Opinions & Commentaries

The Post Office Appropriation Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 553, 554, c. 389, in § 2, contains the following:"SEC. 2. . . . That it shall be the duty of the editor, publisher, business manager, or owner of every newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication to file with the Postmaster General and the postmaster at the office at which said publication is entered, not later than the first day of April and the first day of October of each year, on blanks furnished by the Post Office Department, a sworn statement setting forth the names and post-office addresses of the editor and managing editor, publisher, business managers, and owners, and, in addition, the stockholders, if the publication be owned by a corporation; and also the names of known bondholders, mortgagees, or other security holders; and also, in the case of daily newspapers, there shall be included in such statement the average of the number of copies of each issue of such publication sold or distributed to paid subscribers during the preceding six months: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to religious, fraternal, temperance, and scientific, or other similar publications: Provided further, That it shall not be necessary to include in such statement the names of persons owning less than one per centum of the total amount of stock, bonds, mortgages, or other securities. A copy of such sworn statement shall be published in the second issue of such newspaper, magazine, or other publication printed *297 next after the filing of such statement. Any such publication shall be denied the privileges of the mail if it shall fail to comply with the provisions of this paragraph within ten days after notice by registered letter of such failure.

READ MORE


This is an indictment in thirteen counts. The first alleges a conspiracy between the plaintiff in error and one Carl Gleeser, they then being engaged in the preparation and publication of a newspaper, the Missouri Staats Zeitung, to violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219. It alleges as overt acts the preparation and circulation of twelve articles, &c. in the said newspaper at different dates from July 6, 1917, to December 7 of the same year. The other counts allege attempts to cause disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States, by the same publications, each count being confined to the publication of a single date. Motion to dismiss and a demurrer on constitutional and other grounds, especially that of the First Amendment as to free speech, were overruled, subject to exception, and the defendant refusing to plead the Court ordered a plea of not guilty to be filed. There was a trial and Frohwerk was found guilty on all *206 the counts except the seventh, which needs no further mention. He was sentenced to a fine and to ten years imprisonment on each count, the imprisonment on the later counts to run concurrently with that on the first.

READ MORE


After a hearing on September 22, 1917, by the Third Assistant Postmaster General, of the time and character of which the relator (plaintiff in error) had due notice and at which it was represented by its president, an order was entered, revoking the second-class mail privilege granted to it in 1911 as publisher of the Milwaukee Leader. So far as appears, all that the relator desired to say or offer was heard and received. This hearing was had and *409 the order was entered upon the charge that articles were appearing in relator's paper so violating the provisions of the National Defense Law, approved June 15, 1917, which has come to be popularly known as the Espionage Act of Congress (c. 30, 40 Stat. 217), as to render it "non-mailable" by the express terms of Title XII of that act. On appeal to the Postmaster General the order was approved. Thereupon the relator filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, praying that a writ of mandamus issue, commanding the Postmaster General to annul his order and restore the paper to the second-class privilege. To a rule to show cause the Postmaster General answered, and a demurrer to his answer being overruled and the relator not pleading further, the court discharged the rule and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the constitutional validity of laws of the United States being involved the case was brought here by writ of error.

READ MORE


Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota for the year 1925[1] provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, *702 magazine or other periodical." Section one of the Act is as follows:"Section 1. Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a firm, or association or organization, or as an officer, director, member or employee of a corporation, shall be engaged in the business of regularly or customarily producing, publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling or giving away.

READ MORE


The publishers of more than 1,200 newspapers are members of the Associated Press (AP), a cooperative *4 association incorporated under the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New York. Its business is the collection, assembly and distribution of news. The news it distributes is originally obtained by direct employees of the Association, employees of the member newspapers, and the employees of foreign independent news agencies with which AP has contractual relations, such as the Canadian Press. Distribution of the news is made through interstate channels of communication to the various newspaper members of the Association, who pay for it under an assessment plan which contemplates no profit to AP.

READ MORE


This proceeding brings here for review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida, 156 Fla. 227, 22 So.2d 875, which affirmed a judgment of guilt in contempt of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on a citation of petitioners by that Circuit Court.

READ MORE


331 U.S. 367 (1947) CRAIG ET AL. v. HARNEY, SHERIFF. No. 241. Supreme Court of United States. Argued January 9, 1947. Decided May 19, 1947. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS. *368 Marcellus G. Eckhardt and Ireland Graves argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief was Charles L. Black. Jerry D’Unger argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John S. McCampbell. Elisha Hanson and Letitia Armistead filed a brief for the American Newspaper Publishers Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, announced by […]

READ MORE


The petitioner was convicted upon information in the Municipal Court of Chicago of violating § 224a of the Illinois Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 38, Div. 1, § 471. He was fined $200. The section provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots. . . ."
Beauharnais challenged the statute as violating the liberty of speech and of the press guaranteed as against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as too vague, under the restrictions implicit in the *252 same Clause, to support conviction for crime. The Illinois courts rejected these contentions and sustained defendant's conviction. 408 Ill. 512, 97 N. E. 2d 343. We granted certiorari in view of the serious questions raised concerning the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on the power of a State to punish utterances promoting friction among racial and religious groups. 342 U. S. 809.

READ MORE


We must decide whether § 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 bars a broadcasting station from removing defamatory statements contained in speeches broadcast by legally qualified candidates for public office, and if so, whether that section grants the station a federal immunity from liability for libelous statements so broadcast. Section 315 reads:

"(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate."[1]
This suit for libel arose as a result of a speech made over the radio and television facilities of respondent, WDAY, Inc., by A. C. Townley—a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States senatorial race in North Dakota. Because it felt compelled to do so by the requirements of § 315, WDAY permitted Townley to broadcast his speech, uncensored in any respect, as a reply to previous speeches made over WDAY by two other senatorial candidates. Townley's speech, in substance, accused his opponents, together with petitioner, Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, of conspiring to "establish *527 a Communist Farmers Union Soviet right here in North Dakota." Farmers Union then sued Townley and WDAY for libel in a North Dakota State District Court. That court dismissed the complaint against WDAY on the ground that § 315 rendered the station immune from liability for the defamation alleged. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed, stating: "Section 315 imposes a mandatory duty upon broadcasting stations to permit all candidates for the same office to use their facilities if they have permitted one candidate to use them. Since power of censorship of political broadcasts is prohibited it must follow as a corollary that the mandate prohibiting censorship includes the privilege of immunity from liability for defamatory statements made by the speakers." For this reason it held that the state libel laws could not apply to WDAY. 89 N. W. 2d 102, 110. We granted certiorari because the questions decided are important to the administration of the Federal Communications Act. 358 U. S. 810.

READ MORE


Petitioner challenges on constitutional grounds the validity on its face of that portion of § 155-4[1] of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago which requires submission of all motion pictures for examination prior to their public exhibition. Petitioner is a New York corporation owning the exclusive right to publicly exhibit in Chicago the film known as "Don Juan." It applied for a permit, as Chicago's ordinance required, and tendered the license fee but refused to submit the film for examination. The appropriate city official refused to issue the permit and his order was made final on appeal to the Mayor. The sole ground for denial was petitioner's refusal to submit the film for examination as required. Petitioner then brought this suit seeking injunctive relief ordering the issuance of the permit without submission of the film and restraining the city officials from interfering with the exhibition of the picture. Its sole ground is that the provision of the ordinance requiring submission of the film constitutes, on its face, a prior restraint within the prohibition of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds, inter alia, that neither a substantial federal question nor even a justiciable controversy was presented. 180 F. Supp. 843. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the case presented merely an abstract question of law since neither the film nor evidence of its content was submitted. 272 F. 2d 90. The precise question at issue here never having *45 been specifically decided by this Court, we granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 917 (1960).

READ MORE


The Rhode Island Legislature created the "Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth," whose members and Executive Secretary are the appellees herein, and gave the Commission inter alia ". . . the duty . . . to educate the public concerning any book, picture, pamphlet, balled, printed paper or other thing containing obscene, indecent or impure language, or manifestly tending to the corruption of the youth as defined *60 in sections 13, 47, 48 and 49 of chapter 610 of the general laws, as amended, and to investigate and recommend the prosecution of all violations of said sections . . . ."[1] The appellants brought this action in *61 the Superior Court of Rhode Island (1) to declare the law creating the Commission in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) to declare unconstitutional and enjoin the acts and practices of the appellees thereunder. The Superior Court declined to declare the law creating the Commission unconstitutional on its face but granted the appellants an injunction against the acts and practices of the appellees in performance of their duties. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court with respect to appellants' first prayer but reversed the grant of injunctive relief. ___ R. I. ___, 176 A. 2d 393 (1961).[2] Appellants brought this appeal and we noted probable jurisdiction, 370 U. S. 933.[3]Appellants are four New York publishers of paperback books which have for sometime been widely distributed in Rhode Island. Max Silverstein & Sons is the exclusive wholesale distributor of appellants' publications throughout most of the State. The Commission's practice has been to notify a distributor on official Commission stationery that certain designated books or magazines distributed by him had been reviewed by the Commission and had been declared by a majority of its members to be objectionable for sale, distribution or display to youths under 18 years of age. Silverstein had received at least 35 such notices at the time this suit was brought. Among *62 the paperback books listed by the Commission as "objectionable" were one published by appellant Dell Publishing Co., Inc., and another published by appellant Bantam Books, Inc.[4]The typical notice to Silverstein either solicited or thanked Silverstein, in advance, for his "cooperation" with the Commission, usually reminding Silverstein of the Commission's duty to recommend to the Attorney General prosecution of purveyors of obscenity.[5] Copies of the *63 lists of "objectionable" publications were circulated to local police departments, and Silverstein was so informed in the notices.

READ MORE


We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.

READ MORE


378 U.S. 205 (1964) A QUANTITY OF COPIES OF BOOKS ET AL. v. KANSAS.   No. 449. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued April 1-2, 1964. Decided June 22, 1964. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.*206 Stanley Fleishman argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Sam Rosenwein. William M. Ferguson, Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Rober E. Hoffman, J. Richard Foth and Richard H. Seaton, Assistant Attorneys General of Kansas, and William Clement. The following State Attorneys General joined in the brief for appellee: […]

READ MORE


378 U.S. 576 (1964) TRALINS v. GERSTEIN, STATE ATTORNEY.   No. 246. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 22, 1964. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT.Richard Yale Feder and Howard W. Dixon for petitioner. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, Herbert P. Benn and Leonard R. Mellon, Assistant Attorneys General, and Glenn c. Mincer for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would reverse for the reasons stated in the […]

READ MORE


380 U.S. 356 (1965) HENRY v. COLLINS. No. 89. Supreme Court of United States. Decided March 29, 1965.[*] ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI. Robert L. Carter, Barbara A. Morris, Jack H. Young and Frank D. Reeves for petitioner in both cases. W. O. Luckett for respondents in both cases. PER CURIAM. The petitions for certiorari are granted. The judgments are reversed. After petitioner’s arrest on a charge of disturbing the peace, he issued a statement to the effect that this arrest was the result of “a diabolical plot,” in which respondents, the County […]

READ MORE


A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded respondent damages in this civil libel action based on one of petitioner's columns in the Laconia Evening Citizen. Respondent alleged that the column contained defamatory falsehoods concerning his performance as Supervisor of the Belknap Country Recreation Area, a facility owned and operated by Belknap County. In the interval between the trial and the decision of petitioner's appeal by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, we decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254. We there held that consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments a State cannot award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the official proves actual malice—that the falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the award, finding New York Times no bar. 106 N. H. 26, 203 A. 2d 773. We granted certiorari and requested the parties to brief and argue, in addition to the questions presented in the petition for certiorari, the question whether respondent was a "public official" under New York Times and under our decision in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64. 380 U. S. 941.

READ MORE


388 U.S. 447 (1967) ADAY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 149. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.Stanley Fleishman for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall for the United States. Melvin L. Wulf, Rolland R. O’Hare and Erwin B. Ellmann for the American Civil Liberties Union et al., and Horace S. Manges for the American Book Publishers Council, Inc., as amici curiae, in support of the petition. Charles H. Keating, Jr., and James J. Clancy for Citizens for Decent Literature, […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 449 (1967) BOOKS, INC. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 323. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.Stanley Fleishman for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Robert S. Erdahl and Marshall Tamor Golding for the United States. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE would grant […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 130 (1967) CURTIS PUBLISHING CO. v. BUTTS.   No. 37. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued February 23, 1967. Decided June 12, 1967.[*] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.*133 Herbert Wechsler argued the cause for petitioner in No. 37. With him on the brief was Philip H. Strubing. William P. Rogers argued the cause for petitioner in No. 150. With him on the briefs were Leo P. Larkin, Jr., Stanley Godofsky, Arthur Moynihan and J. A. Gooch. Allen E. Lockerman and William H. Schroder argued the cause for respondent in No. […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 440 (1967) KENEY v. NEW YORK.   No. 2. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COUNTY COURT OF MONROE COUNTY, NEW YORK.Eugene Gressman for petitioner. James H. Biben for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the County Court of Monroe County, New York, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN adheres to the views expressed in his separate opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 441 (1967) FRIEDMAN v. NEW YORK.   No. 7. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.Ira H. Holley and Eugene Gressman for petitioner. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN adheres to the views expressed in […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 442 (1967) RATNER ET AL. v. CALIFORNIA.   No. 10. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO.Richard A. Lavine for petitioners. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Robert R. Granucci and Charles W. Rumph, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 443 (1967) COBERT v. NEW YORK.   No. 21. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.Ephraim London for petitioner. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would affirm. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN adheres to the views expressed in his separate opinions in […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 444 (1967) SHEPERD ET AL. v. NEW YORK.   No. 26. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.Ira H. Holley and Eugene Gressman for petitioners. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE CLARK […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 446 (1967) AVANSINO ET AL. v. NEW YORK.   No. 72. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.Eugene Gressman for petitioners. Frank S. Hogan for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE CLARK would affirm. Mishkin v. […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 448 (1967) CORINTH PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. WESBERRY ET AL.   No. 227. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.Stanley Fleishman for petitioner. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, and G. Ernest Tidwell, Executive Assistant Attorney General, for respondents. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument. MR. JUSTICE CLARK would grant the petition and […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 450 (1967) ROSENBLOOM v. VIRGINIA.   No. 366. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.Seymour Horwitz and Melvin L. Wulf for petitioner. James B. Wilkinson for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia is reversed. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN adheres to the views expressed in his separate opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, […]

READ MORE


388 U.S. 454 (1967) SCHACKMAN ET AL. v. CALIFORNIA.   No. 995. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 12, 1967. APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.Burton Marks for appellants. Roger Arnebergh and Philip E. Grey for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgments of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, are reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would affirm the judgments of the lower court. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN adheres to the […]

READ MORE


Companion case to Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

READ MORE


389 U.S. 50 (1967) CENTRAL MAGAZINE SALES, LTD. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 368. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided October 23, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.Richard Lipsitz for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Jerome M. Feit for the United States. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the […]

READ MORE


389 U.S. 47 (1967) POTOMAC NEWS CO. v. UNITED STATES.   No. 164. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided October 23, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.Stanley M. Dietz for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Jerome M. Feit for the United States. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the […]

READ MORE


389 U.S. 48 (1967) CONNER v. CITY OF HAMMOND.   No. 259. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided October 23, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, LOUISIANA, PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA.Leonard B. Levy and Stanley Fleishman for petitioner. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Twenty-first Judicial District Court for the Parish of Tangipahoa, Louisiana, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN would affirm the judgment of the state court upon the premises stated in his separate opinion […]

READ MORE


389 U.S. 81 (1967) BECKLEY NEWSPAPERS CORP. v. HANKS.     No. 467. Supreme Court of United States.    Decided November 6, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WEST VIRGINIA, WYOMING COUNTY.Thurman Arnold and Jack A. Mann for petitioner.Harry G. Camper, Jr., for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for certiorari is granted. Respondent Hanks is the elected Clerk of the Criminal and Circuit Courts of Raleigh County, West Virginia. He brought this libel action in the West Virginia Circuit Court, Wyoming County, alleging that during his reelection campaign he was libeled by three editorials, […]

READ MORE


389 U.S. 89 (1967) CHANCE v. CALIFORNIA.   No. 306, Misc. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided November 6, 1967. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO.Marshall W. Krause for petitioner. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Robert R. Granucci and Michael J. Phelan, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN would affirm for the reasons […]

READ MORE


This suit for declaratory relief that a Maryland teacher's oath required of appellant was unconstitutional was heard by a three-judge court and dismissed. 258 F. Supp. 589. We noted probable jurisdiction. 386 U. S. 906.

READ MORE


389 U.S. 573 (1968) I. M. AMUSEMENT CORP. v. OHIO.   No. 260. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided January 15, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.Allen Brown for appellant. Melvin G. Rueger and Calvin W. Prem for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs on the ground that evidence of contemporary community standards was excluded at trial. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN would affirm for the reasons set forth in his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. […]

READ MORE


389 U.S. 578 (1968) ROBERT-ARTHUR MANAGEMENT CORP. v. TENNESSEE EX REL. CANALE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY GENERAL.   No. 679. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided January 15, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.Longstreet Heiskell for appellant. George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE would affirm. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN would affirm for the reasons set forth in his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. […]

READ MORE


390 U.S. 340 (1968) FELTON ET AL. v. CITY OF PENSACOLA.     No. 934. Supreme Court of United States.    Decided March 11, 1968. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FIRST DISTRICT.Stanley Fleishman, Sam Rosenwein and Hugh W. Gibert for petitioners.Dave Caton for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE would grant the petition and reverse because of the failure […]

READ MORE


Appellee, Board of Education, dismissed appellant, a teacher, for writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter criticizing the Board's allocation of school funds between educational and athletic programs and the Board's and superintendent's methods of informing, or preventing the informing of, the school district's taxpayers of the real reasons why additional tax revenues were being sought for the schools. At a hearing, the Board charged that numerous statements in the letter were false, and that the publication of the statements unjustifiably impugned the Board and school administration. The Board found all the statements false as charged, and concluded that publication of the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district" and that "the interests of the school require[d] [appellant's dismissal]" under the applicable statute. There was no evidence at the hearing as to the effect of appellant's statements on the community or school administration. The Illinois courts, reviewing the proceedings solely to determine whether the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the Board could reasonably conclude that the publication was "detrimental to the best interests of the schools," upheld the dismissal, rejecting appellant's claim that the letter was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on the ground that, as a teacher, he had to refrain from making statements about the schools' operation "which, in the absence of such position, he would have an undoubted right to engage in."

READ MORE


392 U.S. 655 (1968) HENRY v. LOUISIANA.   No. 932. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 17, 1968. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.Thomas Barr III for appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, and William P. Schuler, Second Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE […]

READ MORE


The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has for many years imposed on broadcasters a "fairness doctrine," requiring that public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side of those issues be given fair coverage. In No. 2, the FCC declared that petitioner Red Lion Broadcasting Co. had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness doctrine when it carried a program which constituted a personal attack on one Cook, and ordered it to send a transcript of the broadcast to Cook and provide reply time, whether or not Cook would pay for it. The Court of Appeals upheld the FCC's position. After the commencement of the Red Lion litigation, the FCC began a rulemaking proceeding to make the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and more readily enforceable, and to specify its rules relating to political editorials. The rules, as adopted and amended, were held unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in RTNDA (No. 717) as abridging the freedoms of speech and press.

READ MORE


396 U.S. 119 (1969) CARLOS v. NEW YORK.     No. 524. Supreme Court of United States.    Decided December 8, 1969. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.Herald Price Fahringer and Eugene Gressman for petitioner.PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed, Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied. However, the case having been taken for review, they would affirm the judgment of the state court upon […]

READ MORE


The petitioners are the publishers of a small weekly newspaper, the Greenbelt News Review, in the city of Greenbelt, Maryland. The respondent Bresler is a prominent local real estate developer and builder in Greenbelt, and was, during the period in question, a member of the Maryland House of Delegates from a neighboring district. In the autumn of 1965 Bresler was engaged in negotiations with the Greenbelt City Council to obtain certain zoning variances that would allow the construction of high-density housing on land owned by him. At the same time the city was attempting to acquire another tract of land owned by Bresler for the construction of a new high school. Extensive litigation concerning compensation for the school site seemed imminent, unless there should be an agreement on its price between Bresler and the city authorities, and the concurrent negotiations obviously provided both parties considerable bargaining leverage.

READ MORE


398 U.S. 278 (1970) BLOSS ET AL. v. DYKEMA.   No. 1347. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 1, 1970 ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE WHITE are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. I would affirm […]

READ MORE


399 U.S. 524 (1970) HOYT ET AL. v. MINNESOTA.   No. 1544. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided June 29, 1970. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA.PER CURIAM. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed, Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN join, dissenting. I am not persuaded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments necessarily prescribe a national and uniform measure—rather than one capable of some flexibility and resting on concepts of reasonableness—of […]

READ MORE


On September 10, 1960, three days before the New Hampshire Democratic Party's primary election of candidates for the United States Senate, the Concord Monitor, a daily newspaper in Concord, New Hampshire, published a syndicated "D. C. Merry-Go-Round" column discussing the forthcoming election. The column spoke of political maneuvering in the primary campaign, referred to the criminal records of several of the candidates, and characterized Alphonse Roy, one of the candidates, as a "former small-time bootlegger."[1] Roy was not *267 elected in the primary, and he subsequently sued the Monitor Patriot Co. and the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA), the distributor of the column, for libel.

READ MORE


In November 1961, the United States Commission on Civil Rights issued the fifth volume of its Report for that year, a document entitled Justice. A part of Justice was devoted to a study of "police brutality and related private violence," and contained the following paragraph:

"Search, seizure, and violence: Chicago, 1958.— The Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Monroe v. Pape on February 20, 1961. Although this decision did not finally dispose of the case, it did permit the plaintiff to sue several Chicago police officers for violation of the Federal Civil Rights Acts on the basis of a complaint which alleged that:
". . . [O]n October 29, 1958, at 5:45 a. m., thirteen Chicago police officers led by Deputy Chief of Detectives *281 Pape, broke through two doors of the Monroe apartment, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights, and forced them at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center of the living room; that the officers roused the six Monroe children and herded them into the living room; that Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight, calling him `nigger' and `black boy'; that another officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor; that the police ransacked every room, throwing clothing from closets to the floor, dumping drawers, ripping mattress covers; that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on `open' charges for ten hours, during which time he was interrogated about a murder and exhibited in lineups; that he was not brought before a magistrate, although numerous magistrate's courts were accessible; that he was not advised of his procedural rights; that he was not permitted to call his family or an attorney; that he was subsequently released without criminal charges having been filed against him." Justice 20-21.
A week later, Time, a weekly news magazine, carried a report of the Commission's new publication. The Time article began:
"The new paperback book has 307 pages and the simple title Justice. It is the last of five volumes in the second report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, first created by Congress in 1957. Justice carries a chilling text about police brutality in both the South and the North—and it stands as a grave indictment, since its facts were carefully investigated *282 by field agents and it was signed by all six of the noted educators who comprise the commission."
There followed a description, with numerous direct quotations, of one of the incidents described in Justice, and then the following account of the Monroe incident:
"Shifting to the North, the report cites Chicago police treatment of Negro James Monroe and his family, who were awakened in their West Side apartment at 5:45 a. m. by 13 police officers, ostensibly investigating a murder. The police, says Justice, `broke through two doors, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights . . . .' "
The Time article went on to quote at length from the summary of the Monroe complaint, without indicating in any way that the charges were those made by Monroe rather than independent findings of the Commission.

READ MORE


The Ocala Star-Banner Co., a petitioner in this case, publishes a small daily newspaper serving four counties in rural Florida. On April 18, 1966, the Star-Banner *296 printed a story to the effect that the respondent, Leonard Damron, then the mayor of Crystal River in Citrus County and a candidate for the office of county tax assessor, had been charged in a federal court with perjury, and that his case had been held over until the following term of that court.[1] This story was false. The respondent had not been charged with any crime in federal court, nor had any case involving him been held over, but the story was substantially accurate as to his brother, James Damron.[2] Two weeks later the *297 respondent was defeated in the election for county tax assessor.

READ MORE


403 U.S. 29 (1971) ROSENBLOOM v. METROMEDIA, INC.     No. 66. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued December 7-8, 1970. Decided June 7, 1971. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.*30 Ramsey Clark argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Benjamin Paul.Bernard G. Segal argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Irving R. Segal, Samuel D. Slade, and Carleton G. Eldridge, Jr. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join. In […]

READ MORE


403 U.S. 713 (1971) NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. UNITED STATES.         No. 1873. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued June 26, 1971 Decided June 30, 1971[*] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.Alexander M. Bickel argued the cause for petitioner in No. 1873. With him on the brief were William E. Hegarty and Lawrence J. McKay.Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Mardian and Daniel M. Friedman.William R. Glendon argued the cause for respondents in […]

READ MORE


408 U.S. 665 (1972) BRANZBURG v. HAYES ET AL., JUDGES. No. 70-85. Supreme Court of United States. Argued February 23, 1972. Decided June 29, 1972.[*] CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY. Edgar A. Zingman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 70-85. With him on the briefs was Robert C. Ewald. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner in No. 70-94. With him on the briefs was William H. Carey. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States in No. 70-57. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Assistant Attorney General […]

READ MORE


Petitioner Barbara Papish, a graduate student in the University of Missouri School of Journalism, was expelled for distributing on campus a newspaper "containing forms of indecent speech" in violation of a bylaw of the Board of Curators. The newspaper, the Free Press Underground, had been sold on this state university campus for more than four years pursuant to an authorization obtained from the University Business Office. The particular newspaper issue in question was found to be unacceptable for two reasons. First, on the front cover, the publishers had reproduced a political cartoon previously printed in another newspaper depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The caption under the cartoon read: ". . . With Liberty and Justice for All." Secondly, the issue contained an article entitled "Motherfucker Acquitted," which discussed the trial and acquittal on an assault charge of a New York City youth who was a member of an organization known as "Up Against the Wall, Motherfucker." Following a hearing, the Student Conduct Committee found that petitioner had violated Par. B of Art. V of the General Standards of Student Conduct, which requires students "to observe generally accepted standards of conduct," and specifically prohibits "indecent conduct or speech." Her expulsion, after affirmance first by the Chancellor of the University and then by its Board of Curators, was made effective in the middle of the spring semester. Although she was then permitted to remain on campus until the end of the semester, she was not given credit for the one course in which she made a passing grade.

READ MORE


The Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh (the Ordinance) has been construed below by *378 the courts of Pennsylvania as forbidding newspapers to carry "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns except where the employer or advertiser is free to make hiring or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex. We are called upon to decide whether the Ordinance as so construed violates the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This issue is a sensitive one, and a full understanding of the context in which it arises is critical to its resolution.

READ MORE


413 U.S. 836 (1973) ALEXANDER ET AL. v. VIRGINIA   No. 71-1315. Supreme Court of the United States.   Argued October 19, 1972. Decided June 25, 1973. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIAStanley M. Dietz argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. James E. Kulp, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.[*] PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with […]

READ MORE


The respondents, a major metropolitan newspaper and one of its reporters, initiated this litigation to challenge the constitutionality of ¶ 4b (6) of Policy Statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.[1] At the time that the case was in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, this regulation prohibited any personal interviews between newsmen and individually designated federal prison inmates. The Solicitor General has informed the Court that the regulation was recently amended "to permit press interviews at federal prison institutions that can be characterized as minimum security."[2] The general prohibition of press interviews with inmates remains in effect, however, in three-quarters of the federal prisons, i. e., in all medium security and maximum security institutions, including the two institutions involved in this case.

READ MORE


These cases are here on cross-appeals from the judgment of a three-judge District Court in the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs in the District Court were four California prison inmates—Booker T. Hillery, Jr., John Larry Spain, Bobby Bly, and Michael Shane Guile—and three professional journalists—Eve Pell, Betty Segal, and Paul Jacobs. The defendants were Raymond K. Procunier, Director of the California Department of Corrections, and several subordinate officers in that department. The plaintiffs brought the suit to challenge the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of § 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual, which provides that "[p]ress and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." They sought both injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Section 415.071 was promulgated by defendant Procunier under authority vested in him by § 5058 of the California Penal Code and is applied uniformly throughout the State's penal system to prohibit face-to-face interviews between press representatives and individual inmates whom they specifically name and request to interview. *820 In accordance with 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, a three-judge court was convened to hear the case.[1]

READ MORE


This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment. With this decision we return to that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the extent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen. 410 U. S. 925 (1973).

READ MORE


The issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press.

READ MORE


Petitioners, a mother and her son, brought a diversity action against respondents, a newspaper publisher and a reporter, for invasion of privacy based on a feature story in the newspaper discussing the impact upon petitioners' family of the death of the father in a bridge collapse. The story concededly contained a number of inaccuracies and false statements about the family. The District Judge struck the claims for punitive damages for lack of evidence of malice "within the legal definition of that term," but allowed the case to go to the jury on the "false light" theory of invasion of privacy, after instructing the jurors that liability could be imposed only if they found that the false statements were published with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth, and the jury returned a verdict for compensatory damages.

READ MORE


The issue before us in this case is whether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a State may extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime.

READ MORE


Petitioner is the publisher of Time, a weekly news magazine. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a *450 $100,000 libel judgment against petitioner which was based on an item appearing in Time that purported to describe the result of domestic relations litigation between respondent and her husband. We granted certiorari, 421 U. S. 909 (1975), to review petitioner's claim that the judgment violates its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

READ MORE


The respondent State District Judge entered an order restraining the petitioners from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions or admissions made by the accused or facts "strongly implicative" of the accused in a widely reported murder of six persons. We granted certiorari to decide whether the entry of such an order on the showing made before the state court violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.

READ MORE


430 U.S. 308 (1977) OKLAHOMA PUBLISHING CO. v. DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR OKLAHOMA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, ET AL.   No. 76-867. Supreme Court of United States.   Decided March 7, 1977. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.PER CURIAM. A pretrial order entered by the District Court of Oklahoma County enjoined members of the news media from “publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture of [a] minor child” in connection with a juvenile proceeding involving that child then pending in that court. On application for prohibition and mandamus challenging the order […]

READ MORE


This case presents the question whether the District Court for the District of Columbia should release to respondents certain tapes admitted into evidence at the trial of petitioner's former advisers. Respondents wish to copy the tapes for broadcasting and sale to the public. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court's refusal to permit immediate copying of the tapes was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mitchell, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 551 F. 2d 1252 (1976). We granted certiorari, 430 U. S. 944 (1977), and for the reasons that follow, we reverse.

READ MORE


The question presented on this appeal is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia may subject persons, including newspapers, to criminal sanctions for divulging information regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission which is authorized to hear complaints as to judges' disability or misconduct, when such proceedings are declared confidential by the State Constitution and statutes.[1]

READ MORE


Respondents, a student newspaper that had published articles and photographs of a clash between demonstrators and police at a hospital, and staff members, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against, among others, Petitioners, law enforcement and district attorney personnel, claiming that a search pursuant to a warrant issued on a judge's finding of probable cause that the newspaper (which was not involved in the unlawful acts) possessed photographs and negatives revealing the identities of demonstrators who had assaulted police officers at the hospital had deprived respondents of their constitutional rights.

READ MORE


438 U.S. 1 (1978) HOUCHINS, SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA v. KQED, INC., ET AL. No. 76-1310. Supreme Court of United States. Argued November 29, 1977. Decided June 26, 1978. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. *3 Kelvin H. Booty, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard J. Moore. William Bennett Turner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, and Stanley A. Bass.[*] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an […]

READ MORE


438 U.S. 726 (1978) FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. PACIFICA FOUNDATION ET AL.     No. 77-528. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued April 18, 19, 1978. Decided July 3, 1978. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.*728 Joseph A. Marino argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert R. Bruce and Daniel M. Armstrong.Harry M. Plotkin argued the cause for respondent Pacifica Foundation. With him on the brief were David Tillotson and Harry F. Cole. Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for *729 the United States, a respondent […]

READ MORE


By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the Federal nor a State Government may make any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." The question here is whether those Amendments should be construed to provide further protection for the press when sued for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More specifically, we are urged to hold for the first time that when a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff's reputation, the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial processes of those responsible for the publication, even though the inquiry would produce evidence material to the proof of a critical element of his cause of action.

READ MORE


In 1974, respondent Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published a book entitled KGB, the Secret Work of Soviet Agents (KGB), written by respondent John Barron.[1] The book describes the Soviet Union's espionage organization and chronicles its activities since World War II. In a passage referring to disclosures by "royal commissions in Canada and Australia, and official investigations in Great Britain and the United States," the book contains the following statements relating to petitioner Ilya Wolston:

READ MORE


We granted certiorari to consider whether a West Virginia statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of the juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.

READ MORE


The question presented in this case is whether members of the public have an independent constitutional right to insist upon access to a pretrial judicial proceeding, even though *371 the accused, the prosecutor, and the trial judge all have agreed to the closure of that proceeding in order to assure a fair trial.

READ MORE


448 U.S. 555 (1980) RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC., ET AL. v. VIRGINIA ET AL.   No. 79-243. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued February 19, 1980. Decided July 2, 1980. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA.*558 Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Andrew J. Brent, Alexander Wellford, Leslie W. Mullins, and David Rosenberg. Marshall Coleman, Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were James E. Moore, Leonard L. Hopkins, Jr., Martin A. Donlan, Jr., and Jerry P. Slonaker, Assistant Attorneys General.[*] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE […]

READ MORE


Section 16A of Chapter 278 of the Massachusetts General Laws,[1] as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, requires trial judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of that victim. The question presented is whether the statute thus construed violates the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

READ MORE


At issue in this case is the constitutionality of a New York criminal statute which prohibits persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such performances.

READ MORE


This case presents the question of a State's power to impose a special tax on the press and, by enacting exemptions, to limit its effect to only a few newspapers.

READ MORE


We granted certiorari to decide whether the guarantees of open public proceedings in criminal trials cover proceedings for the voir dire examination of potential jurors.

READ MORE


An unusual metaphor in a critical review of an unusual loudspeaker system gave rise to product disparagement litigation that presents us with a procedural question of first impression: Does Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe the standard to be applied by the Court of Appeals in its review of a District Court's determination that a false statement was made with the kind of "actual malice" described in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964)?In the May 1970 issue of its magazine, Consumer Reports, respondent published a seven-page article evaluating the quality of numerous brands of medium-priced loudspeakers. In a boxed-off section occupying most of two pages, respondent commented on "some loudspeakers of special interest," *488 one of which was the Bose 901 — an admittedly "unique and unconventional" system that had recently been placed on the market by petitioner.[1] After describing the system and some of its virtues, and after noting that a listener "could pinpoint the location of various instruments much more easily with a standard speaker than with the Bose system," respondent's article made the following statements:

"Worse, individual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the room. For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to wall. With orchestral music, such effects seemed inconsequential. But we think they might become annoying when listening to soloists." Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p. 274.
After stating opinions concerning the overall sound quality, the article concluded: "We think the Bose system is so unusual that a prospective buyer must listen to it and judge it for himself. We would suggest delaying so big an investment until you were sure the system would please you after the novelty value had worn off." Id., at 275.

READ MORE


This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.

READ MORE


Moved to action by a widely felt need to sponsor independent sources of broadcast programming as an alternative to commercial broadcasting, Congress set out in 1967 to support and promote the development of noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations. A keystone of Congress' program was the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U. S. C. § 390 et seq., which established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit corporation authorized to disburse federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations in support of station operations and educational programming. Section 399 of that Act, as amended by the Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730, forbids any "noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation" to "engage in editorializing." 47 U. S. C. § 399. In this case, we are called upon to decide whether Congress, by imposing that restriction, has passed a "law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

READ MORE


472 U.S. 749 (1985) DUN & BRADSTREET, INC. v. GREENMOSS BUILDERS, INC.   No. 83-18. Supreme Court of United States.   Argued March 21, 1984 Reargued October 3, 1984 Decided June 26, 1985 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT*750 Gordon Lee Garrett, Jr., reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Hugh M. Dorsey, Jr., David J. Bailey, William B. B. Smith, Peter J. Monte, and A. Buffum Lovell. Thomas F. Heilmann reargued the cause and filed briefs for respondent.[*] *751 JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE […]

READ MORE


This case requires us once more to "struggl[e] . . . to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 325 (1974). In Gertz, the Court held that a private figure who brings a suit for defamation cannot recover without some showing that the media defendant was at fault in publishing the statements at issue. Id., at 347. Here, we hold that, at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public *769 concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false.

READ MORE


1

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 725-726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), we held that, in a libel suit brought by a public official, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that in publishing the defamatory statement the defendant acted with actual malice—"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." We held further that such actual malice must be shown with "convincing clarity." Id., at 285-286, 84 S.Ct., at 728-729. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). These New York Times requirements we have since extended to libel suits brought by public figures as well. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).

2

This case presents the question whether the clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement must be considered by a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case to which New York Times applies. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that that requirement need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. 241 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 746 F.2d 1563 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1134, 105 S.Ct. 2672, 86 L.Ed.2d 691 (1985), because that holding was in conflict with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals, which had held that the New York Times requirement of clear and convincing evidence must be considered on a motion for summary judgment.1 We now reverse.

3

* Respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., is a not-for-profit corporation and self-described "citizens' lobby." Respondent Willis Carto is its founder and treasurer. In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles: "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler." These articles were introduced by a third, shorter article entitled "America's Neo-Nazi Underground: Did Mein Kampf Spawn Yockey's Imperium, a Book Revived by Carto's Liberty Lobby?" These articles portrayed respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist.

4

Respondents filed this diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that some 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the 3 articles were false and derogatory. Named as defendants in the action were petitioner Jack Anderson, the publisher of The Investigator, petitioner Bill Adkins, president and chief executive officer of the Investigator Publishing Co., and petitioner Investigator Publishing Co. itself.

5

Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In their motion, petitioners asserted that because respondents are public figures they were required to prove their case under the standards set forth in New York Times. Petitioners also asserted that summary judgment was proper because actual malice was absent as a matter of law. In support of this latter assertion, petitioners submitted the affidavit of Charles Bermant, an employee of petitioners and the author of the two longer articles.2 In this affidavit, Bermant stated that he had spent a substantial amount of time researching and writing the articles and that his facts were obtained from a wide variety of sources. He also stated that he had at all times believed and still believed that the facts contained in the articles were truthful and accurate. Attached to this affidavit was an appendix in which Bermant detailed the sources for each of the statements alleged by respondents to be libelous.

6

Respondents opposed the motion for summary judgment, asserting that there were numerous inaccuracies in the articles and claiming that an issue of actual malice was presented by virtue of the fact that in preparing the articles Bermant had relied on several sources that respondents asserted were patently unreliable. Generally, respondents charged that petitioners had failed adequately to verify their information before publishing. Respondents also presented evidence that William McGaw, an editor of The Investigator, had told petitioner Adkins before publication that the articles were "terrible" and "ridiculous."

7

In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court first held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures and that New York Times therefore applied.3 The District Court then held that Bermant's thorough investigation and research and his reliance on numerous sources precluded a finding of actual malice. Thus, the District Court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of petitioners.

8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to 21 and reversed as to 9 of the allegedly defamatory statements. Although it noted that respondents did not challenge the District Court's ruling that they were limited-purpose public figures and that they were thus required to prove their case under New York Times, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that for the purposes of summary judgment the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, was irrelevant: To defeat summary judgment respondents did not have to show that a jury could find actual malice with "convincing clarity." The court based this conclusion on a perception that to impose the greater evidentiary burden at summary judgment "would change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem) of the weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts as well." 241 U.S.App.D.C., at 253, 746 F.2d, at 1570. The court then held, with respect to nine of the statements, that summary judgment had been improperly granted because "a jury could reasonably conclude that the . . . allegations were defamatory, false, and made with actual malice." Id., at 260, 746 F.2d at 1577.

IIA.

READ MORE


We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioner has a First Amendment right of access to the transcript of a preliminary hearing growing out of a criminal prosecution.

READ MORE


Respondent, a nationally known minister and commentator on politics and public affairs, filed a diversity action in Federal District Court against petitioners, a nationally circulated magazine and its publisher, to recover damages for, inter alia, libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the publication of an advertisement "parody" which, among other things, portrayed respondent as having engaged in a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The jury found against respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the parody could not "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts . . . or events," but ruled in his favor on the emotional distress claim, stating that he should be awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioners' contention that the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, must be met before respondent can recover for emotional distress. Rejecting as irrelevant the contention that, because the jury found that the parody did not describe actual facts, the ad was an opinion protected by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the court ruled that the issue was whether the ad's publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.

READ MORE


[††]We have before us two decisions of the Indiana courts, involving the application of that State's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) and Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity (CRRA) Acts to cases involving bookstores containing allegedly obscene materials.

READ MORE


Florida Stat. § 794.03 (1987) makes it unlawful to "print, publish, or broadcast . . . in any instrument of mass communication" the name of the victim of a sexual offense.[1] Pursuant to this statute, appellant The Florida Star was found civilly liable for publishing the name of a rape victim which it had obtained from a publicly released police report. The issue presented here is whether this result comports with the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.

READ MORE


A public figure may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood without clear and convincing proof that the false "statement was made with `actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964). See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 162 (1967) (opinion of Warren, C. J.). In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485 (1984), we held that judges in such cases have a constitutional duty to "exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity." Id., at 514. In this case the Court of Appeals affirmed a libel judgment against a newspaper without attempting to make an independent evaluation of the credibility of conflicting oral testimony concerning the subsidiary facts underlying the jury's finding of actual malice. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals' analysis was consistent with our holding in Bose. 488 U. S. 907 (1988).

READ MORE


The issue before us is the constitutionality of § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U. S. C. § 223(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V). The statute, as amended in 1988, imposes an outright ban on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. The District Court upheld the prohibition against obscene interstate telephone communications for commercial purposes, but enjoined the enforcement of the statute insofar as it applied to indecent messages. We affirm the District Court in both respects.

READ MORE


In this case we are asked to decide whether a university enjoys a special privilege, grounded in either the common law or the First Amendment, against disclosure of peer review materials that are relevant to charges of racial or sexual discrimination in tenure decisions.

READ MORE


A Florida statute, with certain limited exceptions, prohibits a grand jury witness from ever disclosing testimony which he gave before that body. We hold that insofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

READ MORE


While petitioner Milkovich was a high school wrestling coach, his team was involved in an altercation at a match with another high school's team. Both he and School Superintendent Scott testified at an investigatory hearing before the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA), which placed the team on probation. They testified again during a suit by several parents, in which a county court overturned OHSAA's ruling. The day after the court's decision, respondent Lorain Journal Company's newspaper published a column authored by respondent Diadiun, which implied that Milkovich lied under oath in the judicial proceeding. Milkovich commenced a defamation action against respondents in the county court, alleging that the column accused him of committing the crime of perjury, damaged him in his occupation of teacher and coach, and constituted libel per se.

READ MORE


Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act imposed a sales tax on dozens of services, including the provision of cable television. The Act, however, exempted from taxation receipts from newspaper and magazine sales. The cable television industry in Arkansas brought suit challenging the Act, arguing that Arkansas could not constitutionally tax cable television when it was not taxing the print media. The trial court rejected this argument. While the case was on appeal, Arkansas amended the Act to tax all television and radio services. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, stating that the First Amendment does not prohibit different taxation of different members of the media. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, also held that the First Amendment does prohibit differential taxation among member of the same medium and therefore found that the Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it, before the amendment, taxed cable television differently from satellite television services. Differential taxation of speakers and publishers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. A tax also is suspect if it targets a small group of speakers. Moreover, a tax triggers heightened scrutiny if it discriminates among speakers based on the content of their speech.Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

READ MORE


During 1982 and 1983 writer Janet Malcolm frequently interviewed Jeffrey Masson for an article she was writing about the Sigmund Freud Archives. Mr. Masson had worked as the Projects Director of the Archives until his disenchantment with psychoanalysis led to his termination. Six passages in the article contained quotations from Mr. Masson that Mr. Masson claimed he never made. Ms. Malcolm's 40 hours of taped interviews demonstrated that the quotations either were never made or had been altered in varying degrees. Mr. Masson sued for libel, but the trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the altered quotations either were substantially true or rational interpretations of statements that Mr. Masson had made. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on similar grounds, holding that Mr. Masson could not prove that Ms. Malcolm had published the altered quotations knowing that their meaning was false. Under the First Amendment, a public figure cannot prevail in a libel action unless he or she proves that the author knew that the alleged defamatory statement was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the statement's truth. The public figure also must prove that the statement injures his reputation and is not at least substantially true. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

READ MORE


508 U.S. 147 (1993) EL VOCERO de PUERTO RICO et al. v. PUERTO RICO et al.     No. 92-949. United States Supreme Court.    Decided May 17, 1993. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO*148 Per Curiam.Under the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure, an accused felon is entitled to a hearing to determine if he shall be held for trial. P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 34, App. II, Rule 23 (1991). A neutral magistrate presides over the hearing, People v. Opio Opio, 104 P. R. R. (4 Official Translations 231, 239) (1975), […]

READ MORE


Congress in 1992 passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, which required, among other things, that cable television systems carry local broadcast stations. Several cable operators filed suit, claiming that the legislation violated the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The district court held that the "must-carry" provisions of the Act were constitutional. The extent to which the government can regulate speech often depends upon whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. Content based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, while content-neutral regulations need only reasonably advance a substantial state interest. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).

READ MORE


Section 10 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. _ 532, regulates indecent programming on local access cable television channels. Indecent speech is speech that, while not obscene, describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in an offensive manner. Local access channels are those channels set aside by the cable operator for use by persons not affiliated with the operator. The operator is prohibited from exercising any editorial control over these channels. Local access channels usually either are leased or are the "public, educational, or governmental" channels that a local government requires the operator to set aside as partial consideration for the operator's right to install cables under city streets and to otherwise use public right of ways. Section 10(a) of the Act permits cable operators to refuse to carry indecent speech on leased local access channels. Section 10(b) of the Act directs the Federal Communications Commission to adopt rules requiring operators who choose to carry indecent programming on local access channels to place the programs on a separate channel and to block the channel until the subscriber, in writing, requests unblocking. Section 10(c) permits cable operators to refuse to carry indecent speech on public, educational, or governmental channels. A combination of groups that produce and watch local access programming challenged the Act and the FCC regulations implementing it on First Amendment grounds. The groups argued that the Act and regulations unconstitutionally censored indecent speech. A panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed with this argument and struck down the Act. On rehearing, however, the full court reversed and held that the Act was constitutional because it did not require censorship of indecent speech and because the blocking provisions were the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest in shielding children from indecent programming. When, as in this case, a governmental restriction of speech is based upon the content of that speech, the restriction can be upheld only if it constitutes the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). In the broadcasting context, the least restrictive means analysis often involves determining whether the broadcasts are available to children, whether the type of broadcasting is pervasively present in society, whether the indecent material can "confront" the audience with little or no warning, and whether adults have other means to receive similar speech. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

READ MORE


Congress in 1992 passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, which required, among other things, that cable television systems carry local broadcast stations. Several cable operators filed suit, claiming that the legislation violated the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. In 1993, the district court held that the "must-carry" provisions of the Act were constitutional. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court, in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Comm., 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), held that the "must-carry" provisions constituted a content-neutral regulation and could be constitutional. The Court then ordered the district court to determine whether the government could demonstrate that the provisions reasonably advanced an important governmental interest. On remand, a divided district court held that Congress had before it "substantial evidence" from which to conclude that the must-carry provisions were necessary to protect the local broadcast industry. When examining content-neutral regulations, courts apply an "intermediate" level of scrutiny. Under this analysis, legislation that affects speech but that does not favor the message of one speaker over another can be constitutional if the legislation (1) furthers an important governmental interest and (2) does not burden more speech than necessary to advance that interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

READ MORE


The Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 223, prohibits the transmission of indecent and patently offensive materials to minors over the Internet. A number of civil rights and computer groups challenged the constitutionality of these provisions on First Amendment grounds. In essence, these groups argued that the inability of Internet users and providers to verify the age of information recipients effectively prevented them from engaging in indecent speech, which traditionally has received significant First Amendment protection. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing that included many online demonstrations, a special three-judge district court (which was created by the CDA to hear the expected constitutional challenges) agreed with the groups and ruled that the provisions violated the First Amendment. Indecent speech, unlike obscenity, is entitled to constitutional protection because it often has substantial social value and lacks prurient interest. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). This speech therefore cannot be regulated unless the restrictions are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). The Court already has held that the government has a compelling interest in protecting minors from indecent speech. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court also has held that the government may prohibit dissemination of indecent materials to minors as long it does not at the same time prohibit dissemination to adults. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

READ MORE


Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires cable television operators to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block the video and audio portion" of channels that provide primarily "sexually explicit adult programming." The act provides that cable operators can comply with _ 505 by showing the "indecent" or "sexually explicit adult programming" only during so-called safe-harbor hours, 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., when children are not likely to view the programming. In 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware seeking to prohibit the enforcement of Section 505. After the three-judge panel denied Playboy's motion for a preliminary injunction, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1997 refused to review the denial of the preliminary injunction. On Dec. 28, 1998, the district court ruled that _ 505 violated the First Amendment. The court ruled the law was content-based because it restricted only sexually explicit adult programming. The government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Indecent speech, unlike obscene speech, is entitled to First Amendment protection. Government officials cannot suppress the free-speech rights of adults in order to protect minors from objectionable material unless the law is very narrowly drafted. Content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and the government bears the burden of showing that the law advances a compelling state interest in the least restrictive way.

READ MORE


In 1996, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) to deal with computer technology used to produce images looking like real children. The law included in its definition of child pornography sexually explicit material that (1) depicts persons who "appear to be minors;" and (2) is advertised as conveying the impression that the person depicted is a minor. On January 27, 1997, the Free Speech Coalition, an adult trade association, and others filed a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the CPPA. The complaint alleged that the "appears to be a minor" and "conveys the impression" clauses of the CPPA violate the First Amendment and are unconstitutionally vague. Later that year, a federal district court issued an order upholding the constitutionality of the CPPA and granting summary judgment to the government. The district judge ruled that the CPPA is a content-neutral law aimed at the harmful secondary effects associated with virtual child pornography. In December 1999, a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit ruled 2-1 in favor of Free Speech Coalition. The panel majority determined that the two challenged provisions violate the First Amendment, writing: "censorship through the enactment of criminal laws intended to control an evil idea cannot satisfy the constitutional requirements of the First Amendment."

READ MORE


539 U.S. 194 (2003) UNITED STATES et al. v. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.         No. 02-361. Supreme Court of United States.    Argued March 5, 2003. Decided June 23, 2003. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA*195 *196 *197 REHNQUIST, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which O’CONNOR, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., post, p. 214, and BREYER, J., post, p. 215, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 220. SOUTER, J., filed […]

READ MORE


Johnnie Cochran brought a state-law defamation action against petitioner Ulysses Tory. The state trial court determined that Tory (with the help of petitioner Ruth Craft and others) had engaged in unlawful defamatory activity. It found, for example, that Tory, while claiming falsely that Cochran owed him money, had complained to the local bar association, had written Cochran threatening letters demanding $10 million, had picketed Cochran's office holding up signs containing various insults and obscenities; and, with a group of associates, had pursued Cochran while chanting similar threats and insults. App. 38, 40-41. The court concluded that Tory's claim that Cochran owed him money was without foundation, that Tory engaged in a continuous pattern of libelous and slanderous activity, and that Tory had *736 used false and defamatory speech to "coerce" Cochran into paying "amounts of money to which Tory was not entitled" as a "tribute" or a "premium" for "desisting" from this libelous and slanderous activity. Id., at 39, 42-43.

READ MORE


Section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of Title 18, United States Code, criminalizes, in certain specified circumstances, the pandering or solicitation of child pornography. This case presents the question whether that statute is overbroad under the First Amendment or impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

READ MORE


February 15, 2017

Collectively, this bundle of rights, largely developed by U.S. Supreme Court decisions, defines the “freedom of the press” guaranteed by the First Amendment. What we mean by the freedom of the press is, in fact, an evolving concept. It is a concept that is informed by the perceptions of those who crafted the press clause in an era of pamphlets, political tracts and periodical newspapers, and by the views of Supreme Court justices who have interpreted that clause over the past two centuries in a world of daily newspapers, books, magazines, motion pictures, radio and television broadcasts, and internet content.

READ MORE

Defamation refers to false statements of fact that harm another’s reputation. It encompasses both libel and slander. Libel generally refers to written defamation, while slander refers to oral defamation.

READ MORE

May 5, 1992

READ MORE

June 15, 1917

READ MORE

March 3, 1911

READ MORE

December 15, 1791

READ MORE

January 1, 1788

READ MORE

September 17, 1787

READ MORE

June 12, 1776

READ MORE

Help FIRE protect the speech rights of students and faculty.

Support FIRE

Help FIRE protect the speech rights of students and faculty.

Support FIRE
css.php