We must decide whether a California statute that requires California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates the First Amendment.

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This case involves challenges to United States Air Force regulations that require members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations violate the First Amendment. The second question is whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to communicate with a Member of Congress.

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The case presents the question whether a regulation of the Public Service Commission of the state of New York violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it completely bans promotional advertising by an electrical utility.

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These cases raise a challenge under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the constitutionality of a recently enacted New York law which provides financial assistance, in several ways, to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in that State. The cases involve an intertwining of societal and constitutional issues of the greatest importance.

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The question in this case is whether the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly electric bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy.

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472 U.S. 749 (1985) DUN & BRADSTREET, INC. v. GREENMOSS BUILDERS, INC.   No. 83-18. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued March 21, 1984 Reargued October 3, 1984 Decided June 26, 1985 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT*750 Gordon Lee Garrett, Jr., reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Hugh M. Dorsey, Jr., David J. Bailey, William B. B. Smith, Peter J. Monte, and A. Buffum Lovell. Thomas F. Heilmann reargued the cause and filed briefs for respondent.[*] *751 JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE […]

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This case presents a challenge to the facial validity of a Jacksonville, Fla., ordinance that prohibits showing films containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when its screen is visible from a public street or place.

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In sustaining a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the First Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that materially affect its business, property, or assets. The court rejected appellants' claim that the statute abridges freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue presented in this context is one of first impression in this Court. We postponed the question of jurisdiction to our consideration of the merits. 430 U. S. 964 (1977). We now reverse.

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Texas law prohibits the practice of optometry under a trade name. It also requires that four of the six members of the State's regulatory board, the Texas Optometry Board, be members of the Texas Optometric Association, a professional organization of optometrists. A three-judge District Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute governing the composition of the Texas Optometry Board against a challenge based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But it held that the prohibition of the practice of optometry under a trade name ran afoul of First Amendment protection of commercial speech. 438 F. Supp. 428 (ED Tex. 1977). These appeals and the cross-appeal bring both of the District Court's holdings before the Court.[1]

I

The Texas Legislature approved the Texas Optometry Act (Act) in 1969, repealing an earlier law governing the practice of optometry in the State. Section 2.01 of the Act establishes the Texas Optometry Board (Board) and § 2.02 prescribes the qualifications for Board members.[2] The Board *4 is responsible for the administration of the Act, and has the authority to grant, renew, suspend, and revoke licenses to practice optometry in the State.[3] The Act imposes numerous regulations on the practice of optometry,[4] and on several aspects of the business of optometry.[5] Many of the Act's business regulations are contained in § 5.13, which restricts fee splitting by optometrists and forbids an optometrist to allow his name to be associated with any optometrical office *5 unless he is present and practicing there at least half of the hours that the office is open or half of the hours that he practices, whichever is less. Section 5.13 (d), at issue here, prohibits the practice of optometry under an assumed name, trade name, or corporate name.[6]The dispute in this case grows out of the schism between "professional" and "commercial" optometrists in Texas. Although all optometrists in the State must meet the same licensing requirements and are subject to the same laws regulating their practices, they have divided themselves informally into two groups according to their divergent approaches to the practice of optometry.[7] Rogers, an advocate of the commercial *6 practice of optometry and a member of the Board, commenced this action by filing a suit against the other five members of the Board. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement of § 2.02 of the Act, prescribing the composition of the Board, and § 5.13 (d) of the Act, prohibiting the practice of optometry under a trade name.

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This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment. With this decision we return to that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the extent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen. 410 U. S. 925 (1973).

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Petitioners, seeking to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at a state-supported college, were denied recognition as a campus organization. Recognition would have entitled petitioners to use campus facilities for meetings and to use of the campus bulletin board and school newspaper. The college president denied recognition because he was not satisfied that petitioners' group was independent of the National SDS, which he concluded has a philosophy of disruption and violence in conflict with the college's declaration of student rights. Petitioners thereupon brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court first ordered a further administrative hearing, after which the president reaffirmed his prior decision. Approving the president's judgment, the District Court held that petitioners had failed to show that they could function free from the National SDS and that the college's refusal to approve the group, which the court found "likely to cause violent acts of disruption," did not violate petitioners' associational rights. The Court of Appeals, purporting not to reach the First Amendment issues, affirmed on the ground that petitioners had failed to avail themselves of the due process accorded to them and to meet their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition.

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Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this action to challenge the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act (the Act), S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41 *736 et seq. (Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist College at Charleston (the College).[1] The trial court's denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970). This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Earley v. DiCenso, and Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its earlier position. 258 S. C. 97, 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972). We affirm.

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We consider on this appeal whether a State may punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, advises a lay person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available from a nonprofit organization with which the lawyer and her associates are affiliated. Appellant, a member of the Bar of South Carolina, received a public reprimand for writing such a letter. The appeal is opposed by the State Attorney General, on behalf of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. As this appeal presents a substantial question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as interpreted in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), we noted probable jurisdiction.

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The Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), required a re-examination of long-held perceptions as to "advertising" by lawyers. This appeal presents the question whether certain aspects of the revised ethical rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri regulating lawyer advertising conform to the requirements of Bates.

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The Lloyd Corporation owns a large retail shopping center in Portland, Oregon known as the Lloyd Center. It is bounded by public streets and owns all the land and buildings within the Center. The Lloyd Center allows certain civic and charitable organizations, such as the American Legion and The Salvation Army, to have limited use of the mall. In 1960, Center institutes its strict no handbilling policy. At a few places within the Center, small signs are imbedded in the sidewalk which state its policy. Donald Tanner, Betsy Wheeler, Susan Roberts, and two other young people were anti-war protesters. They were trying to publicize a meeting of the Resistance Community. The Resistance Community was composed of people opposed to the draft and the Vietnam War. On November 14, 1968 the respondents distribute anti-war handbills within Lloyd Center. The distribution occurs in several places on the mall walkways. The five young people are quiet and orderly, and there is no littering. Security guards inform the respondents that they will be arrested if they do not cease and desist the distribution of said handbills. Respondents leave the premises in order to avoid arrest and continue handbilling outside. On January 15, 1970, respondents filed an action in the United States District Court of Oregon. Respondents sought an injunction affirming their right to distribute handbills and enjoining Lloyd Corp. from interfering with that right. Chief Judge Solomon grants the injunction, stating that the Center is open to the general public and that it is found to be the functional equivalent of a public business district. On July 7, 1971, per curiam decision, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upholds the constitutionality of the injunction. It states that it is bound by the lower courts factual determination as to the character of Lloyd Center and thus it must abide by the precedents in Marsh and Amalgamated Food Employees Union. In 1972, The United States Supreme Court grants the petition for cert on January 17. On the issue of public forum v. property rights, peaceful expression carried on in a location open generally to public use is, absent from other factors, is protected by the First Amendment. As such, public access must be given to streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places that are historically associated with the exercise of free speech. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The Court has also held that in some circumstances, property that is privately owned may be considered public for First Amendment purposes. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, (1946) In Marsh, the Court ruled that a Jehovahs Witness had the right to distribute religious pamphlets in the business district of a town owned by a private corporation because that district was the functional equivalent of a business district in a municipality. The Court extended the rationale of Marsh to include the peaceful picketing of a store in a large shopping center. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, (1968). A restriction of free expression in a public forum must be able to withstand strict judicial scrutiny of its effect on First Amendment rights.

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This case presents the question, not fully answered in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the *189 standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detriment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certiorari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the Circuits.[1]

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This case presents the question whether the District Court for the District of Columbia should release to respondents certain tapes admitted into evidence at the trial of petitioner's former advisers. Respondents wish to copy the tapes for broadcasting and sale to the public. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court's refusal to permit immediate copying of the tapes was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mitchell, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 551 F. 2d 1252 (1976). We granted certiorari, 430 U. S. 944 (1977), and for the reasons that follow, we reverse.

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Upon hearing of an automobile accident, an Ohio lawyer contacted the parents of one of the injured drivers and visited the daughter in the hospital. He met with the 18-year-old daughter in the hospital. He offered to represent her. He also approached her passenger, another 18-year-old girl, who was at home recovering after being released from the hospital. While both young women eventually fired him, he did obtain some of the insurance money in a settlement for the breach of contract claim he brought against the driver. The two young women filed complaints with a bar grievance committee. The Ohio State Bar Association filed a formal complaint with the Disciplinary Board of the Ohio Supreme Court, which rejected appellant's defense that his conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

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475 U.S. 1 (1986) PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA ET AL.   No. 84-1044. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued October 8, 1985 Decided February 25, 1986 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA*3 Robert L. Harris argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Malcolm H. Furbush. Mark Fogelman argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellee Public Utilities Commission of California were Janice E. Kerr and Hector Anninos. Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Steven L. Mayer, and Frederic D. Woocher filed a brief for appellees […]

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The Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh (the Ordinance) has been construed below by *378 the courts of Pennsylvania as forbidding newspapers to carry "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns except where the employer or advertiser is free to make hiring or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex. We are called upon to decide whether the Ordinance as so construed violates the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This issue is a sensitive one, and a full understanding of the context in which it arises is critical to its resolution.

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