Keen Umbehr had a contract with Wabaunsee County, Kansas, under which he hauled trash for participating cities in the county. While the contract was in force, Mr. Umbehr spoke at county commission meetings and wrote letters and columns in local newspapers concerning, among other things, alleged violations of law and other improprieties by the county commission and its road and bridge department. The county later terminated the hauling contract. Mr. Umbehr filed suit against three of the commissioners, alleging that they had terminated the contract because of his public criticisms and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court rejected Mr. Umbehr's claim, holding that the First Amendment did not prohibit the county from considering Mr. Umbehr's statements when it decided to terminate the contract. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals recognized that its decision was contrary to cases in other Circuits but it held that the rationales used in the other cases were no longer valid. The First Amendment prevents the government from terminating employees who speak on matters of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Governmental workers also are constitutionally protected from dismissal for supporting or affiliating with a political party, unless such affiliation reasonably can be considered an appropriate job qualification. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). To prevail in an unlawful termination claim, the employee must show that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination. Even upon such a showing, the government can prevail if it can show that it would have taken the same action absent the protected conduct or if sufficiently strong countervailing governmental interests exist. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

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Petitioner sued respondent unions, claiming that their lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities violated federal labor law and antitrust law. After petitioner lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board decided petitioner had violated federal labor law by prosecuting an unsuccessful suit with a retaliatory motive. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because we find the Board *520 lacked authority to assess liability using this standard, we reverse and remand.

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The issue presented in this case is whether a resolution banning all "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violates the First Amendment.

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496 U.S. 226 (1990) BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WESTSIDE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS (DIST. 66) ET AL. v. MERGENS, BY AND THROUGH HER NEXT FRIEND, MERGENS, ET AL.   No. 88-1597. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued January 9, 1990 Decided June 4, 1990 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT*230 Allen E. Daubman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Verne Moore, Jr., Marc D. Stern, and Amy Adelson. Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for private respondents. With him on the brief were Douglas W. Davis, Robert K. Skolrood, […]

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Section 310(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 88 Stat. 1285, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 437h(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), lists three categories of plaintiffs who may challenge the constitutional validity of FECA in specially expedited suits: (1) the Federal Election Commission (FEC), (2) "the national committee of any political party," and (3) "any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President." In this case, we address a question we expressly reserved in California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 187, n. 6 (1981): whether a party not belonging to one of the three categories listed in § 437h(a) may nonetheless invoke its procedures.

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In 1994, the Erie City Council enacted a public indecency ordinance that purports to criminalize public nudity. However, statements by several council members indicate the real intent of the law was to target nude dancing at adult entertainment businesses. PAP's A.M., the owner of an adult business called Kandyland, challenged the law in state court under the First Amendment and the free-speech provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution. After a trial judge granted a permanent injunction against the ordinance, the city appealed. In 1996, the intermediate state appeals court, called the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, reversed, finding the law constitutional based on the U.S. Supreme Court case Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., which upheld a similar Indiana public indecency law. In 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, finding the law unconstitutional. The state supreme court said that it could find "no clear precedent" from the fragmented Barnes decision. The city contends the state supreme court erred in failing to apply the result of Barnes. Nude dancing is a form of expressive conduct that merits at least some degree of First Amendment protection. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,501 U.S. 560 (1991). Laws that are not designed to suppress freedom of expression but to target harmful secondary effects associated with certain expression are to be considered content-neutral for purposes of First Amendment review. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).

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In 1977, soon after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the city of Los Angeles' planning commission studies the effects of adult businesses on the city. The study concludes that a proliferation of adult businesses leads to an increase in crime and a decrease in surrounding property values. Based on this study, the city council passes a zoning law that prohibits adult businesses from locating within 1,000 feet of another adult business or 500 feet within a church, school, or public park. Then, in 1983, the city passes an ordinance banning so-called multiple use adult businesses, such as businesses that operate as both adult bookstores and adult arcades. Many years later, two adult businesses Alameda Books and Highland Books that operate as both bookstores and arcades sue in federal court, contending that the 1983 law is unconstitutional. In 1998, a federal district court eventually sides with the adult businesses and prevents the city from enforcing the law. In 2000, a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision. The 9th Circuit reasons that the city did not have sufficient evidence that multiple-use adult businesses caused harmful, secondary effects. The panel writes: "The study did not identify any harmful secondary effects resulting from bookstore/arcade combinations as individual business units." The city appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, which grants review on March 5, 2001.

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This case requires us to decide whether the Federal Government violates the First Amendment when it excludes legal defense and political advocacy organizations from participation in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC or Campaign), a charity drive aimed at federal employees. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the respondent organizations could not be excluded from the CFC, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 234 U. S. App. D. C. 148, 727 F. 2d 1247 (1984). We granted certiorari, 469 U. S. 929 (1984), and we now reverse.

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A nurse in the obstetrics unit at a public hospital was fired after she spoke with a nurse who was being recruited to join the unit. According to some witnesses, the nurse spoke inappropriately and negatively about the unit and her supervisor. According to the nurse and other witnesses, she spoke primarily about whether some policies being followed on the unit were diminishing the quality of nursing care. The nurse's supervisors learned of the discussion and fired the nurse after a brief investigation. The nurse sued, complaining that her termination violated the rule set forth by the Court inConnick v. Myers — that a public employee's speech is protected if it involves a matter of public concern and is not disruptive of the employment setting. The district court held that the nurse's speech was not of public concern and dismissed her case. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the speech (if it was as described by the terminated nurse) was of public concern. The court of appeals noted that inquiry must turn on what the speech actually was, and not on what the hospital concluded had been said. In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a public employee's speech is protected if it involves a matter of public concern and is not disruptive of the employment setting. The Court, however, had never before been asked to decide a case in which the public employer and employee disagreed about what had been said.

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Rules of the Florida Bar prohibit personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster. This case asks us to consider whether such Rules violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. We hold that in the circumstances presented here, they do not.

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Brookfield, Wisconsin, has adopted an ordinance that completely bans picketing "before or about" any residence. This case presents a facial First Amendment challenge to that ordinance.

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493 U.S. 215 (1990) FW/PBS, INC., DBA PARIS ADULT BOOKSTORE II, ET AL. v. CITY OF DALLAS ET AL.     No. 87-2012. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued October 4, 1989 Decided January 9, 1990[*] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT*219 John H. Weston argued the cause for petitioners in all cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 87-2051 were G. Randall Garrou, Cathy E. Crosson, and Richard L. Wilson. Arthur M. Schwartz filed briefs for petitioners in No. 87-2012. Frank P. Hernandez filed a brief for petitioners in […]

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This case requires us to consider to what extent the "fair use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 (hereinafter *542 the Copyright Act), 17 U. S. C. § 107, sanctions the unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript. In March 1979, an undisclosed source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished manuscript of "A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford." Working directly from the purloined manuscript, an editor of The Nation produced a short piece entitled "The Ford Memoirs — Behind the Nixon Pardon." The piece was timed to "scoop" an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time Magazine. Time had agreed to purchase the exclusive right to print prepublication excerpts from the copyright holders, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (hereinafter Harper & Row), and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (hereinafter Reader's Digest). As a result of The Nation article, Time canceled its agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright action against The Nation. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's finding of infringement, holding that The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use" of the copyrighted material. We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. 1214 (1984), and we now reverse.

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This case presents the question whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a State from imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the distribution of religious materials by a religious organization.

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Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act imposed a sales tax on dozens of services, including the provision of cable television. The Act, however, exempted from taxation receipts from newspaper and magazine sales. The cable television industry in Arkansas brought suit challenging the Act, arguing that Arkansas could not constitutionally tax cable television when it was not taxing the print media. The trial court rejected this argument. While the case was on appeal, Arkansas amended the Act to tax all television and radio services. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, stating that the First Amendment does not prohibit different taxation of different members of the media. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, also held that the First Amendment does prohibit differential taxation among member of the same medium and therefore found that the Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it, before the amendment, taxed cable television differently from satellite television services. Differential taxation of speakers and publishers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. A tax also is suspect if it targets a small group of speakers. Moreover, a tax triggers heightened scrutiny if it discriminates among speakers based on the content of their speech.Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

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In January 1999, the Massachusetts attorney general implements regulations limiting tobacco advertising. A key provision limits outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of any public playground, playground in public parks and any secondary or elementary school. Another provision prohibits "point of sale advertising" within 1,000 feet of playgrounds or schools. The law defines point of sale advertising to include advertising placed lower than five feet in any store accessible to minors. In May 1999, several tobacco companies challenge the constitutionality of the regulations on preemption and First Amendment grounds. With respect to the First Amendment argument, the companies argue that the restrictions are too broad and violate their rights to engage in commercial speech. After a federal district court rejects the companies' preemption and the vast majority of its First Amendment claims, the companies appeal to the 1st Circuit. The 1st Circuit also rules in favor of nearly all the regulations, including the 1,000 foot ban. The 1st Circuit wrote: "although the geographical scope of the advertising restrictions is substantial, we do not find the restrictions equivalent to a 'blanket ban' on speech." Regulations on truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech are constitutional if the government: (1) has a substantial interest for its regulation; (2) the regulation advances the governmental interest in a direct and material way; and (3) the regulation is narrowly drawn. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Governmental interests in protecting minors from harmful speech do not justify a wholesale suppression of the free-speech rights of adults. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

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491 U.S. 576 (1989) MASSACHUSETTS v. OAKES No. 87-1651. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 17, 1989 Decided June 21, 1989 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS *578 James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Phyllis N. Segal and A. John Pappalardo, Deputy Attorneys General, and Madelyn F. Wessel, Judy G. Zeprun, and H. Reed Witherby, Assistant Attorney General. Richard J. Vita argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.[*] JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE […]

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485 U.S. 312 (1988) BOOS ET AL. v. BARRY, MAYOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL. No. 86-803. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 9, 1987 Decided March 22, 1988 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT *314 Raymond D. Battocchi argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Isaac N. Groner, Walter H. Fleischer, Alfred F. Belcuore, and James A. Bensfield. Edward E. Schwab argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Charles L. Reischel. Michael S. Arif filed a brief for respondent Father […]

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This case presents the question of a State's power to impose a special tax on the press and, by enacting exemptions, to limit its effect to only a few newspapers.

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The State of Minnesota authorizes its public employees to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment. It also requires public employers to engage in official exchanges of views with their professional employees on policy questions relating to employment but outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. If professional employees forming an appropriate bargaining unit have selected an exclusive representative for mandatory bargaining, their employer may exchange views on nonmandatory subjects only with the exclusive representative. The question presented in these cases is whether this restriction on participation in the nonmandatory-subject exchange process violates the constitutional rights of professional employees within the bargaining unit who are not members of the exclusive representative and who may disagree with its views. We hold that it does not.

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