Overruled

383 U.S. 413 (1966) A BOOK NAMED “JOHN CLELAND’S MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE” ET AL. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS. No. 368. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 7-8, 1965. Decided March 21, 1966. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. *414 Charles Rembar argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. William I. Cowin, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Edward W. Brooke, Attorney General, and John E. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General. Charles H. Keating, Jr., and James J. Clancy filed a brief for Citizens […]

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378 U.S. 205 (1964) A QUANTITY OF COPIES OF BOOKS ET AL. v. KANSAS.   No. 449. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued April 1-2, 1964. Decided June 22, 1964. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.*206 Stanley Fleishman argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Sam Rosenwein. William M. Ferguson, Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Rober E. Hoffman, J. Richard Foth and Richard H. Seaton, Assistant Attorneys General of Kansas, and William Clement. The following State Attorneys General joined in the brief for appellee: […]

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388 U.S. 452 (1967) A QUANTITY OF COPIES OF BOOKS ET AL. v. KANSAS. No. 865. Supreme Court of United States. Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. Stanley Fleishman for petitioners. Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General of Kansas, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument in light of A Quantity of […]

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388 U.S. 447 (1967) ADAY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 149. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.Stanley Fleishman for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall for the United States. Melvin L. Wulf, Rolland R. O’Hare and Erwin B. Ellmann for the American Civil Liberties Union et al., and Horace S. Manges for the American Book Publishers Council, Inc., as amici curiae, in support of the petition. Charles H. Keating, Jr., and James J. Clancy for Citizens for Decent Literature, […]

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1963- On September 14, approximately 200 black and white demonstrators were arrested while picketing and protesting outside a segregated movie theater in downtown Tallahassee, FL. Later that night, in an act of solidarity with those who had been imprisoned, 99 Florida A & M students gathered in the driveway of the Leon County Jailhouse. The students sang and clapped until the sheriff ordered them to disperse. Over 100 students refused the order and were charged with violating Florida code section 821.18. Thirty-two students were subsequently convicted. Section 821.18 reads: "Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a malicious and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars." Fla. Stat. 821.18 (1965).

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Overruled

Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, praying that § 12-a of the Civil Service Law,[1] as implemented by *487 the so-called Feinberg Law,[2] be declared unconstitutional, and that action by the Board of Education of the City of New York thereunder be enjoined. On motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court held that subdivision (c) of § 12-a, the Feinberg Law, and the Rules of the State Board of Regents promulgated thereunder violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and issued an injunction. 196 Misc. 873, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 114. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed, 276 App. Div. 527, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 466, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, 301 N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. 2d 806. The appellants come here by appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

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We granted certiorari[1] in this case in order to determine whether Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b) (3),[2] permits nondisclosure *257 to respondents of certain reports in the files of the Federal Aviation Administration. This exemption provides that material need not be disclosed if "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." The reports are known as Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) Reports.[3] They consist of analyses made by representatives of the FAA concerning the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines. Over-sight and regulation of air travel safety is the responsibility of the FAA, § 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 775, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1421. The FAA claims the documents are protected from disclosure *258 by virtue of § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C. § 1504.[4]The facts of the case, in its present posture,[5] are quite simple. During the summer of 1970, in connection with a study of airline safety being conducted by them, the respondents, associated with the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, requested that the FAA make available certain SWAP Reports. The FAA declined to produce the documents. In accordance with established procedures adopted by the FAA, the respondents then filed timely notice of administrative appeal in August 1970. Several months later, while this administrative appeal was pending, the Air Transport Association, on behalf of its airline *259 members, requested that the FAA make no public disclosure of the SWAP Reports. The Association noted that, in a prior memorandum of its own staff, the FAA had pointed out that " `[t]he SWAP Program requires a cooperative effort on both the part of the company and FAA if it is to work effectively,' " and argued that "[t]he present practice of non-public submissions, which includes even tentative findings and opinions as well as certain factual material, encourages a spirit of openness on the part of airline management which is vital to the promotion of aviation safety—the paramount consideration of airlines and government alike in this area." In February 1971, the FAA formally denied respondents' request for the SWAP Reports. It took the position that the reports are exempt from public disclosure under 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b) (3), the section at issue here. As previously noted, that section provides that such material need not be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act when the material is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. The FAA noted that § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 permits the Administrator to withhold information, public disclosure of which, in his judgment, would adversely affect the interests of the objecting party and is not required to be disclosed in the interest of the public. The FAA also based its denial of these data on the exemption for intra-agency memoranda (5 U. S. C. § 552 (b) (5)), the exemption for investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes (§ 552 (b) (7)), and, finally, the exemption for documentation containing trade secrets and commercial or financial information of a privileged or confidential nature (§ 552 (b) (4)). The FAA's answer also explained its view of the need for confidentiality in SWAP Reports:

"The effectiveness of the in-depth analysis that is the essence of SWAP team investigation depends, to *260 a great extent, upon the full, frank and open cooperation of the operator himself during the inspection period. His assurance by the FAA that the resulting recommendations are in the interest of safety and operational efficiency and will not be disclosed to the public are the major incentives impelling the operator to hide nothing and to grant free access to procedures, system of operation, facilities, personnel, as well as management and operational records in order to exhibit his normal course of operations to the SWAP inspectors."
Respondents then sued in the District Court, seeking, inter alia, the requested documents. The District Court held that "the documents sought by plaintiffs . . . are, as a matter of law, public and non-exempt within the meaning of 5 United States Code [§] 552, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of law."A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court "insofar as appellants rely upon Exemption (3)," but remanded the case for consideration of other exemptions which the FAA might wish to assert. 162 U. S. App. D. C. 298, 498 F. 2d 1031 (1974). Examining first what it felt was the ordinary meaning of the language of Exemption 3, the Court of Appeals held that its language required the exempting statute relied on to specify or categorize the particular documents it authorizes to be withheld. Because § 1104 delegated "broad discretionary authority" under a "public interest" standard, it was held not within the scope of Exemption 3. The Court of Appeals distinguished this Court's decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973), on the ground that the exemption involved in that case was construed to be a specific reference by Congress to a definite class of documents, namely those that must be kept secret " `in the *261 interest of the national defense or foreign policy,' " 162 U. S. App. D. C., at 300, 498 F. 2d, at 1033. The Court of Appeals read the Act as providing a comprehensive guide to congressional intent. One of the Act's major purposes was seen as intending to eliminate what it characterized as vague phrases such as "in the public interest" or "for good cause" as a basis for withholding information. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that § 1104 cannot be considered a specific exemption by statute within the meaning of Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act.

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The Communist Party of the United States of America failed to register with the Attorney General as required by the order of the Subversive Activities Control Board *72 sustained in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U. S. 1.[1] Accordingly, no list of Party members was filed as required by § 7 (d) (4) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993-994, 50 U. S. C. § 786 (d) (4) (1964 ed.).[2] Sections 8 (a) and (c) of the Act provide that, in that circumstance, each member of the organization must register and file a registration statement; in default thereof, § 13 (a) authorizes the Attorney General to petition the Board for an order requiring the member to register.[3] The *73 Attorney General invoked § 13 (a) against petitioners, and the Board, after evidentiary hearings, determined that petitioners were Party members and ordered each of them to register pursuant to §§ 8 (a) and (c). Review of the orders was sought by petitioners in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under § 14 (a).[4] The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 332 F. 2d 317. We granted certiorari, 381 U. S. 910. We reverse.[5]

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413 U.S. 836 (1973) ALEXANDER ET AL. v. VIRGINIA   No. 71-1315. Supreme Court of the United States.   Argued October 19, 1972. Decided June 25, 1973. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIAStanley M. Dietz argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. James E. Kulp, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.[*] PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with […]

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Overruled

About the Logan Valley Plaza: The Plaza is a large shopping mall located near the city of Altoona, Pennsylvania. The shopping center directly abuts Plank Road to the east and Goods Lane to the South. Plan Road, otherwise known as U.S. Route 220, is a heavily traveled, high speed highway. There are five entrances to the Plaza: three from Plank Road and two from Goods Lane. At the time of the case, the Plaza was occupied by two businesses, Weis Markets, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck and Co. About Weis: Weis Markets, Inc. owns and operates supermarkets through out the United States. Weis owns an enclosed supermarket building in Logan Valley Plaza. The property includes an open pick-up porch, where Weis consumers can temporarily park and load groceries into their automobiles. About Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590: AFEU 590 is a local food employees union. The members of the union were employed by competitors of Weis.

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380 U.S. 503 (1965) AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN BORN v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD. No. 44. Supreme Court of United States. Argued December 8-9, 1964. Decided April 26, 1965. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. Joseph Forer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was David Rein. Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney, George B. Searls and Doris H. Spangenburg. Melvin L. Wulf and Marvin M. Karpatkin filed a […]

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In Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, ante, p. 287, we held that acts of picketing when blended with violence may have a significance which neutralizes the constitutional immunity which such acts would have in isolation. When we took this case, 310 U.S. 620, it seemed to present a similar problem. More thorough study of the record and full argument have reduced the issue to this: is the constitutional guarantee of freedom of discussion infringed by the common law policy of a state forbidding resort to peaceful persuasion through picketing merely because there is no immediate employer-employee dispute?

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These cases began when appellants, minority political parties and their candidates, qualified voters supporting the minority party candidates, and independent unaffiliated candidates, brought four separate actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against the Texas Secretary of State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of various sections of the Texas Election Code.

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Petitioners are the six maritime unions which appeared before this Court as respondents in Windward Shipping v. American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104 (1974). We granted their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, 415 U. S. 947, in order to review their contentions that this case was distinguishable from Windward on the pre-emption issue, and that the temporary injunction upheld by that court had infringed rights guaranteed to them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.[1]

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Appellants, native-born citizens and residents of the United States, are ranking officials of the Communist Party of the United States. After hearings under State Department regulations, appellants' passports were revoked under § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which provides that, when a Communist organization is registered, or under final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member with knowledge or notice thereof to apply for or use a passport. Appellants filed suit asking that § 6 be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that the Secretary of State be ordered to issue passports to them.

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371 U.S. 218 (1962) ARLAN’S DEPARTMENT STORE OF LOUISVILLE, INC., ET AL. v. KENTUCKY. No. 503. Supreme Court of United States. Decided December 17, 1962. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY. James E. Thornberry and Edward M. Post for appellants. John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, Holland N. McTyeire, Assistant Attorney General, and Chas. E. Keller for appellee. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. This is a criminal prosecution of the owners of three retail stores for employing persons […]

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Petitioner was sentenced to six months in prison and fined $3,000 for printing a pamphlet found to be prohibited by the common law of criminal libel in Kentucky. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, with three judges dissenting, affirmed petitioner's conviction. 405 S. W. 2d 562. We granted certiorari (382 U. S. 971) and reverse.

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The publishers of more than 1,200 newspapers are members of the Associated Press (AP), a cooperative *4 association incorporated under the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New York. Its business is the collection, assembly and distribution of news. The news it distributes is originally obtained by direct employees of the Association, employees of the member newspapers, and the employees of foreign independent news agencies with which AP has contractual relations, such as the Canadian Press. Distribution of the news is made through interstate channels of communication to the various newspaper members of the Association, who pay for it under an assessment plan which contemplates no profit to AP.

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Companion case to Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

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388 U.S. 446 (1967) AVANSINO ET AL. v. NEW YORK.   No. 72. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.Eugene Gressman for petitioners. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE CLARK would affirm. Mishkin v. […]

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