FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. CRUZ

Whether BCRAs so-called "Millionaires Amendment," which relaxes campaign finance limits for opponents of congressional candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own money, violates either the First or Fifth Amendments.

Whether the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Acts ban on election season campaign ads by corporations violates the First Amendment.

Whether Vermont's mandatory limits on candidate expenditures violate the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo? Whether Vermont's treatment of independent expenditures by political parties and committees presumptively coordinated if they benefit fewer than six candidates, and thereby subject to strict contribution and expenditure limits, is consistent with the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC? Whether Vermont's contribution limits, which are the lowest in the country, which allow only a single maximum contribution over a two-year election cycle, and which prohibit state political parties from contributing more than $400 to their gubernatorial candidate, fall below an acceptable constitutional threshold and should be struck down?

Whether the three-judge district court correctly dismissed appellant's as-applied constitutional challenge to the federal prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications."

Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "soft money" provision (section 101) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81, because it constitutes an invalid exercise of Congress' power to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution; violates the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment; or is unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "electioneering communications" provisions (sections 201, 203, 204, and 311), of BCRA, because they violate the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, or are unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, portions of the "advance notice" provisions, the "coordination" provisions, and the "attack ad" provision of BCRA (section 305), because they violates the First Amendment.

Whether certain advocacy groups can contribute to candidates campaigns. Currently, only individuals, political action committees, political parties and other campaign committees can give to candidates. More specifically, the issue is whether North Carolina Right to Life and other nonprofit advocacy corporations groups that raise money not through business ventures but through donations from supporters can make campaign contributions. Such groups have neither business interests nor shareholders.

Whether the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violates a political party's First Amendment rights by limiting the amount of money a party may spend in coordination with its congressional candidates.

Whether the Buckley v. Valeodecision authorizes state limits on campaign-contributions to state political candidates. Whether the limits approved in Buckleydefine the scope of permissible state limitations.

Whether a California state law that prohibits the release of arrestees' personal addresses if used for commercial purposes, but allows the release of such information for other purposes, violates the First Amendment.

Whether campaign spending limits constitutionally can be applied against a state committee of a political party whose spending was not coordinated with a candidate.

Whether an injunction that limits the places where and the manner in which antiabortion protestors may demonstrate violates the First Amendment.

Did the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Whether a Dallas ordinance licensing "sexually oriented businesses" amounted to a prior restraint on protected expression, violating the First Amendment.

Did Lakewood's city ordinance violate freedom of speech rights as protected by the First Amendment?

Whether provisions of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act restricting union and corporation's funds for political purposes to members of the corporation violate the First Amendment's guarantees of associational rights.

Whether a $250 limit on contributions to committees in support of or opposition to ballot initiatives in California violated First Amendment guarantees of association and free speech.

Whether a provision of the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act prohibiting individual contributions of over $5000 to multicandidate political committees violated First Amendment guarantees of speech and associational freedoms.

Whether a city ordinancewhich bars door-to-door solicitation by charities that cannot prove that 75% of their proceeds go directly to charitable purposesviolates the 1st and 14th Amendment free speech rights of solicitors.

Whether a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals violates the First Amendment.

Do the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on electoral expenditures violate the 1st Amendment?

Whether an injunction against enforcement of a New York ordinance prohibiting topless dancing due to overbreadth was wrongly granted.

Whether a federal law barring use of the mail for delivering obscene matter to persons over 21 was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

Does a Maryland law that requires that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited violate the First Amendment?

Whether a state commission with broad discretion to define obscenity, and that allowed police enforcement of obscenity laws, was constitutional under the First Amendment.

Whether a Virginia barratry statute which banned the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business unconstitutionally burdened the First Amendment freedom of association rights of the petitioner and petitioners clients.