In 1956, Rhode Island adopted two statutes, R.I. Gen. Laws __ 3-8-7 and 3-8-8.1, that forbid both sellers and the media from advertising the price of any alcoholic beverage. The stated purpose of this legislation is to promote temperance by increasing the price of alcoholic beverages. These statutes were upheld by Rhode Island state courts. S & S Liquormart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1985);Rhode Island Liquor Stores Ass'n. v. The Evening Call Pub. Co., 497 A.2d 331 (R.I. 1985). In early 1992, 44 Liquormart, a Rhode Island retail store that sells alcoholic beverages, and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, a Massachusetts retailer that would advertise in Rhode Island if it could, challenged the Rhode Island laws in federal court. The trial court, after a trial on the merits, held that the advertising ban was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court held that, under the First Amendment, truthful, non-misleading commercial speech can be restricted only if (1) the government has a substantial interest in regulating the speech, (2) the regulation directly advances that substantial interest, and (3) the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to advance that interest. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Council of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), the Court held that a legislature's power to ban a particular product or activity included the power to ban all advertising of that product or activity.

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This case concerns the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2680, which carves out certain exceptions to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed by federal employees. Section 2680(c) provides that the waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims arising from the detention of property by "any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer." Petitioner contends that this clause applies only to law enforcement officers enforcing customs or excise laws, and thus does not affect the waiver of sovereign immunity for his property claim against officers of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). We conclude that the broad phrase "any other law enforcement officer" covers all law enforcement officers. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the dismissal of petitioner's claim.

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A Hawaii statute prohibits voters in both primary and general elections from casting write-in votes. Because Hawaii traditionally has been dominated by the Democratic party, voters in many races have a choice only between voting for the Democratic candidate or not voting at all. A voter challenged the write-in ban on the grounds that it deprived him of the opportunity to vote for the candidate of his choice. The federal district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow a contrary holding by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989). A court considering a challenge to an election law must balance the magnitude of the injury to the challenger's First Amendment rights against the offered justifications for the law, taking into account the extent to which the justifications make it necessary to burden the challenger's rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). When the challenger's rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992). When the restrictions are only reasonable and nondiscriminatory, however, the state's important regulatory interests generally are sufficient to justify the restrictions. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).

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A religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest receives communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed from plants unique to the region, that contains a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by the Federal Government. The Government concedes that this practice is a sincere exercise of religion, but nonetheless sought to prohibit the small American branch of the sect from engaging in the practice, on the ground that the Controlled Substances Act bars all use of the hallucinogen. The sect sued to block enforcement against it of the ban on the sacramental tea, and moved for a preliminary injunction.

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The Arkansas Educational Television Commission, a state agency, sponsored a debate between the Democratic and Republican candidates for a U.S. House of Representatives seat in Arkansas' Third Congressional District. The Commission only invited the two major party candidates and excluded Ralph Forbes, a legally qualified independent candidate. AETC determined Forbes did not have sufficient "political viability" for inclusion. Forbes sued the agency. After a federal district court dismissed the claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed, finding that AETC had created a limited public forum to which Forbes had a presumptive right of access. Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television Commission, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996). The appeals court determined that AETC's assessment of "political viability" was not a compelling enough interest nor narrowly tailored enough reason to pass constitutional review. The Court analyzes right of access cases using the public forum doctrine. There are three types of fora: traditional public fora, limited or designated public fora and nonpublic fora. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Even in a nonpublic forum, government officials cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, discriminate based on viewpoint. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). However, television broadcasters enjoy &"the widest possible journalistic freedom" consistent with their public responsibilities. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).

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Petitioner filed suit against respondents, a county school board and school officials, seeking damages for the sexual harassment of her daughter LaShonda by G. F., a fifth-grade classmate at a public elementary school. Among other things, petitioner alleged that respondents' deliberate indifference to G. F.'s persistent sexual advances toward LaShonda created an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive school environment that violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which, in relevant part, prohibits a student from being "excluded from participation in, be[ing] denied the benefits of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). In granting respondents' motion to dismiss, the Federal District Court found that "student-on-student," or peer, harassment provides no ground for a Title IX private cause of action for damages. The en banc Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

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The Petitioners in this case sought to expand the Harold Washington Party, an established party within the City of Chicago, to the surrounding suburbs within Cook County. Under Illinois law, the organizers of a new political party must collect 25,000 signatures of eligible voters in order to field a candidate for state office. If the organizers wish to run candidates solely for offices within a large political subdivision, such as Cook County, they must obtain 25,000 signatures from that subdivision. If the subdivision is comprised of separate "districts," the organizers must obtain 25,000 signatures from each district. Cook County contains two districts city and suburban. Illinois law also provides that a new political party may not use the name of an established political party. The Petitioners gathered 44,000 signatures from the city district, but only 7,800 signatures from the suburban district. When the Petitioners' slate of candidates was challenged on several grounds, the Cook County Officers Electoral Board ruled that the Petitioners could use the Harold Washington Party name in the suburban district elections and that the failure to gather 25,000 signatures from the suburban district disqualified the candidates who were running only for suburban district offices, but did not disqualify the party's candidates running for city and county-side seats. On appeal, the trial court affirmed the Board's ruling on the use of the party name but held that the failure to obtain 25,000 signatures from the suburban district doomed the entire slate of candidates. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Illinois law prohibited use of the party name and that the inability to obtain 25,000 signatures in the suburban district required disqualification of the entire slate of candidates. A court considering a challenge to an election law must balance the magnitude of the injury to the challenger's First Amendment rights against the offered justifications for the law, taking into account the extent to which the justifications make it necessary to burden the challenger's rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). When the challenger's rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest. Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979). When the restrictions are only reasonable and nondiscriminatory, however, the state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).

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In May 1993, Gloria Bartnicki, chief negotiator for the Wyoming Valley West School District Teachers' Union, had a cellular phone conversation with Anthony Kane, a teacher at Wyoming Valley West High School about the contentious negotiations over the teachers' new contract. An unknown person intercepted the contents of the cellular phone conversation and gave them to defendant Jack Yocum, president of the Wyoming Valley West Taxpayers' Association an organization formed for the sole purpose of opposing the teachers' new contract. Yocum then gave the tape to a Fred Williams, a local radio show host, who goes by the name of Frederick Vopper. Vopper played portions of the cell phone conversation over the air. Bartnicki and Kane sued Vopper, two radio stations and Yocum in federal district court in 1994 under the Federal Wiretapping Act and a similar state law. In 1995, the federal district court denied all parties' motions for summary judgment, finding there were genuine issues of material fact. The district then later certified two questions of law to the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The certified questions asked whether imposing liability on the defendants, none of whom illegally intercepted the contents of the phone call, violates the First Amendment. In 1999, a three-judge panel of the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rules that the federal law imposing liability on individuals who merely disclose or use material that was illegally intercepted violates the First Amendment. The plaintiffs and the United States, which had intervened to defend the constitutionality of its law, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. A court considering a challenge to an election law must balance the magnitude of the injury to the challenger's First Amendment rights against the offered justifications for the law, taking into account the extent to which the justifications make it necessary to burden the challenger's rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). When the challenger's rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest. Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979). When the restrictions are only reasonable and nondiscriminatory, however, the state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). "State action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional concerns."Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). Privacy of communication is an important interest.Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539 (1985). The right of privacy does not generally prohibit the publication of truthful information of material that is of public interest. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, (1890).

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These cases raise an important question concerning what degree of protection, if any, the First Amendment provides to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication. That question is both novel and narrow. Despite the fact that federal law has prohibited such disclosures since 1934,[1] this is the first time that we have confronted such an issue.

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Keen Umbehr had a contract with Wabaunsee County, Kansas, under which he hauled trash for participating cities in the county. While the contract was in force, Mr. Umbehr spoke at county commission meetings and wrote letters and columns in local newspapers concerning, among other things, alleged violations of law and other improprieties by the county commission and its road and bridge department. The county later terminated the hauling contract. Mr. Umbehr filed suit against three of the commissioners, alleging that they had terminated the contract because of his public criticisms and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court rejected Mr. Umbehr's claim, holding that the First Amendment did not prohibit the county from considering Mr. Umbehr's statements when it decided to terminate the contract. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals recognized that its decision was contrary to cases in other Circuits but it held that the rationales used in the other cases were no longer valid. The First Amendment prevents the government from terminating employees who speak on matters of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Governmental workers also are constitutionally protected from dismissal for supporting or affiliating with a political party, unless such affiliation reasonably can be considered an appropriate job qualification. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). To prevail in an unlawful termination claim, the employee must show that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination. Even upon such a showing, the government can prevail if it can show that it would have taken the same action absent the protected conduct or if sufficiently strong countervailing governmental interests exist. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

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Petitioner sued respondent unions, claiming that their lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities violated federal labor law and antitrust law. After petitioner lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board decided petitioner had violated federal labor law by prosecuting an unsuccessful suit with a retaliatory motive. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because we find the Board *520 lacked authority to assess liability using this standard, we reverse and remand.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus YSURSA, SECRETARY OF STATE OF IDAHO, ET AL. v. POCATELLO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES […]

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512 U.S. 687 (1994) BOARD OF EDUCATION OF KIRYAS JOEL VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GRUMET   No. 93-517. United States Supreme Court.   Argued March 30, 1994. Decided June 27, 1994.[*] CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK*689 Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II—B, II—C, and III, in which Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and an opinion *689 with respect to Parts II (introduction) and II—A, in which Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, […]

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The University of Wisconsin-Madison requires its students to pay an annual fee, in addition to tuition, that is used to support an array of student services and organizations. Three University of Wisconsin law students challenged the fee system in 1996 as unconstitutional. The students, all Christians, said it violated their free-speech and religious liberty rights for the university to funnel their money to groups they oppose on moral grounds. Both a federal district court and federal appeals court ruled that the fee system violated the students' free-speech rights. In 1977, the high court ruled in Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Education,that union members could "prevent the Union's spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative." The three Wisconsin students argued that the university must grant them the choice not to fund student groups that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to their beliefs.

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James Dale, who earned his Eagle Scout badge, became an assistant scoutmaster in 1989. While attending Rutgers University, Dale revealed his sexual orientation during a speech in his capacity as co-president of the university's Lesbian/Gay Alliance group. In July 1990, scouting authorities sent Dale a letter, severing all ties with him. When Dale wrote to inquire the reason, the response said "the grounds for this membership revocation are the standards for leadership established by the Boy Scouts of America, which specifically forbid membership to homosexuals." Dale sued in state court, saying the Boy Scouts violated a state law, which prevents places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. After a trial court judge ruled in favor of the Scouts in 1995, both the Superior Court of New Jersey and the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled in favor of Dale. The Boy Scouts appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case on Jan. 14, 2000. The freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate with certain individuals and ideas. Though the First Amendment protects free-association rights, the freedom of association is not absolute. In order to qualify for free-association protection, a group must engage in some form of expressive association. States have a compelling interesting in eradicating discrimination in public accommodations.

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The issue is whether a state wide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools may be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school. The association in question here includes most public schools located within the State, acts through their representatives, draws its officers from them, is largely funded *291 by their dues and income received in their stead, and has historically been seen to regulate in lieu of the State Board of Education's exercise of its own authority. We hold that the association's regulatory activity may and should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association, there being no offsetting reason to see the association's acts in any other way.

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This case presents the question whether the State of California may, consistent with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, use a so-called "blanket" primary to determine a political party's nominee for the general election.

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Ohio law maked Capitol Square, the statehouse plaza in Columbus, a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gave petitioner Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board (Board) responsibility for regulating access to the square. To use the square, a group must simply fill out an official application form and meet several speechneutral criteria. After the Board denied, on Establishment Clause grounds, the application of respondent Ku Klux Klan to place an unattended cross on the square during the 1993 Christmas season, the Klan filed this suit. The District Court entered an injunction requiring issuance of the requested permit, and the Board permitted the Klan to erect its cross. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment, adding to a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a private, unattended display of a religious symbol in a public forum violates the Establishment Clause.

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In 1997, Robert MacDonald sought to obtain a permit to hold a political rally in Grant Park in Chicago on behalf of the Ad Hoc Coalition for Drug Law Reform. Park officials denied MacDonald's request in part because they said he had violated the terms of his permit in 1996 for a prior rally. After being denied by the park district's general superintendent, MacDonald sued in federal court. He challenged the constitutionality of the park-permit rules on their face. Among his challenges, MacDonald argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because it did not contain adequate procedural safeguards. For example, MacDonald argued that the park-permit rules violate the First Amendment because they do not provide for a prompt judicial decision on the merits if a permit applicant appeals a negative decision. After MacDonald lost at the federal trial court level, he appealed to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the 7th Circuit, MacDonald died. The appeals court allowed Caren Cronk Thomas and the Windy City Hemp Development Board Inc. to substitute as the plaintiffs. In 2000, the 7th Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments. The appeals court noted that several federal courts had determined that "judicial review of the denial of a permit must indeed be 'deadlined.' " However, the appeals court panel distinguished those cases, finding that they all involved "special licensing regimes for sexually oriented businesses." The panel reasoned that the speech by those adult businesses needed "greater judicial vigilance" or more protection than the speech at issue in the Chicago park case.

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A California statute known as “Assembly Bill 1889” (AB 1889) prohibits several classes of employers that receive state funds from using the funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” See Cal. Govt. Code Ann.

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