FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al. v. NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE et al.

During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign and consistent with federal law, Ted Cruz loaned $260,000 to his campaign committee, Ted Cruz for Senate.

The Supreme Court vacated an appellate court judgment and asked it to reconsider whether Alaska’s political contribution limits were consistent with First Amendment precedents.

Do state laws that prohibit judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds for their campaigns violate the First Amendment?

The Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court's decision that the broad free speech protections given to corporations in Citizens United v. FEC do not apply to Montana's campaign finance laws.

Petitioners were members of a Secret Service detail protecting Vice President Dick Cheney while he greeted members of the public at a shopping mall.

The Supreme Court found that Arizona's Clean Elections Act placed a burden on groups making protected independent expenditures by forcing them to choose between speech and campaign funds.

Whether BCRAs so-called "Millionaires Amendment," which relaxes campaign finance limits for opponents of congressional candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own money, violates either the First or Fifth Amendments.

Whether the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Acts ban on election season campaign ads by corporations violates the First Amendment.

Whether Vermont's mandatory limits on candidate expenditures violate the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo? Whether Vermont's treatment of independent expenditures by political parties and committees presumptively coordinated if they benefit fewer than six candidates, and thereby subject to strict contribution and expenditure limits, is consistent with the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC? Whether Vermont's contribution limits, which are the lowest in the country, which allow only a single maximum contribution over a two-year election cycle, and which prohibit state political parties from contributing more than $400 to their gubernatorial candidate, fall below an acceptable constitutional threshold and should be struck down?

Whether the three-judge district court correctly dismissed appellant's as-applied constitutional challenge to the federal prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications."

Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "soft money" provision (section 101) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81, because it constitutes an invalid exercise of Congress' power to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution; violates the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment; or is unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "electioneering communications" provisions (sections 201, 203, 204, and 311), of BCRA, because they violate the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, or are unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, portions of the "advance notice" provisions, the "coordination" provisions, and the "attack ad" provision of BCRA (section 305), because they violates the First Amendment.

Whether certain advocacy groups can contribute to candidates campaigns. Currently, only individuals, political action committees, political parties and other campaign committees can give to candidates. More specifically, the issue is whether North Carolina Right to Life and other nonprofit advocacy corporations groups that raise money not through business ventures but through donations from supporters can make campaign contributions. Such groups have neither business interests nor shareholders.

Whether the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violates a political party's First Amendment rights by limiting the amount of money a party may spend in coordination with its congressional candidates.

Whether the Buckley v. Valeodecision authorizes state limits on campaign-contributions to state political candidates. Whether the limits approved in Buckleydefine the scope of permissible state limitations.

Whether several conditions placed by the state of Colorado on the ballot-initiative process infringe on political free-speech rights, including:
(1) a requirement that initiative-petition circulators be registered voters; (2) a requirement that circulators wear an identification badge; and (3) a requirement that proponents of the initiative disclose certain information, such as names and addresses of paid circulators and amount paid to each circulator.

Whether a public television station sponsoring a candidates debate may exclude a legally qualified candidate who the station does not believe can win the election.

Whether a political party's associational rights under the First Amendment require a state to permit multiple-party candidacies on the state's election ballot.

Whether campaign spending limits constitutionally can be applied against a state committee of a political party whose spending was not coordinated with a candidate.

Whether the government may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person issuing it.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit write-in voting.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place.

Whether a state, through its election laws, may constitutionally (1) prohibit a political party in one district from using the same name that a different political party uses in another district; (2) require more signatures to get on the ballot in a multidistrict political subdivision than are required to get on a state-wide ballot; and (3) require a political party seeking to be on ballots in both suburban Cook County and in Chicago to obtain 25,000 signatures from both areas.

Did the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Whether a Kentucky statute prohibiting electoral candidates from offering materials benefits to voters in consideration for their votes violated the candidates free speech rights under the First Amendment.

Whether a $250 limit on contributions to committees in support of or opposition to ballot initiatives in California violated First Amendment guarantees of association and free speech.

Whether a provision of the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act prohibiting individual contributions of over $5000 to multicandidate political committees violated First Amendment guarantees of speech and associational freedoms.

Whether a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals violates the First Amendment.

Do the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on electoral expenditures violate the 1st Amendment?