As part of its regulation of the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of that State has imposed and enforces a disciplinary rule that restricts advertising by attorneys. This case presents two issues: whether §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, forbid such state regulation, and whether the operation of the rule violates the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth.[1]

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An advertisement carried in appellant's newspaper led to his conviction for a violation of a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circulation of any publication, to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion. The issue here is whether the editor-appellant's First Amendment rights were unconstitutionally abridged by the statute. The First Amendment, of course, is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939).

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A Tennessee statute prohibits the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. Mary Rebecca Freeman, the treasurer for the campaign of a city council candidate in Nashville, challenged the statute in Tennessee state court. Freeman argued that the statute violated the freedom of speech provisions in the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. The trial judge rejected her challenge. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was unconstitutional.

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492 U.S. 573 (1989) COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY ET AL. v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, GREATER PITTSBURGH CHAPTER, ET AL. No. 87-2050. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 22, 1989 Decided July 3, 1989[*] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT *577 Peter Buscemi argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 87-2050 and 88-96. With him on the briefs were George M. Janocsko, Robert L. McTiernan, D. R. Pellegrini, and George *578 R. Specter. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88-90. With him on the briefs was Charles H. Saul. Roslyn M. […]

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Title 5 U.S.C. Ch. 75, provides a "two-track" system for undertaking "adverse actions" against certain Government employees. An employee removed for "cause," §§ 7511-7514, has a right of appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), § 7513(d), that includes a hearing. The Board reviews such removals under a preponderance of the evidence standard. § 7701. An employee is also subject to summary removal based on national security concerns. Such a removal is not appealable to the Board, but the employee has certain specified procedural rights, including a hearing by an agency authority. § 7532. Respondent was removed from his laborer's job at a submarine facility after the Navy denied him a required security clearance. Without a security clearance, respondent was not eligible for any job at the facility. Upon respondent's appeal of his removal under § 7513(d), the Board's presiding official reversed the Navy's decision, holding that the Board had the authority to review the merits of the underlying security clearance determination and that the Navy had failed to show that it reached a reasonable and warranted decision on this question. The full Board reversed and sustained the Navy's removal action, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that, since the Navy had chosen to remove respondent under § 7512 rather than § 7532, review under § 7513 applied, including review of the merits of the underlying security clearance determination.

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The Federal Open Market Committee has a practice, authorized by regulation, 12 CFR § 271.5 (1978),[1] of withholding *343 certain monetary policy directives from the public during the month they are in effect. At the end of the month, the directives are published in full in the Federal Register. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that this practice violates the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. 184 U. S. App. D. C. 203, 565 F. 2d 778 (1977). We granted certiorari on the strength of the Committee's representations that this ruling could seriously interfere with the implementation of national monetary policy. 436 U. S. 917 (1978).

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Petitioner Oliver T. Fein is a doctor of medicine. In February 1969 he filed this pre-induction suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Jurisdiction was asserted under the federal-question statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, under the civil rights statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, and under the federal-officer statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1361. Fein challenged, on *367 due process grounds, the constitutionality of his Selective Service appeal procedures and sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent his induction into military service. The defendants are Fein's local board at Yonkers, New York, the Appeal Board for the Southern District, the State Selective Service Director, and the National Appeal Board.

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After several violent confrontations between civil rights marchers and local residents, the Forsyth (Georgia) County Board of Commissioners enacted an ordinance that permitted the county administrator to adjust the fee charged for a parade permit, up to a maximum of $1,000, to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the parade. In January 1989, The Nationalist Movement applied for a permit to demonstrate in opposition to the Martin Luther King, Jr., holiday. The county charged a $100 fee that did include any calculation for expenses incurred by law enforcement authorities. The Movement challenged the fee in federal court. The federal district court rejected the challenge. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the arbitrary fee violated the First Amendment. A government may regulate competing uses of public forums, such as streets and sidewalks, by imposing permit requirements on those who wish to hold rallies, parades, and marches. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). The regulatory scheme, however, must not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official, must be content-neutral, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternative channels for communication. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).

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A Michigan teachers union, pursuant to state law, required all employees in the bargaining unit who did not belong to the union to pay a service fee equivalent to the amount of dues paid by each union member. Some of the non-union members objected to the union's use of the service fee for purposes other than negotiating and administering the collective bargaining agreement, claiming that the non-agreement uses violated the non-members' First Amendment rights. The trial court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the union could use the service fee for (1) lobbying activities unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement, (2) the parent union's collective bargaining costs, (3) disseminating information concerning the parent union's litigation activities, (4) public relations expenditures, (5) disseminating general information about job opportunities, professional development, and award programs, (6) sending delegates to the union's national convention, and (7) preparing for a strike that would have been illegal under state law. Compulsory affiliation with, or monetary support of, a union of public employees does not, without more, violate the First Amendment rights of non-members. Public employees, however, cannot be required to contribute to the support of an ideological cause that he or she may oppose. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education,431 U.S. 209 (1977). Non-union members can be charged with union expenses that are (1) germane to collective bargaining activity, (2) justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding "free riders," and (3) not a significant burden on free speech. Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).

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Once again, we are faced with an issue under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act), 5 U. S. C. § 552. This time, we are concerned with the Act's Exemption 7, § 552 (b)(7). That provision exempts from disclosure

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This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization. The question for decision is whether civil courts, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve the dispute on the basis of "neutral principles of law," or whether they must defer to the resolution of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church.

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418 U.S. 298 (1974) LEHMAN v. CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS ET AL. No. 73-328. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 26-27, 1974. Decided June 25, 1974. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. Leonard J. Schwartz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Harry J. Lehman, Melvin L. Wulf, and Joel M. Gora. *299 Paul R. Donaldson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Louis H. Orkin and H. Stephen Madsen. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion, in which THE CHIEF […]

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Three cases, consolidated for hearing in the court below, raise the issue of the effect of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552, upon proceedings pending under the Renegotiation Act of 1951, c. 15, 65 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1211 et seq. In particular, they concern the jurisdiction of a federal district court to enjoin the renegotiation process until an FOIA claim is resolved.

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426 U.S. 736 (1976) ROEMER ET AL. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF MARYLAND ET AL.   No. 74-730. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued February 23, 1976. Decided June 21, 1976. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.*739 Lawrence S. Greenwald argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Melvin L. Wulf. George A. Nilson, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, and Paul R. Connolly argued the cause for appellees. With Mr. Nilson on the brief for appellees Board of Public Works of Maryland et al. were Francis B. Burch, Attorney […]

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In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), this Court, with one dissenting vote, concluded that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of contributions by a charitable organization that did not use at least 75% of its receipts for "charitable purposes" was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue in the present case is whether a Maryland statute with a like percentage limitation, but with provisions that render it more "flexible" than the *950 Schaumburg ordinance, can withstand constitutional attack. The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that, even with this increased flexibility, the percentage restriction on charitable solicitation was an unconstitutional limitation on protected First Amendment solicitation activity. We agree with that conclusion and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

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In Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), this Court rejected a plea for a uniform national standard as to what *293 appeals to the prurient interest and as to what is patently offensive; the Court held, instead, that these essentially were questions of fact to be measured by contemporary standards of the community. Id., at 30-34. The instant case presents the issue of the constitutional effect of state law that leaves unregulated the distribution of obscene material to adults, on the determination of contemporary community standards in a prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1461 for a mailing that is wholly intrastate. The case also raises the question whether § 1461 is unconstitutionally vague as applied in these circumstances, and the question whether the trial court, during the voir dire of prospective jurors, correctly refused to ask proffered questions relating to community standards.

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The issue in this case is whether First Amendment rights were abridged when respondents denied petitioner the use of a municipal facility in Chattanooga, Tenn., for the showing of the controversial rock musical "Hair." It is established, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the States the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 162 (1943).

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490 U.S. 401 (1989) THORNBURGH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. ABBOTT ET AL. No. 87-1344. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 8, 1988 Decided May 15, 1989 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT *402 Deputy Solicitor General Bryson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Dennis, Robert H. Klonoff, and Andrew Levchuk. Steven Ney argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Edward I. Koren, Alvin J. Bronstein, and Steven R. Shapiro.[*] Briefs […]

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In this case we are asked to decide whether a university enjoys a special privilege, grounded in either the common law or the First Amendment, against disclosure of peer review materials that are relevant to charges of racial or sexual discrimination in tenure decisions.

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