pandering or solicitation of child pornography. This case presents the question whether that statute is overbroad under the First Amendment or impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

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The issue presented in this case is whether the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy is facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine.

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